





VOL. 148 DECEMBER 1999 No. 2
ARTICLES
FORUM SHOPPING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
LAURENCE R. HELFERt
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 288
I. TWO TYPOLOGIES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PETITION SYSTEM .... 296
A. An Overiew of Human Rights Monitoring ............................. 296
t Associate Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. J.D. New York Uni-
versity School of Law, 1992; M.P.A. Woodrow Wilson School of Public and Interna-
tional Affairs, Princeton University, 1992; B.A. Yale University, 1987. Thanks to David
Boyd, Catherine Fisk, Gregory Fox, Lawrence Solum, Georgene Vairo, and Jessica
Vapnek for their many comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, and to Dina Cho-
doroff for her excellent research assistance. Work on this Article was supported by a
summer research fellowship from Loyola Law School.
(285)
286 UNIVERS1TY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:285
B. Typology of Similarities and Differences Among Human
Rights Treaties ................................................................. 301
C. A Typology of Forum Shopping ............................................ 304
1. Choice of Tribunal Forum Shopping ........................... 304
2. Simultaneous Petition Forum Shopping ...................... 305
3. Successive Petition Forum Shopping ............................ 306
II. FORUM SHOPPING PRACTICE ..................................................... 308
A. UsingDifferences Among Human Rights Treaties as a
Basis for Avoiding a Forum Shopping Bar ............................... 309
1. The UNHRC's Interpretation of "The Same Matter" .. 310
a. The Early Restrictive Approach to Successive
Petition Forum Shopping ............................................. 310
b. Recent Confusion Over Successive Petition
Forum Shopping ......................................................... 313
2. The European Commission's Interpretation
of "Substantially the Same Matter" ..................... 319
3. The Inter-American Commission's Interpretation
of "Substantially the Same Matter". .............................. 322
4. The African Commission's Interpretation of
"Cases Which Have Been Settled". ............................... 324
B. Diverging and ConflictingApproaches toHuman Rights Norms.. 325
1. Higher Regional Standards: The Death Row
Phenom enon .................................................................. 326
2. Higher Global Standards: Discrimination
Between Conscientious Objectors ................................. 331
3. Avoiding Conflicting Standards: Racist Speech ........... 335
III. FORUM SHOPPING THEORY ...................................................... 341
A. The Parties'Interests and Incentives ........................................ 341
B. Institutional and Normative Concerns ..................................... 342
1. Threatening the Authority of Tribunals ....................... 343
2. Preserving the Primacy of Regional Human
Rights Regim es ............................................................... 344
3. Avoiding Diverging and Conflicting Decisions ............. 345
C. Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom: Identifing the Interests
of Individual Petitioners Favoring Forum Shopping ................ 346
D. Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom: Identifing Normative
and Institutional Factors FavoringForum Shopping ................ 349
FORUM SHOPPING
1. From Vertical Hierarchy to Horizontal Dialogue
Conceptions of Human Rights Litigation ..................... 349
2. FromRegional Protectionism toRobust Regionalism .. 353
a. TheEuropean Convention ........................................... 353
b. The Inter-American Convention ................................... 354
c. The African Charter .................................................... 355
3. From Resisting to Embracing Differing Human
Rights Standards ............................................................. 355
a. Diverging Standards .................................................... 355
b. Conflicting Standards ................................................. 358
E. Refocusing on Institutional lnterests: Burdens of
Expanding Responsibilities, Crowded Dockets, Delays,
and Inadequate Resources ....................................................... 360
IV. FORUM SHOPPING REFORM ...................................................... 363
A. A Proposalfor Forum Shopping Reform .................................... 364
1. Simultaneous Petition Forum Shopping ...................... 365
a. Identical FactualAllegations and Legal Claims ............ 365
b. Distinct Legal Claims and Factual Allegations .............. 366
i. Distinct Legal Claims Arising Out of
Related Factual Allegations ................................ 366
ii. Distinct Factual Allegations ............................... 367
iii. Claims Reviewable in Only One Forum ........... 368
c. Applying an Events and Facts Approach to
Simultaneous Petitions ................................................. 369
2. Successive Petition Forum Shopping ............................ 371
a. Legal Claims and FactualAllegations That Could
Not Have Been Raised in the First Proceeding ............... 373
i. Legal Claims ........................................................ 373
a. Exclusive Treaty Rights ................................ 374
b. Differently Defined or Interpreted
Treaty Rights .......................................... 375
ii. Factual Allegations ............................................. 377
iii. Prudential Concerns ......................................... 378
b. Claims That Could Have Been Raised in the First
Proceeding, But Were Not ............................................ 380
c. Claims That Were Raised and Rejected in the
First Proceeding ........................................................... 382
B. ImplementingForum Shopping Reform ..................................... 385
1999]
288 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:285
1. Amending the Treaties to IncreaseJurists' Discretion .. 385
2. Justifying Forum Shopping Discretion: Death Row
Petitions andTreaty Denunciations in the Caribbean .. 389
3. The Prospects for Amending the Treaties .................... 391
4. Implementing Forum Shopping Reform in the
Absence of Amendment ................................................ 392
C. Reforming the U.N. HumanRightsSystem: A CautionayNote.... 395
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 399
INTRODUCTION
Individuals have now acquired the power to shape international
human rights law. No longer found merely in aspirational or am-
biguous treaties with limited practical impact on the lives of the peo-
ple it was meant to protect, the law of human rights is being refined
not only by diplomats or governments but by jurists-neutral arbiters
of decidedly legal disputes initiated by individuals. Human rights
courts, quasi-judicial tribunals, and treaty bodies (the "tribunals")' -
including the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights;
the European, Inter-American and African Commissions of Human
Rights; and United Nations treaty bodies such as the Human Rights
Committee, Committee Against Torture, and Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination-now regularly adjudicate peti-
tions filed by victims of human rights abuses against national govern-
ments that have agreed to subject themselves to scrutiny by the tribu-
nals.
This trend toward individualized adjudication of human rights law
The language needed to describe these juridical entities collectively is cumber-
some. Two of these entities, the European and Inter-American Courts of Human
Rights, are officially referred to as "courts" with the power to issue binding decisions
under international law. Other entities, such as the European and Inter-American
Human Rights Commissions, while not courts in the formal sense, are quasi-judicial
tribunals that adjudicate disputes between individuals and their governments. Finally,
the panels of human rights experts established to monitor States' compliance with
various U.N. human rights agreements are known as "treaty bodies," a deliberately am-
biguous title that reflects the judicial and nonjudicial functions they exercise. Al-
though the treaty bodies are not courts in the formal sense and do not issue legally
binding decisions, in practice they increasingly exercise quasi-judicial functions in re-
viewing petitions filed by individuals and issuing non-binding recommendations to
governments encouraging them to modify national practices. For a review of the lit-
erature, see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudicatior 107 YALE LJ. 273 (1997). For the sake of simplicity, I will
generally refer to these human rights courts, quasi-judicial tribunals, and treaty bodies
as "tribunals," and to their members as "jurists."
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started over forty years ago in Europe, and has spread more recently
to the Americas and to Africa, as well as to human rights treaties
within the United Nations ("U.N."). With the end of the Cold War's
geopolitical divisions, the possibility of achieving widespread, if not
universal, ratification of these treaties and their individual complaint
procedures is within sight. 2 Proposals are now being considered to
create new tribunals or complaint procedures for other human rights
treaties and to link new treaties to existing procedures.3 In short, at
the end of the twentieth century, many national governments have
created a vast and multi-faceted "international human rights petition
system" that grants to individuals a widening range of opportunities to
vindicate their rights internationally.
4
Individuals have seized upon these opportunities by filing an in-
creasing number of claims for relief before a panoply of global and
regional human rights tribunals. In response, the jurists on these tri-
bunals have developed a rich and nuanced case law that translates ab-
stract legal principles into concrete, fact-specific rulings. Through the
repeated adjudication of these individual complaints, a clearer picture
of the human rights practices of particular countries has emerged.5 A
2 See Philip Alston, Effective Function of Bodies Established Pursuant to United Nations
Human Rights Instruments: inal Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the
United Nations Human Rights Treaty System, U.N. ESCOR, 53d Sess., Agenda Item 15, 11
14-36, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/74 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Alston Report] (discussing
the recent increase in ratification of U.N. human rights treaties and efforts made to
achieve "universal ratification").
s United Nations treaty bodies that are authorized to hear claims against govern-
ments by individuals and groups include the Human Rights Committee, the Commit-
tee on the Elimination of Race Discrimination, and the Committee Against Torture.
See DOMINIC McGoLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 50-
51 (1991); MICHAEL O'LAHERTY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UN: PRACTICE BEFORE THE
TREATYBODIEs 104-09, 158-64 (1996). The Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women cannot receive petitions from individuals, although this possibility is
under active consideration within the United Nations. See infra notes 63, 65 (discuss-
ing proposals to create optional petition procedures to allow these two committees to
receive communications from individuals).
4 This is a striking change from the state-dominated dispute settlement system that
existed prior to World War II. See 1 M.E. TARDU, Historical Development of the Interna-
tional Petition System, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE INTERNATIONAL PETITION SYSTEM pt. IL
§§ 4-5 (1985) (describing the international petition systems that existed from the close
of the 18th century until World War II).
- See Rein A. Myullerson, Monitoring Compliance with International Human Rights
Standards: Experience of the UN Human Rights Committee, 1991-1992 CANADIAN HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 105, 107 ("[I]t is only through the consideration of individual communications
that complete conformity of national legislation and practice with the requirements of
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growing body of scholarship also suggests that granting individuals the
right to challenge States' actions internationally is a critical compo-
nent of a broader strategy for pressuring the different branches of na-
tional governments to adhere to human rights standards.6
The important role individuals play in shaping human rights law
has been examined before. What has not been studied, however, is
how the very same forces that are pushing States to expand the num-
ber of tribunals before which individuals can file complaints are also
those that have the potential to thwart both the further expansion of
the petition system and the development of a coherent human rights
jurisprudence. Specifically, individuals in a growing number of recent
and heretofore unexamined cases are capitalizing upon the existence
of multiple human rights tribunals by "forum shopping" for a favor-
able decision.
The definition of forum shopping that I use in this Article will be
somewhat novel to readers familiar with United States procedural law.
What I define as forum shopping is not limited to an individual peti-
tioner's strategic choice to litigate her claims in one of several avail-
able adjudicatory fora. It also encompasses other consequential
choices engendered by the concurrent, overlapping jurisdiction of
human rights treaties and tribunals, including attempts by petitioners
to litigate identical or related claims in multiple fora at the same time,
and attempts to engage in sequential litigation of claims. As explained
more fully below, I refer to these three distinct activities as "choice of
tribunal forum shopping," "simultaneous petition forum shopping,"
and "successive petition forum shopping."
These three types of forum shopping also occur in domestic legal
systems.7 For example, the modem judicial system in the United
States seeks to maximize litigants' choices among fora, and even toler-
ates simultaneous litigation in multiple fora prior to final judgment.
international law can be assessed.").
6 See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 338-45 (providing an overview of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee and its use of the petition procedure to supervise parties'
compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights); see also
MATTHEw C.R. CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON rrs DEVELOPMENT 32 (1995) ("Petition sys-
tems ... are generally considered the most effective means for the protection of hu-
man rights.").
Professor Robert Cover has identified these three activities as facets of the Ameri-
can judicial system's "complex concurrency" structure. He labels each activity, respec-
tively, as "strategic choice, synchronic redundancy, and diachronic or sequential re-
dundancy." Robert M. Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and
Innovation, 22 WM. & MARYL. REV. 639, 646 (1981).
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Unlike many civil law jurisdictions,8 however, it strongly discourages
claim splitting and relitigation of claims through the use of broad
joinder rules and expansive doctrines of resjudicata.9 Once a litigant
has been given a full and fair opportunity to raise claims relating to a
single transaction or occurrence, she is forever barred from relitigat-
ing those claims in another forum." In this way, the American judicial
system encourages efficient use of resources, promotes finality of liti-
gation, and limits the possibilities for inconsistent outcomes or relief
in the same case."
Litigation in the international human rights petition system is
fundamentally different and thus requires a radically different ap-
proach to forum shopping. Unlike the United States, where permis-
sive pleading and joinder rules encourage litigants to consolidate
their claims in a single forum, petitioners asserting human rights
claims are far more procedurally constrained. Nearly all human rights
tribunals are empowered only to adjudicate claims arising under the
treaty that created them. Claims arising under other treaties-whether
those claims relate to identical, similar, or different substantive
norms-must be litigated before other tribunals. 2 In this situation, the
incentives for petitioners to forum shop for a favorable ruling and the
arguments for permitting redundant litigation are considerable.
Notwithstanding the basic differences between domestic and in-
ternational adjudication, most commentators addressing the forum
8 See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudica-
tions: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1604, 1673 (1968) (as-
serting that U.S. law "accords broader conclusive effects to domestic judgments than
does any other legal system," whereas many civil law countries "are prepared to allow
the parties... to fragment a controversy that could be handled as a single matter").
9 SeeHoward M. Erichson, InterjurisdictionalPreclusion, 96 MIcH. L. REv. 945, 961-62
(1998) (discussing the means by which a jurisdiction can encouragejoinder of claims
and parties).
10 The only major exception to finality in the United States occurs in habeas cor-
pus cases. For a foundational discussion of the merits of redundant litigation in the
habeas context, see Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism.
Habeas Corpus and the Court 86 YALE LJ. 1035 (1977).
" See, eg., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) ("To preclude
parties from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
protects their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,
conserves judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the
possibility of inconsistent decisions."); see also Cover, supra note 7, at 646-48.
12 The procedural rules governing human rights petitions are thus similar to the
writ system that operated during the early centuries of English common law and re-
quired a complaining party to use a different writ to vindicate each legal wrong he or
she had suffered. SeeJ.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGuSH LEGAL HISTORY 49-59
(2d ed. 1979) (explaining the history and function of the writ system).
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shopping issue in international human rights literature have viewed
simultaneous or successive petition forum shopping as a danger to be
suppressed. Specifically, they have argued that allowing more than
one tribunal to examine the same individual's petition wastes scarce
resources, creates a risk of divergent or conflicting rulings, and
threatens to undermine the authority of international tribunals and
the jurists who serve on them.13 This Article questions that conven-
tional wisdom and offers in its place a re-envisioning of the human
rights petition system. It argues that forum shopping, if properly
regulated, can materially benefit international human rights law.
As I explain more fully below when discussing forum shopping
theory, both the interests of individual petitioners and the institu-
tional and normative perspective favor some relitigation of human
rights claims. In many instances, for example, successive review by two
or more tribunals is the only way that aggrieved individuals can re-
1'3 The few articles addressing this issue were published before the tribunals had
issued many decisions concerning forum shopping. See Thomas Buergenthal, Interna-
tional and Regional Human Rights Law and Institutions: Some Examples of Their Interaction,
12 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321 (1977) (providing an overview of the interaction between inter-
national and regional human rights organizations and law); Marc-Andre Eissen, The
European Convention on Human Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights: Problems of Coexistence 22 BUFF. L. REV. 181 (1972) (examining the diffictil-
ties with the coexistence of the Council of Europe and the United Nations and the in-
teraction between the concepts of universalism and European regionalism in the
human rights context); Theodor Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International
Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Norm Making] (presenting an overview of the problems and policies that are due to
the coexistence of various human rights instruments and systems of supervision); A.H.
Robertson, The United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Con-
vention on Human Rights, 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'LL. 21 (1968-69) (comparing the rights and
obligations that exist under the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
with those that exist under the European Convention on Human Rights, and discuss-
ing the problems with their coexistence); M.E. Tardu, The Protocol to the United Nations
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Inter-American System- A Study of Co-Existing
Petition Procedures, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 778 (1976) (examining the main legal questions
that arise from the coexistence of the system of international procedures for handling
individual petitions established by the Optional Protocol to the U.N. Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and two regional procedures established within the framework of
the Organization of American States).
More comprehensive discussions of the subject are found in THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1986) [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW-MAKING], and A.A. CANCADO TRiNDADE, Co-EXISTENCE AND CO-
ORDINATION OF MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
1987-11 Recueil des Cours, 202 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1988), but these sources also predate the explosion of human
rights litigation in the last decade. For a critical assessment of forum shopping schol-
arship, see infra Parts III.A, II.B.
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ceive a complete review of their claims under all applicable human
rights treaties. In addition, forum shopping encourages jurists to en-
gage in a dialogue to elucidate and harmonize the legal norms shared
by those treaties-a dialogue that, unlike the U.S. common law, has
not adequately developed through litigation of similar factual and le-
gal claims by different petitioners.14 Finally, by permitting redundant
review by multiple tribunals, forum shopping reduces the number of
instances in which human rights claims are erroneously denied byju-
rists.15
Relitigation of claims by multiple human rights tribunals is not
costless, however. To the contrary, it creates serious finality and effi-
ciency concerns that weigh against permitting relitigation.16 For these
reasons, I develop at the conclusion of this Article a detailed set of
control rules that balances the competing theoretical rationales for
and against forum shopping and applies those rationales to the het-
erogeneous range of petitions that individuals are likely to present to
the tribunals in the future.
1 7
Although the potential for human rights forum shopping has ex-
isted for years, four recent developments suggest that it has now be-
come a far more pressing concern.
First, since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, human
rights tribunals have become increasingly active. The dockets of re-
gional tribunals have been overflowing with new cases and the U.N.
human rights tribunals have been receiving an increasing number of
petitions from a wider array of nations. 8 With this activity has come a
14 In the United States, commentators have stressed that duplicative review of
criminal defendants' constitutional rights claims promotes a dialogue between federal
and state courts that reduces judicial error and leads to a more precise articulation of
the rights involved. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 10, at 1045-49 (describing how
the Warren Court's expansion of the writ of habeas corpus fostered a dialogue be-
tween state and federal courts). For a general discussion of how dialogue among su-
pranational tribunals in different disputes promotes effective adjudication of interna-
tional legal norms, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 323-26.
1 See infra Part IV.A.2.c (describing situations where a petitioner seeks to relitigate
claims that were rejected by the first tribunal); see also Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note
10, at 1045 ("[R]edundancy fosters greater certainty that constitutional rights will not
be erroneously denied.").
16 See infra Part ILI.E; cf. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 8, at 1603 (noting
that courts grant recognition to foreign judgments in part out of "a desire to avoid the
duplication of effort and consequent waste involved in reconsidering a matter that has
already been litigated").
17 See infra Part IV.A (proposing a model for forum shopping reform).
is For a discussion of the European tribunals and the United Nations Human
Rights Commission, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 296, 302, 347. See also
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rising number of cases in which individuals have attempted to forum
shop by filing petitions with more than one tribunal. In response, the
tribunals have issued several recent and conflicting decisions analyz-
ing the conditions under which forum shopping is permitted or pro-
hibited by a particular treaty. 9 These conflicts have created skewed
litigation incentives for litigants and States, and make it impossible to
predict with any degree of certainty the preclusive effect of one tribu-
nal's decision in subsequent litigation before another tribunal .
Second, together with the increase in forum shopping has come
an increasing divergence among the tribunals' case law analyzing the
substantive human rights norms. Although differing interpretations
might be expected where the texts of two treaties differ, the divergent
rulings have in fact occurred in cases involving rights that are defined
identically, or nearly so, in two or more treaties. These decisions have
generated fresh incentives for forum shopping by individuals seeking
out the tribunal with the most rights-protective case law in which to
litigate their claims. They have also created uncertainty for individu-
als and governments seeking to incorporate the tribunals' decisions
into national law.
Third, since the 1993 World Conference on Human Rights, the
United Nations has advanced several proposals to create new individ-
ual petition procedures for several existing and new human rights
treaties. In their present form, these proposals would increase the
number of venues in which individuals may litigate their claims. The
Manfred Nowak, UN-Human Rights Committee: Survey of Decisions Given Up TillJuly 1989,
11 HuM. RTs. L.J. 139, 152 (1990) ("The comparably high number of communications
against Western industrialized countries shows that lawyers are increasingly aware of
this individual communication procedure being available in addition or as an alterna-
tive to the one under the European Convention on Human Rights.").
'9 See cases discussed infra Part II.A (addressing cases showing recent confusion in
the United Nations Human Rights Committee regarding forum shopping, as well as
conflicting interpretations of forum shopping standards by the European Commission,
Inter-American Commission, and African Commission).
In U.S. domestic law, some commentators have shown that "preclusion law can
affect many of the most significant strategic decisions in litigation." Erichson, supra
note 9, at 947. To facilitate strategic decision making by the parties and to further the
policy determinations and value choices of the forum, these commentators have ar-
gued that the preclusive effect of a rendering court's judgment should be determined
by the law of the renderingjurisdiction, rather than the law of the recognizingjurisdic-
tion. See id. at 983-1008. The human rights tribunal decisions discussed in Part IIA all
apply the law of the recognizing jurisdiction to determine the preclusive effect of an
earlier tribunal decision, creating significant uncertainty for States and individuals.
Another way to enhance predictability and facilitate strategic decision making, of
course, would be to adopt a uniform preclusion rule for all tribunals. For the details of
such a proposal, see infra Part IV.A.
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proposals themselves also contain different approaches to forum
shopping that threaten to add further complexity and confusion to an
already convolutedjurisprudence.2
Finally, the U.N. Secretary General has recently commissioned
several studies of the U.N. human rights monitoring system and its re-
lationship to regional human rights systems. The studies advocate re-
forms to address the woefully inadequate resources allocated to hu-
man rights bodies to carry out their functions, including the review of
individual petitions. The proposed changes range from minor revi-
sions of procedural rules to a merger of all U.N. treaty bodies into one
or two tribunals that would moot many opportunities for forum shop-
ping. These reform proposals thus raise concerns that will affect any
revision of the current approach to forum shopping that States may
choose to implement.
Taken together, these four developments highlight the need for a
comprehensive reexamination of the phenomenon of human rights
forum shopping and its place in the human rights petition systems.
Part I of this Article begins with a brief overview of the petition sys-
tems. It then defines two different typologies. The first categorizes
the similarities and differences among global and regional human
rights treaties, and explains how these similarities and differences cre-
ate incentives for forum shopping by individual litigants. The second
typology categorizes three distinct types of forum shopping and the
divergent approaches that States have adopted in these treaties to
regulate each of them.
Part II examines recent case law concerning both typologies iden-
tified in Part I. It first examines how global and regional human
rights tribunals have responded to attempts by individual litigants to
forum shop for a favorable decision. The case law these attempts have
produced is conflicting and confusing, and contains limited guidance
for individuals and States. Part II then discusses three recent exam-
ples of diverging and conflicting human rights decisions in order to
illustrate that tribunals are beginning to treat each other's decisions as
persuasive precedents to be considered when fashioning responses to
common legal issues.
Part III turns from practice to theory, identifying the arguments
and policy rationales for and against forum shopping. These argu-
ments cluster into two distinct categories-arguments based on the
parties' interests and incentives, and arguments based on institutional
21 See infra Parts L.A, I.B.
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and normative concerns. Part III also critiques, on various grounds,
the received wisdom of commentators that human rights forum shop-
ping is problematic and should be discouraged.
Part IV sets forth a detailed proposal for reforming the practice of
forum shopping in both simultaneous and successive petition cases.
The proposal is guided by two primary objectives. The first objective
is to balance the interests of aggrieved individuals in maximizing their
opportunities for review against the interests of States parties and ju-
rists in finality and efficient use of resources. The second objective is
to encourage jurists to use forum shopping cases as opportunities to
engage in a dialogue with other tribunals to promote the develop-
ment of a more coherent human rights jurisprudence. After setting
forth this proposal, Part IV identifies two different ways in which it
might be implemented into practice, and then concludes with a cau-
tionary note about proposals to reform the U.N.'s human rights treaty
system.
I. TwO TYPOLOGIES OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS PETITION SYSTEM
The ability of individual litigants to forum shop for a favorable
human rights ruling results from the conjunction of two distinct his-
torical trends: (1) the creation of multiple treaty systems that protect
similar or related rights and freedoms, and (2) the establishment
within each system of an independent body of jurists or experts-a
court, or quasi-judicial tribunal or review body-to monitor States par-
ties' compliance with the treaty by considering petitions from ag-
grieved individuals. This section explains how each of these trends
evolved.
A. An Overview of Human Rights Monitoring
The corpus of international human rights law does not exist in a
single, comprehensive treaty, code or statute. Rather, the rights and
freedoms it enshrines are found in a complex web of overlapping
global, regional, and specialized agreements, many of which contain
identical, related, or even conflicting substantive standards. Each of
these agreements has its inspirational source in the foundational 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 Over the years, however,
2 For the text of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS:
A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1-17, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/1, U.N. Sales No. E.73.XIV.2 (1973).
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that source has been refracted and refined into numerous treaties ad-
dressing a wide variety of subject matters.23
The two most comprehensive agreements are the U.N.-based In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR7) 24 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
("ICESCR"),2 each of which protects a broad catalogue of rights and
freedoms. The ICCPR, and to a more limited extent, the ICESR, have
been mirrored in three regional treaties: the Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "European
Convention"),26 the American Convention on Human Rights (the
"American Convention") ,27 and the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights (the "African Charter").28 In addition, both within the
U.N. and regionally, there are numerous subject-specific treaties ad-
dressing specialized human rights issues. United Nations treaties in-
clude the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination ("Race Convention"), the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), 30 the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("Convention Against
Torture"), 3 the Convention on the Rights of the Child,32 and the In-
2 See HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 120 (1996) (explaining that the Universal Declaration has been widely used
as a "springboard" to international treaties). International human rights law is also
part of customary international law, as reflected in numerous U.N. and regional decla-
rations relating to human rights issues and in the practice of States themselves. For a
comprehensive list of these declarations, see International Human Rights Instruments,
(visited Sept. 20, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/ainstIsl.htm>.
2' Adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
AdoptedDec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976).
DoneNov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953).
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 144-63 (entered into forceJuly 18, 1978).
Organization of African Unity- Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights,
openedforsignatureJune 20, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [here-
inafter African Charter]. Other regional treaties protecting economic and social rights
include the European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (entered into
force Feb. 26, 1965) and Organization of American States: Additional Protocol to the
American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, doneNov. 14, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 156 [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador].
2 Opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 212-38 (entered into force
Jan. 4, 1969).
Adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981).
3' Adopted Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113-22 (entered into force June 26,
1987).
32 G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990).
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ternational Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families ("Migrant Workers' Conven-
tion") .s At the regional level, specialized treaties are often added as
protocols to the region's principal human rights agreement. Finally,
numerous treaties protecting labor rights and freedom of association
are overseen by the International Labor Organization ("ILO").35
Each of these treaties is superintended by a court, tribunal, or
treaty body that is authorized to monitor States parties' compliance
with the rights and freedoms protected by that treaty. 6 This monitor-
ing function is accomplished differently in each treaty system, but as a
general rule treaties provide for up to three distinct mechanisms: a
reporting procedure, a general comments procedure, and an individ-
ual petition procedure.s7
"GA. Res. 45/158, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 49A, at 262, U.N.
Doc. A/45/49 (1990) (not yet entered into force).
See, e.g., Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 28, at 156; Protocol to the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done Mar. 20,
1952, Europ. T.S. No. 9 (entered into force May 18, 1954). Not all specialized treaties
are adopted in this way. See European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, doneNov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No.
126 (entered into force Feb. 1, 1989) (establishing a committee for the prevention of
torture, and providing general procedural rules with regard to the committee).
See generally HECTOR BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL
LABOR ORGANIZATION: THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS SYSTEM AND BASIC HUMAN
RIGHTS (1996) (explaining the history of the adoption of international labor stan-
dards, and its relationship to fundamental human rights). For a comprehensive list of
the ILO treaties, see International Human Rights Instruments, supra note 23.
• 6 Until recently, the European Convention and the American Convention were
each supervised by both a court and a commission of human rights. For a discussion
of their respective functions in the two treaty systems, see SCOTT DAVIDSON, THE
INTER-AMERCrAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 99-154 (1997); P. VAN DijK & G.J.H. vAN
HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 97-
266 (3d ed. 1998). In 1998, the States parties to the European Convention merged the
European Court and the European Commission into a single, permanent European
Court of Human Rights. See Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restructuring the Control Machinery Es-
tablished Thereby, done May 11, 1994, Europ. T.S. No. 155 (entered into force Nov. 1,
1998) [hereinafter Protocol No. 11] (establishing a European Court of Human Rights
and adopting general procedural rules for its operation). The African Charter's
member States are considering a proposal to create a Court of Human and People's
Rights to complement the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights. Draft Additional Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights (visited Sept. 22, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/
draft_additLprotocol.html> [hereinafter Draft Additional ProtocolJ.
37 For a more detailed discussion of these three functions, see Helfer & Slaughter,
supra note 1, at 338-43. Other monitoring functions exercised by some tribunals in-
clude emergency procedures and investigations and review of inter-State petitions. See
O'FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 45, 103, 154 (describing procedures developed by various
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The practice of three U.N. treaty bodies-the United Nations
Human Rights Committee ("UNHRC"), the Committee Against Tor-
ture ("CAT"), and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination ("CERD")-illustrates these three functions. Under the
reporting process, each treaty body receives written reports from
States parties which explain the measures they have taken to protect
the rights recognized in the treaties. The members of each Commit-
tee review the reports in public sessions, question governmental rep-
resentatives about their contents, and then publish comments and
recommendations to States on how to improve the protection of hu-
man rights. The jurisdiction of each Committee is limited to review-
ing reports concerning the particular treaty under which it was cre-
ated. No Committee has authority to review reports relating to other
treaties, even if those treaties contain the same or similar rights and
freedoms.3s
In addition to reviewing States parties' reports, each of the three
Committees also drafts "general comments" addressed to the States
parties. Some of these comments concern procedural questions about
the reporting process, but most contain interpretations of the substan-
tive rights and freedoms contained in the treaty each Committee over-
sees. The general comments develop with greater specificity the treaty
bodies' understanding of these rights and freedoms. 9
Finally, each of the three treaty bodies receives written "commu-
nications" or "petitions" from individuals alleging that a State party
has violated one or more rights protected by the particular treaty they
monitor.0  These petition procedures are optional, however,4' and
Committees). The inter-State dispute procedure has rarely been utilized. See Scott
Leckie, The Inter-State Complaint Procedure in International Human Rights Law: Hopeful
Prospects or Wishful Thinking?, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 249, 255 (1988) (indicating that the
procedure, to date, has been used only 24 times).
See Philip Alston, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human
Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR World Conf. on Hum. Rts. Preparatory Comm., 4th Sess., Annex, Agenda
Item 5, 11 139-55, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.1l/Rev.1 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 Alston Report] (recommending to the General Assembly that treaty bodies elimi-
nate overlapping competencies, while moving toward a more concerted cross-
referencing system).
3' See, e.g., DomNc MCGOLDRrCM THE HUMAN RIGHTS ComMrrrEE 95 (1991)
("The general comments serve rapidly to develop the jurisprudence of the HRC under
the Covenant.").
40 Several other U.N. human rights treaties do not provide any mechanism for re-
view of individual petitions. These include the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
CEDAW, and the ICESCR. See O'FLAIMRTY, supra note 3, at 62-63, 122-23, 180-81.
Proposals to add optional complaints procedures for CEDAW and the ICESCR are now
being considered by the U.N. as noted in the discussion of draft admissibility clauses
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many States that have ratified the treaties do not recognize the juris-
diction of the Committees to receive individual petitions.42 For States
that have made this optional election, the Committees exercise a
quasi-judicial function when reviewing petitions. If the complainant
satisfies the numerous admissibility hurdles set forth in the treaties,43
the relevant Committee considers the merits of the complaint. The
jurists seek to resolve the dispute between the parties "in a judicial
spirit," and to develop a "specific problem-centered jurisprudence." 4
Unlike the decisions of some regional tribunals, the decisions of the
three Committees are not legally binding. However, many States view
them as highly persuasive and have implemented the recommenda-
discussed infra notes 63, 65.
4 This is not the case in regional human rights systems, whose treaties require
States parties to authorize regional courts and quasijudicial tribunals to receive peti-
tions from individuals. In Europe, 40 States have recognized the competence of the
ECHR to receive petitions from individuals alleging violation of the European Conven-
tion. See Council of Europe (visited Oct. 31, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/euro/eurocon.html> (listing ratification information relating to the Proto-
cols to the European Convention, including Protocol No. 11). In the Americas, the
Inter-American Commission can receive petitions from individuals concerning 25 Cen-
tral and South American nations. See Inter-American Human Rights Instruments (visited
Oct. 31, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/oaslist.htm> (listing ratifi-
cation information relating to Inter-American Human Rights instruments). In Africa,
49 nations have authorized the African Commission to hear individual petitions. See
African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (visited Sept. 21, 1999)
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/zlafchar.htm> (listing 49 States parties
that have ratified the African Charter).
42 As of October 1999, 95 of the 144 States parties to the ICCPR had ratified the
First Optional Protocol authorizing the UNHRC to receive petitions from individuals.
See Human Rights Committee (visited Oct 31, 1999) <http://wwwl.umn.edu/
humanrts/hrcommittee/hrc-page.html> [hereinafter Optional Protocol] (listing rati-
fication information for the ICCPR and the First Optional Protocol). As of the same
date, 28 of the 155 States parties to the Race Convention and 41 of the 118 States par-
ties to the Convention Against Torture had filed declarations recognizing the compe-
tence of CERD and CAT, respectively, to receive individual communications. See Con-
vention of Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (visited
Nov. 10, 1999) <http://ww.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo/
iv_boo/iv_9.html> (CAT); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination (visited Nov. 10, 1999) <http://www.un.org/DeptsTreaty/final/ts2/
newfiles/part boo/iv_boo/iv_2.html> (CERD).
's For a discussion of these admissibility hurdles, see TOM ZWART, THE
ADMsSIBITYOF HuMAN RIGHTS PETITONs 8-9 (1994), and O'FLAHERTY, supra note 3,
at 49-50.
44 Matthew Craven, Towards an Unofficial Petition Procedure: A Review on the Role of the
UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in SOCIAL RIGHTS AS HuMAN
RIGHTS: A EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 91, 94 (KrzysztofDrzewicki et al. eds., 1994). For a
detailed discussion of the UNHRC's jurisprudence, see MANFRED NOWAK, U.N.
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY (1993) (setting out
the UNHRC's case law interpreting the ICCPR and the First Optional Protocol).
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tions they contain.4
This brief overview illustrates what I will refer to as the disaggre-
gated or decentralized nature of the human rights petition system.
Unlike U.S. federal law, there is no supreme arbiter of international
human rights law as a whole. Rather, each court or tribunal operates
as the sole interpreter of the agreement that created it, with no formal
mechanisms available to interact with its counterparts in other treaty
46systems. It is this characteristic of the petition system, together with
the overlapping treaty rights discussed below, that creates the oppor-
tunities and incentives for individuals to forum shop for a favorable
human rights ruling.
B. A Typology of Similarities and Differences Among Human Rights Treaties
The complex nodes of overlap among the world's human rights
agreements can be illustrated by examining the similarities and differ-
ences between two specific treaties: the ICCPR and the European
Convention. The two treaties protect many of the same civil and po-
litical rights, sometimes in language that is identical or nearly so.4
These areas of concordance are far from absolute, however s Four
distinct types of differences exist: (1) rights protected exclusively by
either the ICCPR or the European Convention;49 (2) rights protected
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 344-45 (discussing studies by the UNHRC
documenting the extent of compliance with its non-binding decisions).
16 See Klaus T. Samson, Human Rights Co-ordination Within the UN System, in THE
UNITED NATioNs AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRrrCAL APPRAIsAL 620, 658 (Philip Alston
ed., 1992) ("Organic links between the different [petition] procedures are lacking
and... the diffuse nature of the arrangements and the distinct composition, methods,
and traditions of the organs concerned will make it difficult to secure a sufficient de-
gree of consistency in evaluations and views." (footnote omitted)).
47 For a comprehensive discussion of the overlapping rights and freedoms of the
European Convention and the ICCPR, see Report of the Committee of Experts on Human
Rights to the Committee of Ministers: Problems Arising from the Co-Existence of the United Na-
tions Covenants on Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights, Eur.
Council, Doc. No. H (70) 7 (1970) [hereinafter Co-Existence Report]. See also Rosalyn
Higgins, The United Nations: Still a Forcefor Peace, 52 MOD. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (recog-
nizing that treaties granting the same rights may have different interpretations).
4" See Eissen, supra note 13, at 207-08 ("[W]hile many... drafting differences are
probably of little consequence, others seem rather significant." (footnote omitted)).
49 The reference to the Convention here includes its substantive protocols, which
contain additional human rights guarantees not found in the main text of the Conven-
tion. In the years since the ICCPR was drafted, the number of rights protected by the
ICCPR alone has diminished, as the Council of Europe promulgated several additional
protocols to the European Convention containing additional civil and political liber-
ties.
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by both treaties, but for which one treaty provides more extensive pro-
tection to individuals;0 (3) rights protected by both agreements using
the same language, but which are interpreted differently by the tribu-
nals; and (4) rights that conflict, such that it would be impossible for a
State party to protect both of them at the same time.51
This typology defines the relationship between any two human
rights agreements. For example, a comparison of the American Con-
vention and the ICCPR reveals many identical rights and freedoms.
In contrast, a comparison of CEDAW with either the ICCPR or the
ICESCR reveals many shared rights with different definitions or inter-
pretations, and, on occasion, conflicting rights. Finally, some treaties,
such as the Race Convention and the Convention Against Torture,
have no common rights. In every instance, however, it is possible to
classify the nature of two human rights treaties' intersections into
these four distinct categories.
52
The existence of overlapping substantive standards among human
rights treaties, together with the multiple tribunals overseeing the
treaties, create powerful incentives for individuals to forum shop. To
see this concretely, consider the hypothetical example of a Norwegian
national of South Asian descent who is convicted of murder in a Nor-
wegian court. She alleges that police officials tortured her during an
interrogation, that the selection ofjurors at her trial was tainted by ra-
cial bias, and that her right to a fair trial was violated in other ways.
The Norwegian national could file a petition against Norway raising
all or part of these allegations before no fewer than four different tri-
bunals: the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR"), the
so The first two differences are discussed in the Co-Existence Report, supra note 47,
at 4-6 (listing articles in the ICCPR that differ from those in the European Conven-
tion). See also Eissen, supra note 13, at 206-09 (comparing the normative clauses of the
ICCPR with those of the European Convention and Protocols); Robertson, supra note
13, at 27-41 (discussing rights protected by one treaty or the other, or more extensively
in one treaty than the other).
"' For a discussion of the difference between diverging and conflicting approaches
to human rights norms, see infra Part II.B. Such a conflict might arise, for example, if
the ICCPR's right to life protected unborn fetuses while the European Convention's
privacy right protected a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy. Cf. HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw-MAXING, supra note 13, at 139 (discussing similar tensions within the In-
ter-American human rights system). In fact, no conflict has yet emerged because no
tribunal has construed the treaties in this manner. See id. at 138 (stating that the
Commission was able to interpret the American Declaration and the American Con-
vention "so as to avoid conflicts between the two").
52 For a different typology of "normative differences" among treaties, see HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW-MAKING, supra note 13, at 150.
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UNHRC, CAT, and CERD .
Numerous strategic factors could affect this individual's decision
about where and how to litigate her claims internationally. Consider
first the substantive human rights violations this petitioner might al-
lege. The broad scope of rights contained in the European Conven-
tion and the ICCPR would favor filing a petition with either the ECHR
or the UNHRC. However, the more precisely defined obligations in
the Race Convention and the Convention Against Torture, as well as
the expertise of CAT and CERD jurists, might suggest proceeding be-
fore those committees if the torture or race discrimination facets of
her claim were particularly strong.!
The petitioner would also need to consider remedial and proce-
dural issues. Among the four tribunals, only the ECHR is empowered
to issue rulings that are legally binding, as opposed to mere recom-
mendations for remedial action.ss It is also by far the most well-
established tribunal, having gained the respect of governments and
achieved a track record of compliance mirroring that of domestid
courts.s But the ECHR also imposes stringent procedural hurdles
that result in the dismissal of the overwhelming majority of cases prior
5s An analogous choice confronts individuals in Uruguay, except that they may pe-
tition the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights rather than the European
Commission. I have chosen Norway and Uruguay as examples because both States
permit individuals to submit petitions to all of the tribunals listed in the text. See
O'FLAHERY, supra note 3, at 48, 105, 158. This is a rather unique situation. Most
other nations within the Americas and Europe permit individuals to file petitions with
a regional tribunal and only one U.N.-based treaty body, usually the UNHRC. See it.
(identifying States that have accepted optional petition procedures to U.N. human
rights treaties).
" For example, the definitions of "racial discrimination" in the Race Convention
and "torture" in the Convention Against Torture are significantly more sweeping than
those found in the European Convention. Compare Race Convention, supra note 29,
art. 1(1), at 216 (defining "racial discrimination"), and Convention Against Torture,
supra note 31, art. 1(1), at 113 (defining the scope of protection against torture), with
European Convention, supra note 26, art. 3, at 3, art. 14, at 6 (defining the scope of
protection against "torture" and "racial discrimination"). See generally Andrew Byrnes,
The Committee Against Torture, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 509, 513
(Philip Alston ed., 1992) (stressing that "there is no one, standard definition of torture
or other ill-treatment that applies in every context," and that as a result, "a State may
have different obligations under" different treaties).
5' See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 304-05, 351 (noting that the ECHR issues
rulings binding on States parties as a matter of international law and distinguishing
non-binding recommendations of the UNHRC).
John H. Barton & Barry E. Carter, The Uneven, but Growing, Role of International
Law, in RETHINKING AMERICA'S SECURITY: BEYOND COLD WAR TO NEW WORLD ORDER
279, 287 (Graham Allison & Gregory F. Treverton eds., 1992) (noting that ECHR
judgments are "as effective as those of any domestic court").
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to a hearing on the merits. The other tribunals, by contrast, are more
nascent adjudicatory institutions but are more likely to consider the
petitioner's claim on its merits.
7
Given these diverse strategic considerations, there are strong in-
centives for the aggrieved Norwegian national to file petitions with
two or more tribunals either simultaneously, or in succession if the
first tribunal rejects her allegations. Indeed, in the absence of such
forum shopping, no single tribunal would have the authority to ad-
dress the full scope of her legal claims.s
C. A Typology of Forum Shopping
The foregoing hypothetical example is, admittedly, an extreme
one. It illustrates, in the starkest way possible, the incentives to forum
shop created by overlapping human rights treaties with multiple peti-
tion procedures. In fact, most aggrieved individuals can present their
claims to at most two tribunals, either because of their petitions' lim-
ited subject matter or because the State against which they are com-
plaining does not accept more than two such procedures.
Government officials and legal experts drafting human rights trea-
ties have recognized that individuals may seek to forum shop even in
this more limited way. Rather than implementing a uniform rule to
regulate forum shopping, the treaty drafters adopted three different
approaches to the practice, creating a confusing environment for both
petitioners and defending States.
1. Choice of Tribunal Forum Shopping
States parties might have simply prohibited all forum shopping
entirely by requiring any dispute falling within the jurisdiction of two
or more tribunals to be litigated in a particular forum. 9 No interna-
57 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 313 n.162, 352 n.367 (citing relevant
authorities).
58 For example, neither CAT nor CERD could address the petitioners' fair trial
claims. Conversely, the ECHR and the UNHRC might not be able to address the full
scope of her race discrimination and torture allegations given the narrower definition
of those rights in the European Convention and the ICCPR.
59 The Council of Europe has adopted this approach for adjudication of human
rights disputes between States. A 1970 resolution by the Council's Committee of Minis-
ters provides that States parties to both the European Convention and the ICCPR
normally will litigate claims relating to rights and freedoms protected by both treaties
only before the ECHR and the European Commission on Human Rights (European
Commission), rather than the UNHRC. See Resolution of the Comm. of Ministers, Res.
(70)17 (May 15, 1970), reprinted in COUNcIL OF EUROPE, COLLECTION OF
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tional human rights treaties impose such a rule, however, and no State
has appended a reservation to a treaty to compel this result. To the
contrary, individuals enjoy complete freedom to choose the tribunal
before which they will litigate their claims, a freedom which both in-
ternational and domestic law commentators have uniformly praised. 60
2. Simultaneous Petition Forum Shopping
If individuals may choose the tribunal, may they also submit peti-
tions to more than one tribunal at the same time and receive concur-
rent review of their claims? Human rights treaties are split over
whether to permit such "simultaneous petition forum shopping." The
majority of these treaties expressly prohibit this practice in their ad-
missibility clauses. For example, article 5 (2) (a) of the ICCPR's First
Optional Protocol states that the UNHRC "shall not consider any
communication from an individual unless it has ascertained
that... [t]he same matter is not being examined under another proce-
dure of international investigation or settlement."6' However, the pe-
RECOMMENDATIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF
MINISTERS CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS: 1949-87, at 20, 21 (1989) (stating that dis-
putes arising out of the European Convention should use the means of settlement pro-
vided for in the Convention); see also HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAEING, supra note 13, at
235 (noting that disputes arising out of the ECHR may only be brought before other
bodies "by special agreement").
60 See Robertson, supra note 13, at 46 ("Since the underlying object of both instru-
ments is to secure the protection of the rights of the individual,. . . a person who be-
lieves that his rights have been violated should have a choice between [petition proce-
dures] and should be allowed to use that which he considers most favourable to his
case."); see also Eissen, supra note 13, at 201-02 (favoring the freedom of a petitioner to
choose a tribunal). Maxime Tardu has referred to this type of forum shopping as the
"una via electa" standard. Tardu, supra note 13, at 784. Commentators in the United
States have proposed a similar rule, arguing that "individuals with constitutional claims
generally should be able to choose whether to litigate in federal or state court." Erwin
Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciay, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 233, 300 (1988).
6' Optional Protocol, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (a) (emphasis added). Similarly
phrased prohibitions on simultaneous petition forum shopping appear in most other
human rights treaties. See Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 33, art. 77(3) (a)
(requiring a finding that the "same matter has not been ... examined under another
procedure of international investigation"); Convention Against Torture, supra note 31,
art. 22(5) (barring consideration of petition unless it is ascertained that "the same mat-
ter.., is not being[] examined under another procedure of international investiga-
tion or settlement"); American Convention, supra note 27, art. 46(1) (c) (making ad-
missibility subject to a determination that "the subject of the petition or
communication is not pending in another international proceeding for settlement").
Article 27(1) (b) of the European Convention uses slightly different language, barring
the consideration of a petition that is "substantially the same as a matter which ... has
already been submitted to another procedure of international investigation or settle-
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tition procedures of the ILO treaties, the African Charter, and per-
haps the Race Convention have been interpreted to permit the filing
of simultaneous petitions.62
3. Successive Petition Forum Shopping
Human rights treaties are also divided over whether an individual
may engage in "successive petition forum shopping" by submitting a
petition to a second tribunal after proceedings concerning an earlier
petition before a different tribunal have been concluded. The
ICCPR's Optional Protocol permits the UNHRC to hear a petition
previously submitted to another tribunal once that petition is no
longer pending. The same permissive rule applies to the ILO treaties,
to the Race Convention, and to the Optional Protocol to the
ICESCR 63
ment" and that contains "no relevant new information." European Convention, supra
note 26, art. 27(1) (b). This language bars consideration of a petition pending before
another human rights tribunal. See Eissen, supra note 13, at 198 & n.59.
62 The African Charter's admissibility clause implicitly allows simultaneous petition
forum shopping by permitting the African Commission to declare petitions admissible
only if they "[d]o not deal with cases which have been settled by these States involved in
accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, or the Charter of
the Organization of African Unity or the provisions of the present Charter." African
Charter, supra note 28, art. 56(7) (emphasis added). See also Amendments to the Rules of
Procedure, 18th Ord. Sess., at 104(1)(g), U.N. Doc. ACHPR/AMEND.RP(DANKWA)/
XVIII (Oct. 1995) (requiring petitioner to provide information to the Commission on
whether the petition "has been settled" by another international body). An earlier rule
of procedure adopted by the Commission also barred consideration of simultaneous
petitions, but that rule was superseded by a later rule following the text of the charter.
See Rachel Murray, Decisions by the African Commission on Individual Communications Under
the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 46 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 412, 424-25 &
425 n.99 (1997) (concluding that the Charter bars only successive petitions).
The labor treaties administered by the ILO and the Race Convention contain no
rules regulating simultaneous consideration of petitions. See HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-
MAKING, supra note 13, at 218-19, 221-22 (suggesting that while not entirely clear, the
treaties probably do not restrict the examination of a case pending before another in-
ternational body); TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 332 & n.1074 (noting that the ILO pro-
cedures "contain no clauses.., for co-ordination with other human rights proce-
dures"). However, the Rules of Procedure drafted by CERD may implicitly preclude
the filing of simultaneous petitions. See CERD R. of Proc., U.N.H.S.RL, at Rule
84(1) (g), U.N. Doc. CERD/C/35/Rev.3 (1989), available in Treaty Bodies Database
(visited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/> (authorizing the Secre-
tary General to inquire on CERD's behalf whether "the same matter is being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement"). But see
HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKING, supra note 13, at 222 (questioning the efficacy of this
rule).
See TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 332 ("The operation of other co-existing human
rights complaint procedures therefore has been taken as not having effects on the re-
ceivability of complaints of alleged human rights violations under the ILO proce-
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By contrast, other treaties categorically bar successive petition fo-
rum shopping. This restriction often is contained in the same clause
that prohibits simultaneous petition forum shopping. For example,
article 47(d) of the American Convention provides that the Inter-
American Commission "shall consider inadmissible any petition or
communication... if... [t]he petition or communication is substan-
tially the same as one previously studied by the Commission or by another
international organization."4 Similarly phrased prohibitions appear in
the admissibility clauses of the European Convention, the Convention
Against Torture, the African Charter, Migrant Workers' Convention,
and in a proposed Optional Protocol to CEDAW.6
Nor is the disharmony limited to the actual texts of the treaties.
When ratifying the ICCPR's Optional Protocol and the Race Conven-
tion, two treaties that permit successive petition forum shopping, sev-
eral nations (mostly in Europe) filed reservations to expand the trea-
ties' ban on simultaneous petition forum shopping to include
successive petition forum shopping. Such reservations preclude the
jurists on the UNHRC and CERD from entertaining both successive
and simultaneous petitions filed against those countries.6
dures."); U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 109, art. 4(2)(a), U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/4 (1999) (stating that a claim will be inadmissible where "[t]he same mat-
ter has already been examined by the Committee or has been or is being examined
under another procedure of international investigation or settlement"); supra note 62
(citing the African Charter).
6 American Convention, supra note 27, art. 47(d) (emphasis added).
Migrant Workers' Convention, supra note 33, art. 77(3) (a) (allowing a petition
to be considered only if "[t]he same matter has not been.., examined under another
procedure of international investigation or settlement"); Convention Against Torture,
supra note 31, art. 22(5) (barring consideration of petition unless it is established that
"[t]he same matter has not been ... examined under another procedure of interna-
tional investigation or settlement"); African Charter, supra note 28, art. 56(7) (barring
consideration of "cases which have been settled"); European Convention, supra note
26, art. 27(1) (b) (barring consideration of a petition that is "substantially the same as a
matter which has.., already been submitted to another procedure of international
investigation or settlement and if it contains no relevant new information"); Convention
on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Including the Elaboration of
a Draft Optional Protocol to the Convention, U.N. ESCOR, 42d Sess., Agenda Item 5, art.
4(2) (I), U.N. Doc. E/CN.6/1998/WG/L2 (1998) (containing a draft admissibility
clause requiring dismissal of petition where "the same matter.., has been or is being
examined under another procedure of international investigation or settlement").
"' European States were especially troubled by the prospect that individuals could
file claims with the UNHRC after their petitions had been dismissed by the European
Commission. To achieve parallelism with the European Convention, which bars suc-
cessive petition forum shopping, these States filed reservations barring the UNHRC
from considering "a communication from an individual if the same matter is being ex-
amined or has already been examined under another procedure of international investiga-
tion or settlement." Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
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II. FORUM SHOPPING PRACTICE
The two typologies described in Part I reveal the close relationship
between the practice of forum shopping and the areas of substantive
overlap among the world's human rights agreements. These typolo-
gies, which are based principally on human rights treaty texts, merely
frame the broad outlines of this complex issue, however. Human
rights jurists elected to serve on global and regional tribunals also play
a crucial role in regulating the practice of forum shopping and in de-
fining the treaties' areas of overlap.
Jurists regulate forum shopping when they apply the admissibility
clauses and reservations discussed above. They also shape the norma-
tive linkages among human rights agreements by issuing decisions in-
terpreting substantive treaty rights that follow, diverge from, or con-
flict with the decisions of other tribunals. When these jurists adopt
inconsistent applications of these forum shopping clauses and reserva-
tions, they create confusion for petitioners and defending States re-
garding the conditions under which forum shopping will be permit-
ted. Further, when they issue divergent or conflicting decisions
relating to the same human rights, they create additional incentives
for petitioners to forum shop for the tribunal with the most rights-
protective standard.
This Section explores both of these strands of jurisprudence. It
demonstrates that recent tribunal decisions are divided over when an
individual may cite differing levels of rights protection between two
human rights treaties as ajustification for avoiding a forum shopping
bar and presenting a simultaneous or successive petition to a second
tribunal. It then discusses three recent case studies involving diverg-
ing and conflicting human rights rulings. In each case study, a global
or regional tribunal confronted a legal issue that previously had been
Rights: Declarations and Reservations, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976)
(updated at Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (vis-
ited Sept. 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part__boo/
iv_boo/iv._5.html>) (emphasis added). States that have filed reservations include Aus-
tria (limited to petitions previously submitted to the European Commission), Croatia,
Denmark, El Salvador, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Norway,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Uganda. Other nations,
including Finland, the Netherlands, Chile and others, have not filed such reservations.
See id. (showing acceptance of the Optional Protocol without reservation). Many
European States that filed successive petition forum shopping reservations to the Op-
tional Protocol, however, did not file similar reservations limiting the jurisdiction of
CERD. See International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 42.
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addressed by another tribunal and faced the question of whether to
follow or deviate from that prior decision.
A. Using Differences Among Human Rights Treaties as a Basis for Avoiding
a Forum Shopping Bar
A vexing question facing all human rights tribunals is how to de-
fine the scope of a petitioner's legal claims for purposes of applying a
treaty's forum shopping bar Stated another wvay, may an individual
avoid a treaty's ban on simultaneous or successive petition forum
shopping by relying on differing definitions or interpretations of
rights protected by two human rights treaties as identified in the first
typology discussed above?
The texts of the treaties and State party reservations provide only
limited guidance to answer this question. These texts compel jurists
to dismiss a petition if it is "substantially the same" as one submitted to
another tribunal, or if "the same matter" is being, or has already been,
67 Although the jurisprudence of forum shopping has become increasingly discor-
dant in recent years, there are a few points of clarity. First, with respect to the issue of
parties' identity, the tribunals have adopted the sensible position that a simultaneous
or successive petition is subject to a forum shopping bar only if it is submitted by the
same individual or someone authorized to act on that individual's behalf. See, e.g., Fa-
nali v. Italy, Comm. No. 18/75, at 160, 1 7.2, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40)
(1983) (noting that "the same matter" applies only to claims "concerning the same in-
dividual, submitted by him or someone else who has the standing to act on his behalf
before the other international body"), reprinted in 4 HUM. RTS. L.J. 189, 190 (1983); see
also ZWART, supra note 43, at 181-82 (discussing the European Commission's conclu-
sion that cases brought by "virtually the same" complainants as earlier petitions, deal-
ing with substantially the same facts, are inadmissible). Compare this practice with the
practice under the American Convention, which permits non-governmental organiza-
tions and individuals to file complaints with the Inter-American Commission without
the consent of the victim. See Mejfa v. Peru, Case 10,970, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.
L/V/II.91, doc. 7 at 157 (1996) (noting that the victim's consent to a petition is not a
requirement for the petition to be deemed admissible), reprinted in 1996 INTER-AM.
Y.B. ON HUM. RTis. 1120, 1146.
Second, the tribunals have concluded that only petitions to other human rights
courts or quasi-judicial tribunals can trigger the forum shopping bar. Complaints to
investigative bodies authorized to examine general human rights conditions in particu-
lar countries will not bar consideration of particular petitions. See e.g., Blanco v. Nica-
ragua, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., 1 5.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/
D/328/1988 (1994) ("The general investigation, by regional and intergovernmental
human rights organizations, of situations affecting a number of individuals, including
the author of a communication under the Optional Protocol, does not constitute 'the
same matter' within the meaning of article 5, paragraph 2(a)."); see also ZwART, supra
note 43, at 174-75, 182-83 (discussing UNHRC and European Commission procedures
of international investigation and settlement).
1999]
310 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:285
examined by another tribunal.68 For American legal scholars, these
phrases suggest something akin to the transactional test adopted by
the United States Supreme Court to determine the contours of pen-
dent junisdicton.9 In the international human rights context, how-
ever, these words have often been given very different interpretations,
as the following analysis of the UNHRC and the European, Inter-
American, and African Commissions demonstrates."
1. The UNHRC's Interpretation of "The Same Matter"
The most extensive body of forum shopping case law has been de-
cided by the UNHRC when interpreting States parties' reservations to
the ICCPR's First Optional Protocol. These reservations prohibit the
Committee from reviewing a petition if "the same matter" has already
been "examined" or "considered" under "another procedure of inter-
national investigation or settlement."
7 1
a. The Early Restrictive Approach to Successive Petition Forum Shopping
A.M. v. Denmarke presented the strongest case for invoking the fo-
68 See supra text accompanying notes 61, 64 (noting, for example, that under the
ICCPR's First Optional Protocol and the American Convention, respectively, the
UNHRC and the Inter-American Commission must dismiss such petitions).
69 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (holding that
pendentjurisdiction exists wherever there is a federal claim, and that "the relationship
between that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action
before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case'").
70 As of the date of this writing, CERD has not decided any cases dealing with fo-
rum shopping. See United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies Da-
tabase (visited Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (reproducing
CERD's published case law). The CAT has reviewed only two cases in which forum
shopping was an issue. In A.E.M. v. Spain, Spain argued that the petition should be
deemed inadmissible because the same petitioners had filed the same complaint with
the European Commission and the European Committee for the Prevention of Tor-
ture. See A.E.M. v. Spain, U.N. GAOR, CAT, 13th Sess., Annex 5, at 43, U.N. Doc.
A/50/44, 1 3.3 (1994). The CAT concluded, without further explanation, that it had
.ascertained... that the same matter has not been and is not being examined under
another procedure of international investigation or settlement," but it then dismissed
the case for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Id. 5.2-5.3. In Mbulu v. Canada,
Comm. No. 26/1995, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/15/D/26/1995 (1995), CAT dismissed a peti-
tion seeking to delay an expulsion from Canada on the ground that petitioners' coun-
sel had previously "submitted a motion relating to her expulsion to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights." Id. 1 3.
7 See supra note 66 (identifying countries that have filed such reservations under
the Optional Protocol).
" Comm. No. 26/121, at 212, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/37/40) (1982), reprinted
in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J. 188 (1982).
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rum shopping bar-the successive presentation of identical factual
and legal claims to two tribunals. A.M. was a Pakistani national con-
victed of a criminal offense in Denmark,'3 who alleged that the Danish
judicial system had treated him unfairly because he was a foreigner,
and had denied him a fair trial. He also asserted that his deportation
from Denmark constituted degrading treatment or punishment under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.74 Prior to petitioning the
UNHRC, A.M. had presented the same allegations to the European
Commission. 75 The Commission had dismissed his claim as "mani-
festly ill-founded,"76 indicating that the allegations failed to raise even
an arguable violation of the European Convention. Without ex-
pressly analyzing the European Commission's prior ruling, the
UNHRC concluded that the "author has submitted the same matter to
the European Commission of Human Rights," and that as a result the
UNHRC was "not competent to consider the present communica-
tion."Th
Only one member of the UNHRC believed that the European
Commission of Human Rights' dismissal of A.M.'s petition did not
compel the UNHRC to dismiss his petition. In a concurring opinion,
Committee member Graefrath reasoned that Denmark's reservation
was inapplicable because the European Commission had declared the
petition inadmissible and had not provided A.M. with a full hearing
on the merits. Because of this summary dismissal, the claim had not
been "considered" in a way that triggered Denmark's forum shopping
bar. Mr. Graefrath stressed that the Danish reservation did not seek
to limit the Committee's powers "merely on the ground that the rights
of the Covenant allegedly violated may also be covered by the Euro-
pean Convention and its procedural requirements."79 Indeed, had
Denmark sought to limit the UNHRC's competence in this manner,
he would have found its reservation incompatible with the Optional
7 Id. 11.
7' See id. 11 3.1-3.2 (discussing A.M.'s allegations that the Danish police were dis-
honest in his pre-trial investigation and that the authorities treated him unfairly,
thereby allegedly violating the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
7d 1& 14.
7' A.M. v. Denmark, App. No. 9490/81, reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J. 354, 357
(1982).
See id. ("The Commission finds no issues under any of the ... Articles invoked by
the applicant."). See generally ZWART, supra note 43, at 144-46 (discussing the European
Commission's use of the phrase "manifestly ill-founded" to summarily dismiss meritess
petitions).
78 A.M., supra note 72, at 189.
Id. at 190 (Graefrath, concurring).
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Protocol.0
In the A.M. case, the factual and legal claims contained in the pe-
tition to the UNHRC were apparently identical in all respects to those
A.M. had previously brought before the European Commission. In
any event, they did not raise serious issues concerning Denmark's
compliance with either treaty.8' Thus, the UNHRC was not required
to determine whether a second petition alleging violations of treaty
rights whose definitions differ from the rights at issue in a prior pro-
ceeding raises "the same matter" as the prior proceeding.
That issue arose two years later in V.M. 0. v. Norway,s2 in which the
petitioner challenged Norwegian divorce and custody proceedings by
alleging that a domestic court failed to protect his relationship with
his daughter and to enforce his visitation rights.ss After exhausting
domestic remedies, the petitioner filed a claim with the European
Commission alleging, under the European Convention, violations of
his right to a fair trial, parental visiting rights, and equality rights.84
The Commission dismissed the case as manifestly ill-founded,8s and
V.M.O. filed a second petition with the UNHRC alleging violations of
8o For his reasoning, see Mr. Graefrath's opinion, in which he concluded:
An application that has been declared inadmissible under the system of the
European Convention is not necessarily inadmissible under the system of the
Covenant and the Optional Protocol, even if it refers to the same facts....
The[] rights [contained in the European Convention], however, differ in sub-
stance and in regard to their implementation procedures from the rights set
forth in the Covenant... A decision on non-admissibility of the European
Commission, therefore, has no impact on a matter before the [UNHRC] and
cannot hinder the [UNHRC] from reviewing the facts of a communication on
its own legal basis and under its own procedure and from ascertaining
whether they are compatible with the provisions of the Covenant. This might
lead to a similar result as under the European Convention, but not necessarily
SO.
Id. at 191.
"' Thus, Mr. Graefrath, while disapproving of the majority's construction of the
.same matter" clause, agreed that the petition should be declared inadmissible because
it did not "raise issues under any of the provisions of the Covenant." Id. at 190. This is
essentially the same justification used by the European Commission to dismiss A.M.'s
earlier petition. SeeA.M. v. Denmark, App. No. 9490181, reprinted in 3 HUM. RTS. L.J.
354, 357 (1982) ('The Commission finds no issues under any of the... Articles in-
voked by the Applicant.").
82 Comm. No. 168/1984, repinted in 7 HUM. RTs. L.J. 268 (1985).
93 See id. 11 2.1-2.2 (discussing the author's allegations of how Norwegian courts
did not adequately address his ex-wife's refusal to honor his visitation rights).
See id. 1 2.3 (noting that the author submitted an application to the European
Commission of Human Rights, claiming such violations).
8s Id. 1 2.4.
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those same rights, as protected by the ICCPR. 6
Although the two petitions' factual allegations were identical,
V.M.O. argued that Norway's reservation did not bar the UNHRC
from considering the matter because "the provisions of the European
Convention... differ in several areas from those of the [ICCPR]," and
the latter treaty was "better suited to protect his rights in the matter
complained of than [the rights] earlier invoked before the European
Commission."7 V.M.O. stressed that he was not attempting to appeal
the Commission's decision to the UNHRC, but rather to raise legal
issues that "the European Convention does not cover.' 8 In response,
Norway argued that the forum shopping bar applied because the sec-
ond application contained no new facts or legal arguments, and the
European Commission had already examined "the substance of the
application. ' 89 As for whether the rights protected by the ICCPR were
broader than their European analogues, Norway acknowledged that
the rights were not "identical" but stated that several articles of the
European Convention "offer in substance the same protection" as the
ICCPR.9
The UNHRC essentially adopted Norway's approach to the issue.
In a tersely worded paragraph, the Committee concluded that the
phrase "the same matter" refers "to the complaints advanced and the facts
adduced in support of them."9' Applying this standard, the Committee
held that V.M.0.'s petition was "in fact the same matter that was ex-
amined by the European Commission. While fully understanding the
circumstances which have led the author to make a communication
under the Covenant," the Committee found that the reservation "pre-
clude [d] it from examining the communication."
2
b. Recent Confusion over Successive Petition Forum Shopping
The Committee's adoption in V.M.O. of a "complaints and facts"
standard appeared to reject the possibility that a petitioner could
See id. 11 2.5-2.6 (noting that petitioner submitted such petition and discussing
his contention that the Committee should hear it).
Id. 1 2.5.
I& 1 2.6. In particular, the applicant argued in general terms that the ICCPR's
fair trial guarantees, family rights, and equality provisions were broader than their
European Convention analogues. See id. (quoting V.M.0.'s reasoning that the Euro-
pean Convention's provisions are too limited to deal with his allegations).
" Id. 14.2.
90 Id. 14.3.
9, Id. [ 4.4 (emphasis added).
92Ia
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avoid the forum shopping bar by invoking rights that the ICCPR de-
fines more expansively than does the European Convention. In sev-
eral cases decided in the mid-1990s, however, the UNHRC'sjurispru-
dence has become significantly more unsettled. While adhering to a
similar "events and facts" test in several cases, the Committee has
stated in other decisions that it is prevented from reviewing a succes-
sive petition only if the precise legal and factual issues were adjudi-
cated before the first tribunal.93
Tributien v. France9 is emblematic of the UNHRC's continued re-
strictive approach to forum shopping. Tr~butien, convicted of nu-
merous offenses before French courts, raised various legal arguments
to challenge the prosecutions against him in three separate petitions
filed with the European Commission. The Commission declared all
three petitions inadmissible on various grounds, including failure to
exhaust domestic remedies, submission of manifestly ill-founded alle-
gations, and filing of repetitive claims.95
Trdbutien then submitted a petition to the UNHRC challenging
the same prosecutions under the analogous provisions of the ICCPR,
which are drafted in substantially similar language.96 He also alleged
that the State had failed to protect his family life, as required by an ar-
ticle of the ICCPR drafted somewhat more broadly than its European
93 In this sense, the Committee's more restrictive interpretation of "the same mat-
ter" is similar to American collateral estoppel principles, which prevent re-litigation of
issues of fact or law necessary to a finaljudgment. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr.
Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6 (1982) ("Under collateral estoppel, once a court decides
an issue of fact or law necessary to itsjudgment, that decision precludes relitigation of
the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties.").
94U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/
421/1990 (1994).
9' See id. 1 2.14 (noting that the Commission declared the case inadmissible ratione
personae because, with regard to some pleadings, the domestic remedies had not been
exhausted, and other pleadings were "manifestly ill founded" and "substantially the
same" as those submitted in a previous petition). In these three petitions, Trdbutien
challenged irregularities in his extradition from Portugal, detention in a French
prison, the conduct of his criminal trials, and the denial of visits from his family in
prison. Id.
'6 Compare European Convention, supra note 26, arts. 5 and 6, with ICCPR, supra
note 24, arts. 9 and 14. Article 14(1) does, however, specify that criminal defendants
are to be tried before a "competent, independent and impartial tribunal," whereas ar-
ticle 6(1) refers only to an "independent and impartial tribunal." Tr~butien's petition
may have related to this difference, inasmuch as he alleged that the judge withheld
court documents necessary for counsel to prepare his defense. See Tributien, supra note
94, 1 2.12 ("The author also points out that... the President of the Court allegedly
withheld the necessary court documents for consultation and preparation of the de-
fense.").
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counterpart97 Finally, Tr~butien raised legal and factual claims which
he alleged had not been presented to the European Commission!'
When France interposed its forum shopping reservation, Trtbutien
argued that the forum shopping ban was inapplicable because the
Commission had not addressed "all the complaints that [had] been
placed before the Human Rights Committee."" The UNHRC rejected
Tr~butien's attempt to circumvent the French reservation, reasoning
that "the author's complaint[s] before that body [were] based on the
same events and facts as the communication that ha[d] been submitted
under the Optional Protocol to the Covenant; accordingly, the Com-
mittee is seized of the 'same matter' as the European Commission."1
In striking contrast to Tributien is the Committee's decision in
Casanovas v. France, which was decided just one day later.10' Casanovas
was a municipal civil servant who was dismissed for alleged incompe-
tence and sought reinstatement before French administrative courts.
Casanovas later filed a complaint with the European Commission. He
9 Compare ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 23(1) ("The family is the natural and funda-
mental group unit of society and entitled to protection by society and the State."), with
European Convention, supra note 26, art. 8 (granting everyone a "right to respect for
his private and family life," but permitting limitations that are "in accordance with the
law and ... necessary in a democratic society" to achieve a list of particular objectives).
93 In particular, Tr~butien argued that his complaints to the European Commis-
sion did not address certain "irregularities" that occurred during his conviction for es-
caping from prison. Tributien, supra note 94,11 5.3-5.4.
9L d. 6.3.
,'0 Id. 1 6.4 (emphasis added). Consistent with Tributien, the UNHRC has refused
to entertain petitions raising "the same events and facts" and "substantially the same
issues" as petitions previously rejected by the European Commission. See Valentijn v.
France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., Annex, I 5.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/57/D/584/1994 (1996) (noting that the petitioner's successive complaints
submitted to the European Commission on Human Rights were predicated on the
same events and facts as his complaint addressed to the UNHRC); Glaziou v. France,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., Annex, 1 7.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/51/D/452/1991 (1994) (noting that the petitioner's application to the
European Commission was based on the same events and facts as his complaint to the
UNHRC). It has, however, permitted individuals to raise factual and legal allegations
not previously submitted to the regional tribunal. See Valentjjn, supra, 1 5.4 (consider-
ingValentijn's claim, not submitted to the European Commission, that he should have
been given a lighter sentence after the Criminal Code was amended); Glaziou, supra,
[ 7.2 (noting that petitioner's claim that he was hit by prison warders had not been
submitted to the European Commission and was not barred by France's forum shop-
ping reservation, but was nevertheless unsubstantiated for purposes of admissibility).
The Committee has not indicated, however, whether the petitioners could have raised
these allegations before the European Commission but failed to do so.
'0' See U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/
51/D/441/1990 (1994). Tributien was decided on July 18, 1994; Casanovas on July 19,
1994.
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alleged that the administrative tribunal had failed to hear his case in a
timely manner in violation of article 6(1) of the European Conven-
tion, which requires a hearing within a reasonable time for any "de-
termination of... civil rights and obligations.",0 2 The Commission
declared his complaint inadmissible ratione materiae because the
Convention "does not cover procedures governing the dismissal of
civil servants from employment."
0 4
When Casanovas filed a petition with the UNHRC containing pre-
cisely the same allegations under ICCPR article 14(1),10 France
sought to dismiss his petition on two grounds. It first invoked the fo-
rum shopping reservation and the V.M.0. decision, urging that the
petition be dismissed because "the case concerns the same individual,
the same facts, and the same claim as the case submitted to the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights."' °6 It also urged the UNHRC to
follow the European Commission's lead and hold that civil service
proceedings are not covered by article 14(1), arguing that the texts of
article 6(1) and article 14(1) are "identical."
0 7
The UNHRC rejected both arguments. It first held that, because
Casanovas's initial petition alleged a violation of a right not protected
by the European Convention, it had not "been 'considered' in such a
way that the Committee was precluded from examining it."" 8 As for
102 European Convention, supra note 26, art. 6(1).
10s A dismissal ratione materiae occurs when the petition alleges a violation of a right
not protected by the treaty. See Erik M6se & Torkel Opsahl, The Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 271, 296-97
(1981).
'o Casanovas, supra note 101, 1 2.5. In effect, the Commission concluded that ad-
ministrative challenges to the dismissal of civil servants do not qualify as "civil rights
and obligations" under article 6(1).
10' See ICCPR, sura note 24, art. 14(1) (requiring fair and public hearings for any
"determination [of] rights and obligations in a suit at law").
"6 Casanovas, supra note 101, 14.2 (citing VM.0., supra note 82, 14.4).
117 Id. 1 4.3. In fact, the texts are drafted somewhat differently. Article 14(1) refers
to "rights and obligations in a suit at law" whereas article 6(1) uses the phrase "civil
rights and obligations." In addition, although article 14(1) does not requirejudicial or
administrative proceedings to be held "within a reasonable time," the UNHRC has im-
plied such a requirement in its case law. See Casanovas, supra note 101, 1 7.3 (citing
prior case law requiring that procedures be conducted expeditiously).
'08 Id. 1 5.1. The LJNHRC specifically stated:
[S]ince the rights of the European Convention differed in substance and in
regard of their implementation procedures from the rights set forth in the
Covenant, a matter that had been declared inadmissible ratione materiae had
not, in the meaning of the reservation, been 'considered' in such a way that
the Committee was precluded from examining it.
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France's second argument, the UNHRC reasoned that article 14(1)'s
application to civil service proceedings depended upon "the nature of
the right in question rather than ... the status of one of the parties."' °9
It then stated without further analysis that a "procedure concerning a
dismissal from employment" satisfied this standard and thus was
within the scope of article 14(1). n ° On the facts presented, however,
the Committee refused to find a violation of the article, reasoning that
the French administrative tribunal had issued a decision within a rea-
sonable time."'
Further evidence of the UNHRC's more permissive approach to
forum shopping appears in its 1994 General Comment 24(52) on
State party reservations. With respect to the European States' forum
shopping reservations to the Optional Protocol, the Committee stated
that the reservations were generally consistent with the Protocol's
fundamental objective of "secur[ing] independent third party review
of the human rights of individuals."" 3 But it also stressed that the res-
ervations could be applied only "where the legal right and the subject
matter are identical under the Covenant and under another interna-
tional instrument."1 14 This statement, together with the Committee's
'09 Id. 15.2.
"0 Id. The UNHRC's position is at odds with that of the ECHR, which recently "re-
iterate[d] that 'disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service
of civil servants are as a general rule outside the scope of Article 6 §1.'" Huber v.
France, European Court of Human Rights-Judgments and Decisions 1998-I, 105, 115, App.
No. 26637/95, 63 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 36 (1998).
.. See Casanovas, supra note 101, 1 7.4 (holding that the period of time that
elapsed between the submission of the complaint and the decision did not violate Arti-
cle 14(1)).
"1 See General Comment 24(52) on issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or
accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under
article 41 of the Covenan4 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., 1382d mtg.
(adopted Nov. 2, 1994), available in International Human Rights Documents (visited Sept.
12, 1999) <http://lawhk.hku.hk/demo/unhrdocs/hrgc24.htm> [hereinafter General
Comment 24(52)] (identifying the "principles of international law that apply to the mak-
ing of reservations and by reference to which their acceptability is to be tested and
their purport to be interpreted").
13 Id.1 14.
. Id. (emphasis added). That the Committee intended to construe the forum
shopping reservations narrowly is suggested by another statement in the General
Comment. Several States parties had attempted to predetermine the content of the
rights protected by the ICCPR by linking them to the interpretation of the same rights
found in domestic law or in other treaties. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (visited Oct. 31, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/
ts2/newfiles/partLboo/iv.._boo/iv_.4.html> ("Articles 19, 21, and 22 [of the ICCPR]
shall be applied by the Belgian Government in the context of the provisions and re-
strictions set forth or authorized in articles 10 and 11 of the [European Conven-
1999]
318 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 148:285
Casanovas case, represents a substantial break with the "events and
facts" standard applied in Tributien and V.M.0. to bar successive peti-
tions raising rights defined more broadly under the ICCPR than un-
der another treaty. 115 The Committee has yet to reconcile these two
lines of authority, an omission it will likely have to confront in a future
116
case.
tion]."). The UNHRC rejected this approach, stating that "States should not
seek... to determine that the meaning of a provision of the Covenant is the same as
that given by an organ of any other international treaty body." General Comment 24(52),
supra note 112, 1 19. Yet the restrictive "events and facts" standard applied in Tribu-
tien, supra note 94, and VM.0., supra note 82, indirectly achieves just this result. It
precludes the Committee from adjudicating successive petitions concerning rights de-
fined more broadly in the ICCPR than in other treaties, thereby limiting the relief
available to the petitioner to the less rights-protective standards contained in those
treaties.
11 For a critical analysis of these two conflicting strands of case law, see infra Part
IV.A.2.a.
16 In its most recent forum shopping decision, the UNHRC held that Austria's fo-
rum shopping reservation did not preclude it from considering on the merits a peti-
tion that the European Commission had rejected in 1995 on the basis of a still earlier
and successful petition by the same applicant to the UNHRC in 1992. See Pauger v.
Austria, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/65/D/716/1996 (1999). The UNHRC concluded that the petition, which
presented new facts showing Austria's continuing violation of the petitioner's rights,
had not been "examined" by the European Commission within the meaning of the
Austrian reservation, but rather had been dismissed on procedural grounds. See id. 11
6.3-6.4.
In light of the Pauger decision and the 1994 General Comment, it is unclear
whether the Committee's earlier decision in VE.M. v. Spain, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/467/1991 (1993), remains good
law. In that case, the petitioner alleged a violation of article 6(1) of the European
Convention concerning his dishonorable dismissal from the Spanish army. The Euro-
pean Commission of Human Rights dismissed his claim ratioem materiae because the
article did not cover proceedings concerning a dismissal from public service. See id
2.5 ("[T] he Commission held that the guarantee of article 6 of the Convention did not
cover disputes about public service, neither the question of access to it nor the dis-
missal from it."). V.E.M. then raised the same claim before the Committee. He relied
on article 14(1) of the ICCPR, which the Committee later held in the Casanovas case
applies to such dismissals. Rather than considering the merits of the petition, how-
ever, the Committee invoked Spain's forum shopping reservation, which precludes
review of a petition that has previously been "submitted" to the European Commission
(as opposed to the "considered" or "examined" language used in the reservations of
other European nations). Id. 1 5.2. Such a reservation is arguably inconsistent with
the Optional Protocol, since it precludes a petitioner whose claims are entirely outside
the scope of the European Convention from later submitting those claims to the
UNHRC.
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2. The European Commission's Interpretation of
"Substantially the Same" Matter
Prior to the recent merger of the European Court and European
Commission of Human Rights, the European Convention barred the
European Commission from considering a petition that is "substan-
tially the same as a matter which ... has already been submitted" to
another human rights tribunal. The Commission has issued two
principal decisions applying the forum shopping ban in the context of
rights defined differently in two human rights treaties.
In Council of Civil Service Unions v. United Kingdom, s8 a trade union
and several of its members challenged, under the freedom of associa-
tion right of European Convention Article 11, the government's re-
fusal to permit employees of the Government Communications
Headquarters from belonging to the union. 9 The United Kingdom
invoked the treaty's forum shopping bar, arguing that a different la-
bor group had already complained about the policy to the Committee
on Freedom of Association ("CFA7), a quasijudicial body within the
International Labour Organization ("ILO") that examines complaints
from workers' organizations and employees alleging violations of vari-
ous labor rights treaties administered by the ILO.120 Seeking to avoid
dismissal of the petition, the union argued that the freedom of asso-
ciation rights protected by ILO Convention No. 87 and by Article 11
of the European Convention were not identical, in that the ILO treaty
"contains no provisions comparable to Article 11 para. 2," which con-
strain the government's power to restrict the right to form and join
11 European Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(1) (b). The identical standard now
applies to petitions submitted directly to the European Court of Human Rights. See
Protocol No. 11, supra note 36, art. 35 (2) (b).
11 App. No. 11603/85,50 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 228 (1987).
"9 This agency ensures the security of the United Kingdom's military and official
communications. See id. at 230.
20 Prior to the union's petition to the European Commission, the British Trades
Union Congress had challenged the government's restrictions before the CFA. The
CFA found that the government's actions were "not in conformity with [ILO] Conven-
tion No. 87," which protects freedom of association. Id. at 233. Its findings were
adopted by the ILO's governing body. The report was later forwarded to the Interna-
tional Labour Conference Committee which "hope[d) that the Governmentwould be
able to find appropriate solutions to the problems raised by the application of the
Convention." I& at 233 (internal quotations omitted). For a discussion of petition
procedures within the ILO, see BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ ET AL., supra note 35, at 67-
126, and 1 M.E. TARDu, Procedures of the International Labour Organization and
Other Specialized Agencies of the United Nations System, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
INTERNATIONAL PETITION SYSTEM pt. 1, § IIA (1985).
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trade unions. The United Kingdom responded that "there is a clear
similarity of scope and purpose between the relevant provisions of the
two Conventions, and the complaints arise out of the same facts. "1
The Commission refused to dismiss the petition under the Euro-
pean Convention's forum shopping bar. The bulk of its analysis fo-
cused on the fact that the petitioners in the two proceedings were not
the same. As to the different definitions of the rights protected by the
two treaties, the Commission noted only that "the rights mentioned in
Article 2 of the ILO Convention No. 87 of 1947 resemble to an extent the
rights guaranteed in Article 11 para. 1 of the Convention. " "
The same issue arose again in Martin v. Spain,124 a case concerning
the dismissal of factory workers who refused to return to work after
toxic chemicals were transported near their factory. The workers'
trade unions filed a complaint with the CFA, which rejected their
claims.125 The workers themselves then filed a complaint with the
European Commission, neglecting to inform the tribunal of the prior
proceeding. Spain invoked the forum shopping bar and the Commis-
sion agreed that the case should be dismissed. 12" As in Council of Civil
Service Unions, the Commission focused principally on the identity of
the parties in the two cases.1 7 With respect to the overlapping rightsissue, the Commission stated that both treaties guarantee the right to
... See Council of Civil Service Unions, supra note 118, at 236. It is uncertain how the
petitioners would benefit from this difference between the two treaties, since the rights
guaranteed in the ILO treaty appear to be broader than those guaranteed in article 11
and do not contain any limitations clauses. Compare ILO Convention No. 87, 68
U.N.T.S. 17, art. 2 (adopted July 9, 1948) ("Workers and employers, without distinc-
tion whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, subject only to the rules of the
organisation concerned, to join organisations of their own choosing without previous
authorisation."), and id. art. 5 ("Workers' and employers' organisations shall have the
right to establish and join federations and confederations .... ."), with European Con-
vention, supra note 26, art. 11(2) (permitting governments to restrict the right to join
trade unions for "members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration
of the State").
1 Council of Civil Service Unions, supra note 118, at 236.
2 Id. at 237 (emphasis added).
124 App. No. 16358/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R Dec. & Rep. 120 (1992).
1 See id. at 131 (stating that the applicants complained to the ILO, who investi-
gated the allegations and concluded that there had been no violation of the freedom
of association).
1 See id. at 134-35 (noting that the application to the Commission concerned sub-
stantially the same subject matter as the application to the ILO in violation of the spirit
and letter of the Convention).
127 As to the issue of the identity of parties, one commentator has characterized
Martin as a "remarkable U-turn" from the Commission's decision in Council of Civil
Service Unions. ZWART, supra note 43, at 181-82.
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freedom of association, and that "applications concerning substan-
tially the same subject-matter were submitted by the same complain-
ants to two international bodies in turn." 8 It viewed this situation as
"not compatible with either the spirit or the letter of the Convention,
which seeks to avoid a plurality of international proceedings relating
to the same cases."' 29
The Commission's reasoning in Martin suggests that it will inter-
pret the Convention's forum shopping clause strictly and will dismiss
successive petitions even if the treaty rights at issue are not defined
identically. Such a construction is consistent with the European Con-
vention's bar on simultaneous or successive petitions raising "substan-
tially the same" issues as those previously submitted to another tribu-
nal.' 3° However, neither the Commission nor the ECHR has resolved
the difficult issue faced by the UNHRC in the Casanovas case: whether
an unsuccessful petition to another tribunal, alleging a violation of
rights that are protected by the European Convention but not by an-
other human rights treaty, can later be presented to the Commission.
128 Martin, supra note 124, at 134.
'29 Id. at 133-34. The Commission invoked this same reasoning to dismiss two peti-
tions by members of the Communist Party of Spain, who had been fed against their will
by Spanish prison authorities while participating in a hunger strike. See Fornieles v.
Spain, App. No. 17512/90, 73 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 214 (1992) (dismissing
the application as "substantially the same" as one previously submitted to the
UNHRC). The petitioners challenged the forced feeding as cruel and degrading
treatment and a violation of their rights to freedom of thought and freedom of expres-
sion. See id. at 222. One of the petitioners had previously submitted the same allega-
tions to the UNHRC, and the second petitioner later joined that petition, but only af-
ter having petitioned the European Commission. Both petitioners then asked the
UNHRC to "suspend" their petitions during the pendency of the European proceed-
ings. The Commission rejected this attempt to circumvent the bar on simultaneous
petitions, stating that "two international bodies... are simultaneously dealing with ap-
plications which are substantially the same," and characterizing the situation as "in-
compatible with the spirit and the letter of the Convention, which seeks to avoid a plu-
rality of international proceedings relating to the same cases." Id. at 223. The
Commission suggested, however, that it would have considered the petitioners' claims
had they formally withdrawn their petitions from the UNHRC. See id. at 224 (stating
that the "Commission has ruled that it is competent to look into an application submit-
ted to another [tribunal] only where the matter has been [withdrawn]"); see also Bor-
des v. France, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess., 1 5.2, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 (1996) (reviewing claims where a simultaneous petition
pending before another tribunal had been withdrawn).
1,0 SeeEuropean Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(1) (b).
1999]
322 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:285
3. The Inter-American Commission's Interpretation of
"Substantially the Same" Matter
Although the American Convention contains a forum shopping
ban drafted in the same language as the ban contained in the Euro-
pean Convention, the Inter-American Commission's case law indicates
that the Commission will entertain simultaneous and successive forum
shopping petitions unless the factual allegations and legal claims
raised therein are identical.
In Fajardo v. Nicaragua,13 1 the Commission addressed a petition
authored by a group of customs agents who were dismissed from their
government employment in June 1993 after a strike. Nicaragua as-
serted that their strike was illegal because public employees do not en-
joy the right to strike. The employees appealed their decision to the
Supreme Court ofJustice, which affirmed the illegality of the strike on
grounds apparently unrelated to the government's argument.
3 2
Immediately after the dismissals, two labor unions representing
the dismissed employees filed a petition with the ILO's Trade Union
Freedom Committee alleging violations of labor rights under two ILO
Conventions. s3 One year later, the employees themselves filed a peti-
tion with the Inter-American Commission. When Nicaragua invoked
the forum shopping ban, the employees argued that their claim be-
fore the Commission was limited to violations of the American Con-
vention resulting from the Supreme Court's untimely and erroneous
ruling,'s whereas the petition before the ILO Committee related
solely to the strike and its aftermath which had occurred one year ear-
lier.
135
The Inter-American Commission gave considerable attention to
the duplication of proceedings issue. It began by noting that the alle-
1 Case 11.381, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 535, OEA/ser. L./V./II.95, doc. 7 rev. (1997).
The Supreme Court decision was based not on the governmental status of the
employees, but rather on obstructive actions taken by them a year before the strike be-
gan. See id. 1 7 (stating that one year before the strike the "workers had put obstacles
on the landing field"). The Commission's report does not discuss these events or their
relationship to the strike.
' See id. 11, 13 (alleging violations under Conventions Nos. 87 and 88 and of
Nicaraguan national labor law rights).
13 Although Nicaraguan law required the Supreme Court to issue its decision
within ninety days following the workers' appeal, the Court delivered its ruling in June
1994, one year after the workers' appeal was filed.
ss See id 7, 27 ("[T]he petitioners ... reiterate that the contents of the petition
formulated to the ILO deal with the violation of labor rights which occurred prior to
issue of [this] ruling....").
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gations in the two cases "must be objectively and subjectively the same
for the petition to be declared inadmissible. " 's6 With regard to the
two petitions' similar subject matters, the Commission noted that the
case before it "deals with violations of freedom to association, the
right to compensation for judicial error, violation of the right to a fair
trial and violation of the right to judicial protection," whereas the ILO
proceeding concerned "repression of these workers' trade union
rights."137 The Commission then quoted from the ILO Committee's
report, which found that Nicaragua's actions did not violate the ILO
treaties, but nevertheless recommended that the government reinstate
the workers:
[T]he [ILO] Committee's recommendation refers to the right to strike
and trade union freedom, and at no time deals with arbitrary court rul-
ings and errors, and unjustified delay in the administration ofjustice, as
are alleged in this petition .... The fact that the ILO frames the right of
trade union organization as a fundamental right does not mean that the
civil and political rights are exhausted in a single right, but rather that
the right of trade union organization is a substantial labor right. The al-
legation of its violation, however, does not bar charges that other civil
and political rights were violated in other spheres, as has occurred in the
case... which is now before the Commission. S
As a result of the different factual allegations and legal claims con-
tained in the two petitions, and because the ILO had no authority to
address due process issues and had issued no binding ruling with re-
spect to the strike, the Commission refused to apply the forum shop-
ping bar to dismiss the employees' petition. s
'-6 I. [ 38. The Commission viewed this construction of its forum shopping rules
as consistent with the practice of the UNHRC, which it characterized as "usually ad-
mit[ing] complaints taken up in other international organizations if the complaint
refers to rights recognized [in the ICCPR], and ... not established in the other inter-
national instrument that is being applied simultaneously even though the complaints
are similar in terms of events." Id. 1 41. As explained above, however, the UNHRC's
case law is unsettled on this very point. See supra Part II.A.1.
'l Fajardo, supra note 131.
1& 1144, 46.
' The Commission did not reach the merits of the petitioners' claims, merely de-
claring the petition admissible and making itself available to the parties for a friendly
settlement. See id. 11 71-72. For an equally restrictive interpretation of the American
Convention's forum shopping clauses, see Mejia, supra note 67, in which the Commis-
sion stated that the Convention's forum shopping bar
must be interpreted restrictively and only in relation to those assumptions in
which the petition is limited to 'the same petition concerning the same indi-
vidual.' This means that its application does not extend to alleged human
rights violations concerning which the Commission or another similar organi-
zation has not yet given its opinion, even when they are included in a petition
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The Inter-American Commission's approach to forum shopping,
which in effect permitted the petitioners to split their legal claims be-
tween two international tribunals, is more liberal than the standard
applied by its European counterpart. The Inter-American Commis-
sion was sensitive to the ILO Trade Union Freedom Committee's lack
of authority to deal with the full scope of the petitioners' claims. The
Commission did, however, permit the petitioners to raise a claim con-
cerning the American Convention's right to freedom of association,
the same right that was at issue before the ILO."40 This suggests that
the two proceedings may not have been as distinct as the petitioners
contended, and that the Commission might have given more careful
consideration to the contours of the rights protected in the two trea-
ties before dismissing the government's arguments.
4. The African Commission's Interpretation of
"Cases Which Have Been Settled"
A discussion of the African Commission on Human Rights's forum
shopping case law is hampered by the Commission's decision to pub-
lish only summaries of its decisions without any analysis. Based on a
review of these summaries, the Commission has dismissed two succes-
sive petition forum shopping cases under the African Charter. In
Mpaka-Nsusu Andre Alphonse v. Zaire, the Commission declared inad-
missible a case concerning "false imprisonment" on the ground that
"the communication [had] already been referred for consideration to
,141the [UNHRC]." In Amnesty International v. Tunisia, the Commission
declared inadmissible a petition concerning "wrongful detention and
torture" without even identifing the other international procedure. 1
42
A commentator examining the Commission's recent practice has
stated, based on anecdotal evidence, that these two cases raise "a con-
cern that the African Commission will be more strict" than other tri-
that also contains other questions that by their nature are inadmissible.
Id. at 1146 (section entitled "Duplication of Proceedings").
140 See Fajardo, supra note 131, 1 38 ("The claim before the Commission deals with
violations of freedom to association .... ").
1 Comm. No. 15/88, Seventh Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and
Peoples'Rights, 1993-1994, 30th Sess.,June 13th-15th, 1994, Tunis, Tunisia, at case no.
14, available in African Human Rights Resource Center (visited Sept. 13, 1999)
<http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/ACHPR2.htm> ("Considering that the
communication has already been referred for consideration to the Human Rights
Committee... the communication [is declared] inadmissible.").
142 See id. at Comm. No. 59/92, case no. 39 ("The African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights... [decides] to declare the communication of Amnesty Interna-
tional against the Republic of Tunisia inadmissible.").
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bunals in its forum shopping jurisprudence.'4 This conclusion is
based on her suspicion "that the Mpaka-Nsusu case before the
[UNHRC] related to different issues from those before the African
Commission."'"
B. Diverging and ConflictingApproaches to Human Rights Norms
In addition to the different interpretations of the forum shopping
clauses contained in the treaties, human rights tribunals have also dif-
fered over the content of the rights and freedoms shared by more
than one treaty. These differing standards can be broadly categorized
as either divergences or conflicts. If the obligations created by one in-
ternational agreement are more onerous than the obligations created
by a second agreement concerning the same subject, a divergence of
legal norms exists. A true conflict is created only where a signatory to
the two agreements cannot comply with both treaty obligations at the
same time.'
The cases discussed below present three case studies of diverging
and conflicting human rights norms. In the first example, divergence
by the UNHRC resulted in a lower standard of protection under the
ICCPR after the Committee gave careful consideration to a landmark
ruling of the ECHR. In the second case study, the UNHRC set a
'0 Murray, supra note 61, at 425.
144 Id
"5 As ProfessorJenks observed in a classic article nearly halfa century ago:
A divergence between treaty provisions dealing with the same subject or related
subjects does not in itself constitute a conflict. Two law-making treaties with a
number of common parties may deal with the same subject from different
points of view or be applicable in different circumstances, or one of the trea-
ties may embody obligations more far-reaching than, but not inconsistent
with, those of the other. A conflict in the strict sense of direct incompatibility
arises only where a party to the two treaties cannot simultaneously comply
with its obligations under both treaties.
C. WilfredJenks, The Conflict of Law-Making Treaties, 30 BRrr. Y.B. INT'LL. 401, 425-26
(1953) (emphasis added). Professor Meron has questioned the significance of the di-
vergence/conflict distinction as a theoretical exercise. He notes that
[it ]is indeed difficult to determine in abstracto whether a difference between
norms contained in two instruments constitutes a conflict or merely a diver-
gence. This determination can only be made in concreto taking into account
the entire complex of relevant legal provisions, the reservations made, and the
factual circumstances, including the identities of the particular States in-
volved.
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING, supra note 13, at 143. Professor Meron's observation
highlights the crucial role played by human rights jurists in clarifying whether treaties
in fact create diverging or conflicting rights and legal obligations for States. The ju-
rist's role is discussed in detail below.
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higher standard of protection than its European neighbors, but did
not expressly distinguish the approach it had adopted.146 The third
example concerns the intersection between two potentially conflicting
norms. It demonstrates how several tribunals have engaged in a dia-
logue over that intersection to avoid imposing conflicting obligations
on States parties.
1. Higher Regional Standards: The Death Row Phenomenon
Over the last decade, a large number of national courts and hu-
man rights tribunals have considered whether prolonged detention
on death row and its associated physical and psychological conse-
quences amount to inhuman or degrading treatment.4 7 Such treat-
ment is prohibited by numerous national constitutions and human
rights treaties.'
The ECHR first addressed the so-called "death row phenomenon"
issue in 1989 in Soeringv. United Kingdom.'49 The Court concluded that
the extradition ofJens Soering to face a capital murder charge in the
United States and await execution on death row would violate the
European Convention's prohibition of degrading treatment or pun-
ishment. The ECHR's ruling was highly fact-specific. The Court ex-
amined the six to eight year delay prior to execution, the conditions
on death row, Soering's age and mental state, the procedures avail-
able to challenge his conviction and sentence, and the possibility of
extradition to another country where capital punishment had been
16 What is most striking about these first two examples is that the diverging juris-
prudence relates to rights that are defined identically or nearly so in two or more trea-
ties. Where, by contrast, texts of two or more human rights treaties differ, a concomi-
tant divergence in the jurisprudence of the tribunals interpreting those texts is to be
expected under accepted principles of treaty construction.
"7 The United States Supreme Court recentlyjoined the growing number ofjudi-
cial bodies asked to address this question. See Knight v. Florida, 120 S. Ct. 459, 462-63
(mem.) (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing to decisions of
the ECHR, the UNHRC, and national courts as supporting defendant's allegation that
confinement on death row for 20 years or more violates the Eighth Amendment's pro-
hibition on cruel and unusual punishment).
4s See Richard B. Lillich, Harmonizing Human Rights Law Nationally and Internation-
ally: The Death Row Phenomenon as a Case Study, 40 ST. LOUIS L.J. 699 (1996) (referenc-
ing various constitutions and treaties that prohibit infliction of inhuman or degrading
treatment upon prisoners). For a recent decision by the Inter-American Commission
condemning the death row detention of a criminal defendant for more than 18 years,
see Andrews v. United States, Case 11.139, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 1, OEA/ser. L/V/II.98,
doc.7 rev, 178 (Feb. 19, 1998) (on file with author and the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review).
49 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
FORUM SHOPPING
abolished.'so
While the ECHR was considering the Soering case, the UNHRC was
also reviewing a petition involving the death row phenomenon. In
Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica,'5' two condemned prisoners argued that
their detention on death row for nearly ten years violated the ICCPR,
which bans inhuman and degrading treatment in language that is es-
sentially identical to language used in the European Convention.'52
The Committee, apparently unaware that Soering was pending before
the European tribunals, adopted "a somewhat more conservative ap-
proach than the European Court."'" Rejecting the petitioners' claim
on the facts presented, the UNHRC held that "[i]n principle pro-
longed judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment even if they can be a source of mental strain for
the convicted prisoners. "'5 It stressed, however, that "an assessment
of the circumstances of each case would be necessary. 
55
In the years following Pratt & Morgan, the UNHRC continued to
reject allegations that prolonged confinement on death row alone vio-
lates the ICCPR. The UNHRC did, however, expressly seek to harmo-
nize its views with those of the ECHR by adopting a fact-specific analy-
sis. Thus, in Kindler v. Canada,'6 the Committee, while reaffirming
that death row detention does not per se violate the ICCPR, gave
"careful regard to" the ECHR's approach, adopting much of the
Court's reasoning while distinguishing the unique facts of Soeringfrom
the case before it. 15
"0 See id. at 42-44 (discussing the particular factual circumstances of the case).
" U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Nos. 210/1986 &
225/1987 at 222, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989).
12 The relevant articles of the European Convention and the ICCPR are virtually
identical. Compare European Convention, supra note 26, art. 3 ("No one shall be sub-
jected to... inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."), with ICCPR, supra
note 24, art. 7 ("No one shall be subjected to... cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.").
"' Richard B. Lillich, Towards the Harmonization of International Human Rights Law,
in REcHT zviscHEN UMBRUcH IUND BEWAHRUNG 453, 466 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds.,
1995).
'm Pratt &Morgan, supra note 151,1 13.6.
"' Id.
' U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex XII, at 138, 151
U.N. Doc. A/48/40 (1993); see also Barrett v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX, at 254, & App., U.N. Doc. A/47/40 (1992) (sepa-
rate opinion of Committee member Chanet) (citing Soeringas support for rejecting the
majority's position that the 14-year stay on death row did not violate the ICCPR).
157 The Committee stated:
In determining whether... the imposition of capital punishment could con-
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In cases following Kindler, however, the UNHRC's promise to
conduct a fact-specific review of each case has not always been real-
ized. In Francis v. Jamaica, the Committee found that twelve years on
death row, together with numerous aggravating factors including beat-
ings by prison wardens, violated the ICCPR."' In other decisions in-
volving equally lengthy periods of detention, however, the Committee
has consistently rejected petitioners' claims, notwithstanding the fact
that several national courts have relied upon the ECHR's Soering deci-
sion to adopt a more pro-petitioner approach.5 9
Tension within the Committee itself over this restrictive approach
surfaced in Johnson v. Jamaica,16° in which an eleven-member majority
of the Committee acknowledged "that its [own death row] jurispru-
dence [had] given rise to controversy," and, as a result, decided to "set
out its position in detail."161 Although the majority stated that it would
continue to apply a facts and circumstances approach to death row
petitions, its opinion contained more restrictive language than in
stitute a violation of article 7, the Committee will have regard to the relevant
personal factors regarding the author, the specific conditions of detention on
death row, and whether the proposed method of execution is particularly ab-
horrent. In this context the Committee has had careful regard to the judg-
ment given by the European Court of Human Rights in the Soering v. United
Kingdom case. It notes that important facts leading to the judgment of the
European Court are distinguishable on material points from the facts in the
present case. In particular, the facts differ as to the age and mental state of
the offender, and the conditions on death row in the respective prison sys-
tems.... The Committee has also noted in the Soering case that... there
was a simultaneous request for extradition by a State where the death penalty
would not be imposed.
Kindler, supra note 156, 1 15.3 (footnote omitted).
'- U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 54th Sess., 11 9.1-9.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/54/
D/606/1994 (1995) (concluding that the "circumstances revealfed] a violation ofJa-
maica's obligations under.., the Covenant").
19 See id. 1 4.4 (citing decisions of the India Supreme Court, the Zimbabwe Su-
preme Court, and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council that followed Soering
and found constitutional violations based on prolonged death row detentions).
160 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 56th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/
588/1994 (1996).
161 Id. 1 8.1. The majority reasoned that because the death penalty was not per se
prohibited by the ICCPR, merely placing a defendant on death row to await execution
could not in itself violate the treaty. The ICCPR, however, also strongly encourages
States to abolish the death penalty and limit its use to the most serious crimes. See id. I
8.2(a) (stating that the ICCPR places severe restrictions on the use of the death pen-
alty). Imposing a bright line cut-off date beyond which death row detention would be
impermissible would create an incentive for States to carry out death sentences expedi-
tiously. Because "[1]ife on death row, harsh as it may be, is preferable to death," even
"prolonged detention on death row cannot, per se, be regarded as cruel or inhuman
treatment...." Id. 1 8.4.
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prior cases. Specifically, the majority stated that a treaty violation
would be found only if a petitioner could demonstrate "compelling
circumstances of the detention" other than its length.'62 AfterJohnson,
it seems unlikely that the Committee will find a violation of the ICCPR
unless the prisoner's treatment has been exceptionally egregious.6
What prompted the UNHRC to retreat from its use of a fact-
specific analysis paralleling the approach adopted by the ECHR? Al-
though the Committee has not explained the shift away from Euro-
pean jurisprudence, one possiblejustification may be found in the dif-
fering legal and political climate in many States parties to the ICCPR
as compared to the climate existing in European nations. As former
Committee member Rosalyn Higgins has written, "what may be an ap-
propriate and sensitive interpretation for the Western European de-
mocracies is not necessarily so for a global system embracing highly
diverse political and economic systems." 1' Stated more candidly,
death row conditions in many States subject to the Committee's juris-
diction may not be compatible with the more stringent requirements
of the Soering case. Were the Committee to adopt the ECHR's more
rigorous approach, it would be setting a standard of protection so far
out of touch with domestic laws that many States might be unwilling to
follow it.16
,62 Id. 1[ 8.5. The six dissenters strongly objected to this formulation as demonstrat-
ing "a lack of flexibility that would not allow [the Committee] to examine ... the cir-
cumstances of each case .... " Id. (dissenting individual opinions of Committee mem-
bers Bhagwati, Bruni, Celli, Pocar, and Vallejo). The dissenters predicted that the
Committee would rarely find a violation of the ICCPR in death row phenomenon
cases, even where time spent awaiting execution exceeds 15 years. Id. at app. B (dis-
senting opinion of Committee member Chanet) (hypothesizing that this decision
would not allow for a finding of cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment regardless
of the length of time a prisoner is on death row).
'63 For recent decisions reaffirming the majority's approach inJohnson, see Bickaroo
v. TTinidad and Tobago, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 61st Sess., Annex, 1 5.3, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/555/1993 (1997), and LaVende v. Tinidad and Tobago, U.N.
GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 61st Sess., Annex, 1 5.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/554/
1993 (1997).
16 Higgins, supra note 47, at 7-8. It is significant that Soeringinvolved extradition of
a defendant to the United States to face a possible stay on death row. Nearly all Euro-
pean nations, by contrast, no longer impose death sentences. See Soering, supra note
149, 1 102 ("De facto the death penalty no longer exists in time of peace in the Con-
tracting States to the Convention."). It is thus extremely unlikely that the European
tribunals will ever be faced with a challenge to the death row phenomenon within a
European nation.
'6 If the Committee was concerned about the political palatability of its decisions,
its anxiety appears to have been well-founded. In October 1997, Jamaica denounced
the Optional Protocol, becoming the first State ever to do so. Jamaica's action repre-
sents a potentially grave threat to supranational human rights adjudication. SeeNatalia
1999]
330 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:285
The Committee's experience withJamaica illustrates this problem.
As of August, 1999, Jamaica had been named as a defendant in 177
cases (many involving the death penalty and death row phenome-
non), far more than any other signatory State to the Optional Proto-
col. 16 Unlike some other States, Jamaica has openly resisted the
Committee's authority: it has failed to submit periodic reports as re-
quired under the ICCPR and has frequently ignored the Committee's
recommendations. 67 Faced with this intransigent stance, the majority
in Johnson may have refrained from adopting a standard requiring a
detailed factual review of each death row case, a review that Jamaica
could avoid by carrying out hasty executions. The majority's more
cautious approach also conserves the Committee's authority for ex-
treme cases such as Francis, where there can be little doubt that the
petitioner's rights were violated.
For purposes of analyzing diverging human rights norms, the
UNHRC's approach suggests that political or pragmatic concerns may
lead jurists sitting on one human rights tribunal to adopt approaches
that differ from those adopted by other tribunals when interpreting
treaty texts that on paper are identical. The UNHRC's actions, how-
ever, also demonstrate that jurists can more carefully refine their rea-
soning and analysis by engaging in a dialogue with their juridical
neighbors over shared legal standards. Thus, putting to one side the
merits of the Committee's restrictive approach to death row cases, its
jurisprudence has plainly been influenced by the existence of analo-
Schiffrin, Jamaica Withdraws the Right of Individual Petition Under the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, 92 AMER. J. INT'L L. 563, 563 (1998) (stating that Ja-
maica may "roll back the international legal protection of human rights" by denounc-
ing the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR). For a discussion of Jamaica's actions and
their significance for structuring forum shopping reform, see infra Part IV.B.2.
1 See Statistical Survey of Individual Complaints Dealt with by the Human Rights
Committee Under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (Aug. 3, 1999), available in
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (last modified Mar. 12, 1999)
<http://www.unhchr.ch> (showing that the country closest to Jamaica in number of
cases naming the country as defendant is Canada with 89).
617 Compare Johnson, supra note 160, at app. C, 1 4 (dissenting opinion of Commit-
tee member Aguilar Urbina) (noting thatJamaica has refused "to comply with its obli-
gation to report to the Human Rights Committee"), and Annual General Assembly Report
of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., Supp. No. 40
549, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 Vol.I (1995), available in Treaty Bodies Database (visited
Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter 1995 Annual Report] <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf> (notingJamaica's explicit refusal to implement the Committee's recommen-
dations in cases decided under the Optional Protocol), with Christian Tomuschat,
Making Individual Communications an Effective Tool for the Protection of Human Rights, in
RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG 615, 629 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. eds.,
1995) (noting thatJamaica has always complied with the Committee's requests not to
carry out death sentences pending consideration of petitions).
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gous European precedents. It can hardly be an accident that the ma-
jority in Johnson felt obligated to explain its reasoning in greater detail
when petitioners had repeatedly asked it to follow national and inter-
national case law adopting a more pro-petitioner approach. Because
that more rights-protective case law has persuaded several dissenting
Committee members, it will likely continue to be a subject of debate
by the UNHRC in future cases.
2. Higher Global Standards: Discrimination Between
Conscientious Objectors
The UNHRC's restrictive approach to the death row phenomenon
should not mislead observers into believing that it always adopts a less
rights-protective standard than regional tribunals. To the contrary,
several recent decisions demonstrate the Committee's willingness to
interpret rights shared by several human rights treaties in a manner
more favorable to individuals than the ECHR or the European Com-
mission. The Committee's recognition of the emerging right of con-
scientious objection clearly illustrates this trend.1ss
Both the European Commission and the UNHRC initially inter-
preted their respective treaties as not protecting a right to conscien-
tious objection.' 6 Petitioners imprisoned for failing to perform mili-
tary service or substituted civilian service alleged that these
punishments violated the freedom of conscience and religion guaran-
'6s See Emily N. Marcus, Note, Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right, 38
VA. J. INT'L L. 507 (1998) (discussing how the UNHRC is beginning to acknowledge
conscientious objection as a human right). A similar trend is found in the UNHRC's
extension of due process guarantees to civil servants denied relief before the European
Commission. See Casanovas, supra note 101. For another example of the UNHRC con-
sidering the merits of a petition previously rejected by the European Commission, see
Coeriel v. The Netherlands, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 52d Sess., Annex, 1 10.5,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 (1994), in which the UNHRC concluded that the
Netherlands had violated the Hindu petitioners' right of privacy when it denied a re-
quest to change their last names to follow their religious beliefs. The European Com-
mission had previously rejected a challenge by the same petitioners under the freedom
of religion clause of the European Convention. See id. 1 2.4 (stating that the complaint
did not establish "that their religious studies would be impeded by the refusal to mod-
ify their surnames").
'0 See, e.g., L.T.K. v. Finland, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 25th Sess., at 61, 1
5.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985) ("The Covenant does not provide for the right
to conscientious objection; neither article 18 nor article 19 of the Covenant, especially
taking into account paragraph 3(c) (ii) of article 8, can be construed as implying that
right."); Conscientious Objectors v. Denmark, App. No. 7565/76, 9Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 117, 118 (1987) ("[T]he right of conscientious objection is not included
among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.").
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teed by the two treaties. 7° Both the UNHRC and the Commission,
however, relied upon another clause exempting from the treaties'
prohibition of forced or compulsory labor "any service of a military
character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where
they are recognized, service exacted instead of compulsory military
service." 71 Based on this language, both tribunals concluded that the
treaties did "not give conscientious objectors the right to exemption
from military service, but leaves each contracting state to decide
whether or not to grant such a right."'7
The European Commission has adhered to this interpretation in
recent decisions, 73 and it has also rejected a challenge to a Swedish
law that exempts Jehovah's witnesses from both military service and
civilian service as a substitute, but requires substitute civilian service
for those whose beliefs are not religious in nature.17 The UNHRC, by
contrast, has slowly modified its practice to recognize a human right
of conscientious objection and the right of different groups of objec-
tors to be treated equally. After alluding to the possible existence of
this right in a 1991 decision, 75 the Committee formally modified its
position in a 1993 General Comment on freedom of thought, con-
'70 See European Convention, supra note 26, art. 9(1); ICCPR, supra note 24, art.
18(1) ("Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and relig-
ion ... [and] to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and
teaching.").
171 European Convention, supra note 26, art. 4(3) (b); accord ICCPR, supra note 24,
art. 8(3) (c) (ii) (exempting from the prohibition of compulsory labor "any service of a
military character, and, in countries where conscientious objection is recognized, any
national service required by law of conscientious objectors").
17 A. v. Switzerland, App. No. 10640/83, 38 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 219,
223 (1984); accord L. T.K, supra note 169 and accompanying text (stating that the right
to conscientious objection is not covered by the ICCPR).
173 SeeJohansen v. Norway, App. No. 10600/83, 44 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
155, 159 (1985) ('There is no possibility of exemption from both military and civilian
service, except for medical reasons.").
14 See N. v. Sweden, App. No. 10410/83, 40 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 203,
208 (1985) ("[M]embership of Jehovah's Witnesses constitutes strong evidence that
the objections to compulsory service are based on genuine religious convictions. No
comparable evidence exists in regard to individuals who object to compulsory service
without being members of a community with similar characteristics.").
'7 SeeJ.P. v. Canada, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43d Sess., Annex, 1 4.2, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/43/D/446/1991 (1991) ("Although article 18 of the Covenant certainly
protects the right to hold, express and disseminate opinions and convictions, including
conscientious objection to military activities and expenditures, the refusal to pay taxes




Later that year, the Committee applied its new approach in Brink-
hof v. The Netherlands.17 A military tribunal had sentenced Brinkhof, a
pacifist, to twelve months imprisonment for refusing to perform mili-
tary or substitute civilian service. After exhausting his appeals, Brink-
hof petitioned the European Commission, alleging that a Dutch stat-
ute exempting only Jehovah's Witnesses from all compulsory service
,vas incompatible with the European Convention's prohibition of dis-
crimination. Upholding prior case law, the Commission summarily
rejected this claim.17 8
Brinkhof then filed a petition with the UNHRC, alleging that the
Dutch law discriminated against individuals holding non-religious ob-
jections to compulsory service. The government raised the same ar-
guments that had persuaded the European Commission to dismiss the
petition, namely thatJehovah's Witnesses are part of "a closely-knit so-
cial group with strict rules of behaviour, membership of which is said
to constitute strong evidence that the objections to military and substi-
tute service are based on genuine religious convictions."'7 Without
addressing the prior European precedents, the Committee rejected
the government's reasoning:
The Committee considers that the exemption of only one group of con-
scientious objectors and the inapplicability of exemption for all others
cannot be considered reasonable. In this context, the Committee refers
to its General Comment on article 18 and emphasizes that, when a right
of conscientious objection to military service is recognized by a State
176 The General Comment states:
[A] growing number of States have in their laws exempted from compulsory
military service citizens who genuinely hold religious or other beliefs that for-
bid the performance of military service and replaced it with alternative na-
tional service. The Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right to conscien-
tious objection, but the Committee believes that such a right can be derived from
article 18, inasmuch as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict with the
freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's religion or belief. When this right
is recognized by law or practice, there shall be no differentiation among con-
scientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs ....
General Comment 22, Article 18, Compilation of General Comments and General Rec-
ommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 48th Sess., at 38, U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\I\Rev.1 (1994) (emphasis added).
177 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/
402/1990 (1993).
17 See id. 7.4 (citing European Commission decisions).
1 Id. 1 9.2. The Netherlands could not seek to dismiss Brinkhof's petition on suc-
cessive petition forum shopping grounds because it had not filed a reservation to the
Optional Protocol prohibiting the UNHRC from considering such petitions.
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party, no differentiation shall be made among conscientious objectors
on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs.
180
On the facts presented, however, the Committee refused to find a
violation of the ICCPR because Brinkhof had not demonstrated that
"his convictions as a pacifist are incompatible with the system of sub-
stitute service in the Netherlands." 8' However, the Committee sug-
gested that a violation might be found in another case, and it urged
the Netherlands to amend its laws and regulations and to "give equal
treatment to all persons holding equally strong objections to military
and substitute service. "1s2
Significantly, the Committee in Brinkhof did not analyze or distin-
guish the European Commission's more restrictive approach to con-
scientious objection claims. This omission is unfortunate because the
Committee lost a valuable opportunity to engage in a dialogue with
the Commission over textually identical human rights norms shared
by both the ICCPR and the European Convention. In fact, a large
body of international practice supports the Committee's more liberal
interpretation of the ICCPR, and the UNHRC might have invoked this
practice both to justify its decision in Brinkhof and to encourage the
Commission to reconsider its more restrictive and arguably outdated




198 Numerous U.N. resolutions and recommendations have advocated formal rec-
ognition of a right to conscientious objection, and European regional organizations
have also urged European nations to recognize this right. See Ulrike Davy, Refugees from
Bosnia and Herzegovina: Are They Genuine, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 53, 110
nn.175-77 (1995) (noting these sources); Marcus, supra note 168, at 532-36 (discussing
the various groups and organizations that have advocated a formal recognition of a
right to conscientious objection). That these recommendations were made by both
European and U.N. bodies suggests that the European tribunals may eventually recon-
sider their approach in light of the Committee's recent practice. Some evidence of
this reconsideration can be found in the European Commission's recent decision in
Tsirlis v. Greece in which two Jehovah's Witness ministers were initially denied an ex-
emption from military service and imprisoned notwithstanding the fact that they be-
long to a "known religion" in Greece. Tsirlis v. Greece, European Court of Human
Rights-Judgments and Decisions 1997-II, 908, 942, App. No. 19233/91, 25 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 198, 11 118-19 (1998), affd on other grounds, No. 54/1996/673/859-60, available in
European Court of Human Rights Home Page (May 29, 1997) <http://www.dhcour.coe.fr/
eng/Judgments.htm>. The Commission found that the Greek authorities' failure to
grant a speedy exemption to the prisoners was discriminatory because members of the
Orthodox Church would have received an exemption without difficulty. The ECHR
affirmed the Commission's decisions on other grounds and did not reach the dis-
crimination issue. Id. [1 68-70.
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relevant precedents from another human rights tribunal, the Commit-
tee could have bolstered the quality of its own reasoning and signaled
to individual petitioners and States parties that its decision to diverge
from its European counterpart did not occur by chance or inadver-
tence.
3. Avoiding Conflicting Standards: Racist Speech
Human rights standards can conflict as well as diverge. When two
tribunals interpret treaty texts that are in tension with each other, they
may issue conflicting decisions that make it impossible for a defending
State to comply with both of its international obligations. The tension
between protecting freedom of expression and prohibiting the dis-
semination of racist speech is one area in which a true conflict of hu-
man rights norms and decisions may occur.'8 At least four tribunals
have addressed the intersection between these two opposing princi-
ples: the ECHR, the European Commission, CERD, and the UNHRC.
The European Commission first addressed the racist speech issue
in Glimmerveen & Hagenbeek v. The Netherlands,ss concluding that the
Netherlands had not violated the free expression rights of two peti-
tioners whom it had prosecuted for possessing and intending to dis-
tribute pamphlets advocating white superiority and inciting racial ha-
tred against foreigners. Noting that the European Convention did
not grant individuals the right to destroy the rights and freedoms of
184 The Race Convention requires its signatories to:
[C]ondemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or
theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic
origin, or which attempt tojustify or promote racial hatred and discrimination
in any form, and undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures de-
signed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to
this end, udth due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination,
as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or
group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin ....
Race Convention, supra note 29, art. 4(a) (emphasis added). The "due regard" clause
of article 4 requires States to consider, when prohibiting racist speech, the right to
freedom of expression, which is referred to in article 5(d) (viii) of the Race Convention
and protected by article 19 of the Universal Declaration, article 19 of the ICCPR, arti-
cle 10 of the European Convention, and other international treaties.
18 App. Nos. 8348/78 and 8406/78, 18 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 187
(1979).
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other members of society,8 6 the Commission reviewed the contents of
the leaflets and concluded that they were clearly aimed at promoting
racial discrimination. Had the Netherlands allowed the petitioners
"to proclaim freely and without penalty their ideas," it would have
"encourage [d] the discrimination prohibited by the provisions of the
European Convention... and the [Race Convention]."' 7 The Com-
mission thus relied upon the U.N. treaty to support its conclusion that
the petitioners' free expression rights had not been violated'
The CERD next addressed the intersection of the two competing
international obligations in its General Comment on article 4 of the
Race Convention. 9 The Committee adopted the position that "the
prohibition of the dissemination of all ideas based upon racial superi-
ority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and
expression."' 90 Although acknowledging that free expression is pro-
tected in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Committee
stated that the "exercise of this right carries special duties and respon-
sibilities, specified in... the Universal Declaration, among which the
obligation not to disseminate racist ideas is of particular impor-
tance."' 9' With these statements, CERD appeared to place the States'
obligation to criminalize racist speech in a position superior to the
right to free expression, adopting a stance in harmony with that pre-
viously espoused by the European Commission.' 92
16 See id. at 194-95 (citing article 17 of the European Convention). Article 17 pro-
vides that:
Nothing in this Convention may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed
at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the Convention.
Id.
187 Id. at 196.
188 The Commission reaffirmed this position three years later, upholding against a
free expression challenge ajudicial order prohibiting the display and sale of brochures
stating that the holocaust was a "zionist swindle or lie." X. v. Germany, App. No.
9235/81, 29 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 194, 194 (1982). Carefully interpreting
the free speech provisions of the European Convention, the Commission reasoned
that the order not only served "a legitimate purpose recognised by the Convention
(namely the protection of the reputation of others), but could also be considered as
necessary in a democratic society" to promote "the principles of tolerance and broad-
mindedness." Id. at 198.
'89 General Recommendation XV on Article 4 of the Convention, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
42d Sess., at 68, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 (1994).
19 Id. 14.
191 Id.
19 The CERD, however, has not yet had an opportunity to apply these principles to
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A more significant challenge to the tribunals' ability to harmonize
the clash between free expression and race discrimination occurred in
Jersild v. Denmark.'93 In Jersild, a journalist who produced a television
program about a group of racist youths living in Copenhagen was
charged with aiding and abetting the making of racially insulting and
degrading statements. Jersild conducted extensive interviews of the
youths, during which they made numerous racist remarks about blacks
and immigrant workers. After the journalist broadcast excerpts of
these interviews as part of a news documentary, a Danish prosecutor
brought criminal proceedings against the youths for making state-
ments insulting or degrading to a group of persons on the basis of
their race and national origin. Jersild was convicted of aiding and
abetting the making of these statements. Jersild unsuccessfully chal-
lenged his conviction before the Danish courts and then petitioned
the European tribunals for relief.
The European Commission ruled injersild's favor94 and Denmark
appealed to the ECHR, which affirmed the Commission's ruling by a
twelve to seven vote.'95 Jersild argued before the Court that "a fair bal-
ance had to be struck between the 'protection of the reputation or
rights of others' and the applicant's right to impart information."196
He based this argument on article 4 of the Race Convention, which
requires States to have "due regard" for freedom of expression when
criminalizing the dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred. 1 7 The ECHR expanded uponJersild's effort to harmonize the
Race Convention's obligations and the free expression rights of the
European Convention. It considered the competing interests at stake
a specific case brought before it under the optional petition procedure of the Race
Convention.
,93 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994).
'"App. No. 15890/89, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1 (1995) (Commission report). The
Commission stated that it had "taken into consideration" Denmark's obligation under
the Race Convention, but it also stressed the need to review broadcasts "in the light of
the context of the programme and all the circumstances of the case," and to strike "a
fair balance" between the rights of the targets of the racist attacks andJersild's right to
communicate information to the public. Id. 1 41. It then consideredjersild's motiva-
tion for broadcasting the interview with the youths and its relationship to the program
as a whole, concluding by a twelve to four vote thatJersild's prosecution violated the
right to freedom of expression protected by the European Convention. See id. 11 42-
45 (concluding that although the applicants' remarks were "highly offensive," article
10 was breached because "the Government [did] not suffice to show that the interfer-
ence complained of was proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued").
1
95 Jersid, supra note 193, at 27.
196 id. [ 28.
197 See Race Convention, supra note 29, art. 4(a).
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in an effort to avoid creating a conflict between the two treaties:
The Court would emphasise at the outset that it is particularly conscious
of the vital importance of combating racial discrimination in all its forms
and manifestations.... Consequently, the object and purpose pursued
by the UN Convention are of great weight in determining whether the
applicant's conviction, which... was based on a provision enacted in or-
der to ensure Denmark's compliance with the UN Convention, was
"necessary" within the meaning of Article 10 §2.
In the second place, Denmark's obligations under Article 10 must be inter-
preted, to the extent possible, so as to be reconcilable with its obligations under the
UN Convention. In this respect it is not for the Court to interpret the
"due regard" clause in Article 4 of the U.N. Convention, which is open to
various constructions. The Court is however of the opinion that its interpreta-
tion of Article 10 of the European Convention in the fTesent case is compatible
with Denmark's obligations under the U.N. Convention
98
The Court then analyzed the youths' statements and the context
of their broadcast in detail, stressing thatJersild "did not make the ob-
jectionable statements himself but assisted in their dissemination in
his capacity of television journalist responsible for a news pro-
gramme."19 The Court contrastedJersild's conviction with that of the
youths, stating that "[t] here can be no doubt that the[ir] remarks...
were more than insulting to members of the targeted groups and did
not enjoy the protection of [the Convention's freedom of expression
clause] .2.°
When Denmark presented its next report on its efforts to combat
'9 Jersi, supra note 193, 1 30 (emphasis added). The ECHR also considered
comments by CERD regardingJersild's case made during Denmark's periodic report
to CERD. The Court noted that CERD was
[D]ivided in its comments on [Jersild's] conviction .... Whilst some members
welcomed it as "the clearest statement yet, in any country, that the right to
protection against racial discrimination took precedence over the right to
freedom of expression", other members considered that "in such cases the
facts needed to be considered in relation to both rights." The Court con-
cluded from these statements that "[t]he effects of the 'due regard'
clause.., have given rise to differing interpretations," a fact that provided fur-
ther support for its own circumspect, fact-intensive approach.
Id. 121.
" Id. 31.
Id. 1 35. In reaching this result, the ECHR relied on the European Commis-
sion's decisions in Glimmerveen, supra note 185, and Kanen v. Germany, App. No.
12194/86, 56 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 205 (1988). SeeJersild, supra note 193, 1
35 (citing cases in support of the contention that the statements were insulting to
members of protected groups and not protected under Article 10); supra text accom-
panying notes 185-92 (discussing the ECHR's decision in Glimmerveen).
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race discrimination to CERD, the Committee members expressly re-
ferred to the ECHR's judgment... Committee member Banton
agreed with the Court's assessment that the judgment in Jersild was
compatible with the U.N. treaty. He proposed that "the Committee
should collectively affirm its agreement with that judgment. "2  Al-
though other members believed that CERD should not express an
opinion on the ECHR's ruling,0 3 when the Committee issued its con-
cluding observations to Denmark it "not[ed]" the ECHR's judgment
and "affirm[ed] that the 'due regard' clause of article 4 of the Con-
vention requires due balancing of the right to protection from racial
discrimination against the right to freedom of expression."2 This
formulation, which is significantly more tempered than CERD's
statement in its General Comment on article 4, embodies the essence
of the ECHR's effort to weigh carefully the competing obligations at
stake.
The most recent case addressing racist speech, Faurisson v.
205France, provides another example of human rights tribunals harmo-
nizing potentially conflicting standards. In Faurisson, the UNHRC
considered a petition from a university professor who publicly dis-
puted the historical existence of the Holocaust and, in particular, the
use of gas chambers in Nazi death camps.2° Several citizens success-
fully filed a private criminal action against Faurisson under France's
recently-enacted Gayssot Act, which makes it a criminal offense to
contest the existence of crimes against humanity that have been rec-
ognized by the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Ger-
many in 1945.
Faurisson challenged his conviction before the UNHRC. In de-
fense of the law and its application to Faurisson, France cited the
Glimmerveen and Kunen decisions of the European Commission.
2' Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 48th Sess., 1137th mtg.
(Summary Record), 1 9, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR. 1137 (1996).
Id. (noting Committee member Banton's statement that the ECHR's interpreta-
tion of article 10 of the European Convention "was compatible with Denmark's obliga-
tions under the United Nations Convention").
203Id. 1 21 (noting that Committee member van Boven stated that it was not ap-
propriate to comment on the court's ruling).
Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination:
Denmark, 48th Sess., 1149th mtg., J 3, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.2 (1996).
25 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 58th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/
550/1993 (1996).
Faurisson expressed his opinion in an interview published in a monthly maga-
zine, stating that "the myth of the gas chambers is a dishonest fabrication ... endorsed
by the victorious powers of Nuremberg." Id. 12.6.
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France argued that the Glimerveen case contained "many similarities
with the present case and its ratio decidendi could be used for the de-
termination of Mr. Faurisson's case."20 7 France also stressed its obliga-
tion under the Race Convention to prohibit racist speech, noting that
CERD had reviewed the Gayssot Act favorably in its concluding obser-
vations on France's periodic report. 
2 0
In rejecting Faurisson's petition, the UNHRC carefully avoided
creating a conflict with the earlier decisions of the European tribunals
and CERD, although it did not cite or directly distinguish them. The
Committee suggested that the Gayssot Act might well be incompatible
with the ICCPR's right to freedom of expression were it to be applied
broadly. On the facts presented, however, the Committee found that
the restriction on Faurisson's freedom of expression was necessary to
protect the rights of others, notably the Jewish community in
France. 9 This approach is strikingly similar to that adopted by the
210ECHR and European Commission in its earlier case law.
The foregoing case study of racist speech provides compelling
evidence that human rights jurists can communicate with each other
in a common enterprise to develop consistent human rights norms.
In the abstract, the tension between protecting freedom of expression
and combating racial discrimination and punishing racist speech is
formidable and perhaps even insoluble. In deciding how these obli-
gations apply to specific cases, however, human rights tribunals have
avoided issuing conflicting decisions by using a narrow, fact-specific
approach and avoiding broad pronouncements of principle. They
have also mitigated any potential conflict by expressly considering
each other's decisions and interpretations and by seeking to develop
coherent standards for States to follow.
o Id. 7.4.
See id. 1 7.7 ("[CERD] specifically welcomed the adoption of the Law... during
the examination of the periodic report of France in 1994.").
See id. 11 9.5-9.7 (holding that the court convicted Faurisson for violating the
rights and reputation of people in the Jewish community and expressing satisfaction
that the application of the Gayssot Act was in accord with the provisions of the ICCPR).
210 See supra text accompanying notes 185-88, 193-200 (noting the approach taken
by the European tribunals in the Glimmerveen andJersild decisions). Several concurring
opinions elaborated upon the Committee's analysis, but all of these statements agreed
that the law as applied did amount to a breach of the right to freedom of expression.
See Faurisson, supra note 205 (providing the text of the concurring opinions of Commit-
tee members Ando, Evatt, Kretzmer, Quiroga, Lallah, and Bagwati).
FORUM SHOPPING
III. FORUM SHOPPING THEORY
The potential for human rights forum shopping has existed since
the creation of overlapping treaties and petition procedures in the
1960s and 1970s. During this formative period, human rights com-
mentators examined the theoretical and policy justifications for and
against forum shopping. Their studies fall into two groups. One set
of studies analyzed the effects of forum shopping on the interests and
incentives of petitioners and defending States before human rights
tribunals. The other set focused on institutional and normative impli-
cations that forum shopping raised for the coexistence of interna-
tional petition procedures. The conclusion reached by most com-
mentators at this early stage was that review of a single petitioner's
human rights claims by more than one tribunal was undesirable and
should generally be prevented.
In this Section, I first describe both of these strands of commen-
tary. Then, focusing on the numerous ways in which the petition sys-
tem has matured over the last twenty five years, I offer a more com-
prehensive appraisal of the justifications for and against duplicative
review from both the aggrieved individual's perspective and from the
perspective of the petition system as an institution for clarifying States
parties' treaty obligations. My analysis reveals that, as in many domes-
tic legal systems, the objectives of finality, certainty, and efficient use
of scarce resources support a rule limiting a petitioner's ability to en-
gage in simultaneous or successive petition forum shopping. Yet, my
analysis also demonstrates that there are many powerful justifications,
absent from domestic law, which do favor relitigation of human rights
claims in the international arena.
A. The Parties'Interests and Incentives
In a 1976 article comparing the petition procedures of the Inter-
American system and the ICCPR, Maxime Tardu cogently identified
the competing interests and incentives of individuals and States as liti-
gants before human rights tribunals.2 ' For individuals, Tardu stressed
the "legitimate procedural interests of the victims of human rights vio-
2" See Tardu, supra note 13. At the time Tardu published this article, none of the
cases discussed in Part II had been decided. Tardu's study focused instead on treaty
texts, on the recent practice of U.N. and regional non-judicial monitoring bodies, and
on hypothetical cases that might arise under the regional and global individual peti-
tion systems. See id. at 786-87 (discussing generally the admissibility of complaints to
both the U.N. and regional bodies).
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lations" under a doctrine she termed "procedural laissez-faire."212 Ac-
cording to advocates of this approach, allowing individuals to engage
in forum shopping maximizes their chances of vindicating their
rights.2 13 Multiple review was also thought to be warranted because
petitioners' "procedural rights are still far weaker than those of plain-
tiffs before national courts" and because the treaties' admissibility
rules "often lead to the rejection of complaints on nonsubstantive
grounds."
2 14
Directly contrary to the procedural laissez-faire theory is an ap-
proach Tardu labeled the "unification doctrine." Proponents of this
doctrine opposed any dual examination of a petition by multiple tri-
bunals, stressing the States parties' interests in "the good administra-
tion ofjustice," the importance of "safeguard[ing] the feeling of 'legal
security' among the States and the petitioners concerned," and the
need to prevent "abusive and repetitive complaints."21 5 Tardu rejected
both of these approaches as too extreme, advocating instead that indi-
viduals should be permitted to file a petition with a second tribunal if
their first petition had been totally or partially rejected by a previous
tribunal.216
B. Institutional and Normative Concerns
Many other early commentators analyzing forum shopping fo-
cused not on the interests and incentives of the parties, but on institu-
tional and normative concerns. These commentators concluded
12 Id. at 794.
"11 See id. ("'[T]he availability of two recourse procedures could only strengthen
the protection of human rights [because] it is the end which matters, not the means:
the more numerous the procedures, the better it will be' for the protection of human
rights." (citation omitted)). For a similar claim in the context of the United States
Constitution, see Chemerinsky, supra note 60, at 300-26.
214 Tardu, supra note 13, at 794.
211 Id. at 793, 795 (citations omitted). Professor Robertson, an advocate of the
"unification" theory, argued that States' interest in the finality of litigation militated
against multiple review of petitions. See Robertson, supra note 13, at 47 (stating that an
"applicant who wishes to bring a case against a State... should have the right of choice
between the two methods of bringing his case before an international organ
but... should accept the consequences of his decision and not have the possibility of
going from one forum to another").
216 In essence, Tardu proposed that the human rights petition system as a whole
adopt a standard similar to that contained in the ICCPR's First Optional Protocol. See
Tardu, supra note 13, at 795-98. Tardu did not, however, discuss how the tribunals
should interpret the key phrase "the same matter" or dispose of successive petitions
concerning rights that are not drafted or interpreted identically in two or more trea-
ties. For a discussion of this issue, see infra Part IV.
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overwhelmingly that multiple review of individual petitions should be
prohibited based on three related justifications: the threat to the
authority of human rights tribunals; a desire to promote the primacy
of regional human rights regimes comprised of States with similar le-
gal, political, and cultural systems over more heterogeneous global
systems; and a fear of divergence and conflict in the jurisprudence of
different tribunals interpreting the same or similar legal norms.
1. Threatening the Authority of Tribunals
The most frequently cited justification for refusing to permit the
filing of successive petitions is the danger that this conduct poses to
the authority of the tribunals. As one commentator forcefully stated:
[D]uplication of proceedings would lead to shocking consequences.
Differences in assessment would almost inevitably occur between the
[UNHRC] and the Strasbourg bodies. Furthermore, the former would
in practice be given a right to look into, if not to censure, the activities of
the latter, who would in turn enjoy the same right. For instance, a State
resorting to the [UNHRC] after having vainly lodged an application un-
der the Convention would appear to be making a kind of appeal: it
would in effect be asking the Committee to uphold a claim which the
Commission [or] Court... had declared inadmissible or ill-founded.
This would undermine the authority of institutions empowered by the
Convention to make binding and final decisions in their respective do-
mains.217
Other commentators agreed, stating for example that to permit
an individual to present a petition to the UNHRC after that petition
had been previously rejected by the European tribunals "would almost
amount to an 'appeal' from the European organs to the United Na-
tions Committee; such an 'appeal' would be bound to undermine, to
some extent, the authority of those organs."
2 18
217 Eissen, supra note 13, at 189. Although Eissen's comments were directed at fo-
rum shopping in inter-State disputes, he believed that the same concerns were raised
by forum shopping by individuals. See i. at 202 n.70 (discussing the need to avoid du-
plication of proceedings).
1 Robertson, supra note 13, at 46; see also COMMISSION TO STUDY THE
ORGANizATON OF PEACE, ThE UNrrED NATONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 177 (1968) ("[I]t
would seem undesirable to provide for an appeal to the United Nations from a final
and binding decision of a regional body or of a specialized agency."); Information Re-
port on the Protection of Human Rights in the United Nations Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Its Optional Protocol and in the European Convention on Human
Rights, EUR. PARL Doc. 3773 19 (1976) (arguing against permitting States to file
with the UNHRC a case previously filed with one of the European tribunals because
"this might create the impression of an 'appeal' from the European organs to the U.N.
committee and this might undermine, or at least weaken, the authority of those or-
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2. Preserving the Primacy of Regional Human Rights Regimes
Closely linked to the threat to jurists' authority was a perceived
need to prohibit forum shopping to bolster regional human rights re-
gimes as superior fora in which to resolve disputes. This claimed su-
periority was premised on the juridical nature of regional tribunals
and their more developed system of supervision, particularly in
Europe. Eissen, for example, justified his preference for regional set-
dement of disputes by noting that U.N.-based human rights treaties
"suffer from an inherent weakness in the way they are to be imple-
mented; for example, they do not provide for binding decisions com-
parable to those of the [European institutions] ."219 He also argued
that European nations "have a legitimate interest in settling enfamille
any disputes that may arise among them in the field of human rights"
to the exclusion of dispute settlement procedures within the United
Nations.
Permitting individuals to file a second petition outside of Europe
after their attempt to receive redress from the European tribunals had
been rejected would seriously erode these regional advantages.nl For
this reason, the Council of Europe urged its member States to file res-
ervations to the First Optional Protocol to prohibit individuals from
filing a petition with the UNHRC once that same petition had been
gans"); Mbse & Opsahl, supra note 103, at 306 ("It has been argued that one should
avoid the possibility of an individual 'appeal' from the European organs to the Human
Rights Committee, and some countries have tabled reservations to this effect.");
TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 113 (noting that commentary concerning "co-ordination"
of human rights petition systems "aim [s] at the preservation of the authority of inter-
national supervisory organs and their decisions").
219 Eissen, supra note 13, at 183; see also M6se & Opsahl, supra note 103, at 286 (ar-
guing that a regional approach to human rights protection is superior to a global ap-
proach in "achieving common standards and efficient procedures of implementa-
tion"); Robertson, supra note 13, at 26 (noting that, unlike the European Convention,
the ICCPR contains "no provision leading to the judicial determination of the exis-
tence (or the absence) of a violation"). More recently, commentators have made the
same arguments concerning the Inter-American human rights system. See TRINDADE,
supra note 13, at 117.
M Eissen, supra note 13, at 183. Eissen also asserts that encouraging regional set-
tlement of disputes benefited individuals, since "[b]y addressing themselves to the
[UNHRC], individuals would run the risk of prejudicing their own cause as the cases
they submitted on the world scene might have had a better chance of being settled to
their satisfaction before the Strasbourg organs." Id. at 201.
2' See P.R. Ghandhi, The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Commu-
nication, 57 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 201, 230 (1986) (arguing that UNHRC review of Euro-
pean tribunal decisions would be undesirable); Robertson, supra note 13, at 46-47 (ar-
guing that States parties to the European Convention should file reservations to the
ICCPR to prevent "appeals" from the European Commission to the UNHRC).
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rejected by the European tribunals.ru In this way, these States could
solve the problem of coexistence between the U.N. and regional hu-
man rights systems by adopting a preference for a "'European' settle-
ment to 'European' disputes."22 3'
3. Avoiding Diverging and Conflicting Decisions
A third rationale frequently articulated by commentators tojustify
their opposition to forum shopping is the need to preclude human
rights tribunals from reaching conflicting or diverging decisions. As
P.R. Ghandhi wrote in a passage that links this justification to the pre-
vious two rationales:
[I]t is understandable that States parties which have also ratified the
European Convention should not wish the final decisions of the Stras-
bourg bodies to be the subject of further scrutiny [by the UNHRC].
Such an examination would weaken the authority of the European
Commission or Court... especially if the Committee disagreed with the Euro-
pean institutions and came to the conclusion that a breach or breaches of rights
covered in both instruments had occurred.
224
Other commentators share this view. Professor Meron, for exam-
ple, has written that successive review of the same petition by different
tribunals "might lead to difficulties as a result... of divergencies in
the case law of the two systems. "'22 Such divergencies, he argued,
could prevent the attainment of "normative uniformity" and encour-
age States "guilty of human rights violations" to "take advantage of




m See Eissen, supra note 13, at 204-05 (citing the Committee of Ministers' decision
recommending that individual petitioners not be permitted "to bring the same case
under both procedures either at the same time or successively" and recommending
reservation to the ICCPR Optional Protocol to achieve that result); see also supra Part
I.C.3 (discussing the Protocol and its relation to successive petition forum shopping).
"'Jan De Meyer, International Control Machinery, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
COLLOQUY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN RELATION TO
OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 290
(1978). That preference did not, however, extend as far as prohibiting individuals
from engaging in choice of tribunal forum shopping. See supra Part I.C.1 (explaining
forum shopping involving choice of tribunals).
224 Ghandhi, supra note 221, at 230 (emphasis added).
= HUMAN RIGHTS IAw-MAKING, supra note 13, at 236.
226Id. at 143, 236, 241; see also Tardu, supra note 13, at 788 (noting that because of
the co-existence of procedures within the Inter-American and U.N. systems, "[d]ual
examination of the same, or similar matters ... may lead to the adoption of conflicting
substantive conclusions").
In a recent petition to CAT, the government of Sweden voiced similar concerns.
The case concerned a Djibouti national who alleged that he would be tortured were
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C. Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom: Identifying the Interests of
Individual Petitioners FavoringForum Shoping
All litigants seeking relief in a judicial or quasi-judicial forum
would naturally prefer a rule that multiplies the chances to receive a
favorable ruling. Yet no system of adjudication has deemed that pref-
erence, standing alone, as sufficient to justify endless relitigation of
claims. In the context of the international human rights petition sys-
tem, however, there are several powerful arguments favoring at least
some forms of duplicative review.
Consider first the far more limited jurisdictional and claims join-
der rules governing human rights tribunals as compared to many do-
mestic courts.2 These limitations are a product of the disaggregated
nature of the petition system, in which only one tribunal is authorized
to adjudicate claims by individuals arising under any given treaty.! As
Sweden to deport him to Djibouti. Sweden argued that although the "test applied" by
both CAT and the European Commission for determining whether to grant asylum to
foreign nationals at risk of torture was "in principle the same," in practice CAT had
applied that standard more liberally than its European counterparts:
The State party expresses its concern about a possible development of differ-
ent standards under the two human rights instruments of essentially the same
right. The State party argues that diverging standards in this respect would
create serious problems for States which have declared themselves bound by
both instruments. Problems would arise when States attempt to adapt them-
selves to international case-law, if this case-law is inconsistent. According to
the State party, inconsistent case-law may also have serious detrimental effects
on the overall credibility of the human rights protection system at [the] inter-
national level.
I-A-O. v. Sweden, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 20th Sess., Annex, 1 5.11, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/20/D/65/1997 (1998). The petitioner responded that there was no inconsis-
tency because Sweden could simply "apply the stricter of the two [standards]." 1&.
6.11. The CAT did not address this issue, although it declined to find a treaty violation
on the facts presented. See id. 1 14.6. For an explanation of why Sweden's concerns
are unjustified, see infra Part III.D.3.
n7 Domestic courts' preclusion rules are also influenced by the extent to which
plaintiffs and defendants can join additional parties to pending litigation. See Erichson,
supra note 9, at 955-56 (discussingjoinder of parties in various jurisdictions). In the
human rights context, by contrast, nearly all claims are made against a single State
party, and ajoinder of parties problem is unlikely to arise.
m There are only a few, limited exceptions to this rule. The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights is authorized to give advisory opinions, when requested by OAS
Member States or organs, interpreting "other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states." "Other Treaties" Subject to the Consultative Jurisdic-
tion of the Court, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A)
No. 1 (1982), 1 9 [hereinafter Other Treaties]. However, the Court may not interpret
these treaties as part of its contentious jurisdiction concerning petitions by individuals.
The proposed (but not yet created) African Court on Human and People's Rights, by
contrast, would have jurisdiction to hear petitions alleging violations of any human
rights treaty ratified by the State party. See Makau Mutua, The African Human Rights
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the hypothetical case of the Norwegian criminal defendant discussed
in Part I.B illustrates, a petitioner with distinct claims arising under
multiple human rights treaties may not consolidate all of her treaty
claims in a single forum. The only way she can obtain a complete re-
view of the rights violations she alleges is by petitioning two or more
tribunals concurrently or successively. In this situation, it is unclear
whether even the most finality-driven domestic preclusion rules bar
relitigation.22
Not all petitioners will face such stark choices, of course. Many
will proffer human rights claims that can readily be adjudicated in
their entirety under more than one treaty (for example a violation of
the right to free expression, which is protected by both the Inter-
American Convention and the ICCPR in similar, albeit not identical
language), or claims that are only partially within the jurisdiction of
one tribunal but are wholly within the jurisdiction of another (for ex-
ample combined torture and due process claims that can be raised in
part before CAT but entirely before the ECHR). Because in these
situations there is at least one tribunal competent to hear all claims, it
might be argued that a petitioner should be afforded only one oppor-
tunity to litigate, regardless of the particular legal instrument under
which her claims arise.
Even for these cases, however, there are justifications favoring re-
dundant litigation. At a most basic level, relitigation of any individual
rights claims has some persuasive force. Indeed, it is the abhorrence
of erroneously denying meritorious constitutional claims that in large
measure supports the broad exceptions to finality found in American
and English habeas corpus law.23 In the human rights context as well,
claims are always against the government or its agents for abuses of
governmental power. In this situation, allowing relitigation to mini-
mize the erroneous denial of fundamental rights claims-even claims
Court: A Two-Legged Stool?, 21 HuM. RTs. Q. 342, 354 (1999) (discussing the extent of
the proposed Court's jurisdiction).
29 Compare Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373,
382 (1985) (stating that "claim preclusion generally does not apply where '[t]he plain-
tiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy be-
cause of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdiction of the courts'" (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENT5 § 26(1) (c) (1982))), with Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1996) (holding that claim preclusion applies
to a state court class action settlement encompassing claims within exclusive jurisdic-
tion of federal court).
2" See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 10, at 1045-46 (discussing the constitutional
benefits of redundancy in the American habeas corpus system); Tardu, supra note 13,
at 795 & n.68 (discussing the benefits of successive appeals before High Court judges
in the English habeas corpus system).
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cognizable in multiple fora-weighs heavily against finality and effi-
ciency concerns.
One should also consider the nature of human rights adjudication
between aggrieved individuals and defending States. In many cases,
petitioners, whether acting on their own behalf or represented by
counsel,23 1 have only rudimentary knowledge of a treaty's substantive
rights or the numerous and often highly technical procedural hurdles
that must be cleared before jurists may entertain a claim on the mer-
its. 2 Taking into account that defending States are often repeat play-
ers before the tribunals and are thus familiar with both its procedural
and substantive law, the comparative inequality of the parties as liti-
gants might justify relitigation on the theory that many petitioners will
not enjoy a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first proceeding.
Finally, the differing remedial powers of human rights tribunals
also justify greater limitations on finality and narrower preclusion
rules. Unlike U.S. domestic law, where judgments of both state and
federal courts are enforceable against the losing party, not all human
rights tribunals can issue legally binding decisions (as contrasted with
recommendations for remedial action). This basic remedial distinc-
tion militates in favor of forum shopping. For example, a petitioner
might reasonably choose to file her complaint before a tribunal that
issues legally binding rulings, even if that tribunal does not have juris-
diction to hear all of her claims. A defeat before that tribunal argua-
bly should not be given preclusive effect if the petitioner then seeks to
2 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 352-53 nn.368-69 (showing that petition-
ers in about half of the cases before the UNHRC were represented by counsel during
the 1980s and 1990s, although many of those cases involved claims against only two
defending States). The majority of petitioners before CERD and CAT have been rep-
resented by counsel, although that has not prevented the dismissal of numerous claims
on both procedural and substantive grounds. See also United Nations High Commissioner
forHuman Rights, Treaty Bodies Database, CERD, Jurisprudence (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (noting that four of six petitioners to CERD
were represented by counsel); United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
Treaty Bodies Database, CAT, Jurisprudence (visited Nov. 24, 1999)
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (citing the fact that 44 of 56 petitioners to CAT
were represented by counsel).
22 See, e.g., D.S. v. Sweden, Comm. No. 9/1997, 1 6.4, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/53/D/
9/1997 (1998) (failure to exhaust domestic remedies); Barbaro v. Australia, Comm.
No. 7/1995, 11 1, 10.4, 10.5, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/51/D/7/1995 (1997) (failure to
specify which treaty articles State had violated and failure to exhaust domestic reme-
dies); Darwish v. Austria, Comm. No. 679/1996, 1 6.5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/
679/1996 (1997) (failure to sufficiently substantiate allegations); K.K.H. v. Canada,
Comm. No. 35/1995, 1 5, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/15/D/35/1995 (1995) (failure to ex-
haust domestic remedies).
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present her claims to a second tribunal whose decisions are merely
hortatory.
D. Critiquing the Conventional Wisdom: Identifying Normative and
InstitutionalFactors Favoring Forum Shopping
Taken together, these basic differences between domestic and in-
ternational adjudication suggest that the interests of aggrieved indi-
viduals may justify duplicative review of human rights claims. In addi-
tion, the broader institutional and normative objectives of the petition
system as a whole support relitigation, contrary to the arguments ad-
vanced by many commentators.
1. From Vertical Hierarchy to Horizontal Dialogue Conceptions of
Human Rights Litigation
The disaggregated nature of the petition system, together with
overlapping treaties protecting interrelated rights and freedoms, cre-
ate a compelling case for coordination among tribunals to promote
the evolution of a coherentjurisprudence. In the absence of any su-
preme arbiter of human rights law, however, the jurists serving on
these tribunals must act on their own to create coherence within the
jurisdictional limits the treaties impose on them.
I argue that jurists can most effectively achieve coherence by en-
gaging in a "horizontal dialogue" with their colleagues on other tri-
bunals over both the substance of shared human rights norms and the
procedural rules under which the petition system operates. I describe
that dialogue as horizontal because it involves a relationship among
relative equals engaged in a common interpretive enterprise. This re-
lationship differs from the vertical hierarchy conception of human
rights litigation advanced by early commentators, who perceived fo-
rum shopping as creating unwarranted opportunities for an appeal to
one tribunal in order to "correct" the "errors" of another. s
See supra Part HI.B.1. According to this view, forum shopping erodes the
authority of tribunals and jurists because the last tribunal to consider a petition acts as
a de facto court of appeal, having the final say as to whether a violation of any human
rights treaty has occurred. This later decision effectively nullifies or supersedes the
decision of the first tribunal that considered the same petition under a different treaty.
This result undermines the first tribunal's authority. As this Article demonstrates,
however, a vertical hierarchical conception does not accurately reflect present day
human rights litigation. See also 1993 Alston Repor, supra note 38, 1 245 ("[Tlhere
is... an underlying presumption that the various organs are all engaged in a common
endeavour to promote understanding of, and respect for, internationally recognized
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Horizontal dialogue, by contrast, does not require one set of ju-
rists either to defer to or to overrule the case law generated by their
colleagues. Rather, it seeks to have jurists treat the relevant decisions
of sibling tribunals as persuasive authority,2 subject to being followed
or distinguished on a reasoned basis grounded in the texts, objectives,
or policies of the overlapping treaties.2ss The core feature of horizon-
tal dialogue is open acknowledgement of the existence of relevant
precedents from other treaty systems as a way to enhance the preci-
sion, certainty, and reasoned decision-making that are essential fea-
tures of a coherent body of human rights law.2
So described, horizontal dialogue among human rights jurists
closely resembles the evolution of the common law by state court
judges in the United States. Thus, it might be argued that dialogue
will arise through iterative litigation by different parties and that the
tribunals can achieve coherence without entertaining sequential peti-
tions by the same individual. There are several reasons, however, why
horizontal dialogue has not adequately developed along the lines of
the U.S. common law and why it can be encouraged and enhanced
human rights principles.").
23 For excellent recent examples of a national court using international human
rights precedents in this way, see the decisions of the South African Constitutional
Court in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Justice, Case No.
CCT/1 1/98 (Oct. 9, 1998), available in Wits Law School Constitutional Law Archive: Deci-
sions of the Constitutional Court of South Africa (visited Dec. 29, 1999)
<http://www.law.wits.ac.2a/judgments/1998/gayles.html> (abolishing a criminal ban
on same-sex consensual sodomy); and The State v. T. Makwanyane, Case No. CCT/3/94
(June 6, 1995), available in Wits Law School Constitutional Law Archive: Decisions of the
Constitutional Court of South Africa (visited Dec. 29, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/
judgements/deathsn.html> (abolishing the death penalty).
2" For a detailed discussion of how horizontal dialogue promotes convergence and
divergence of standards between the UNHRC and the European human rights tribu-
nals, see Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 373-86.
Horizontal dialogue benefits the petition system by "seek[ing] to ensure that
human rights law develops consistently-indeed, that it is possible to speak of 'human
rights law' at all, and not simply the provisions of particular conventions." J.G.
MERRisLs, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW By THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 224 (2d ed. 1993). As Maxime Tardu has observed:
The simultaneous attention given by different bodies to the same types of
problem[s] does not necessarily create confusion, duplication or contradic-
tions. Experience seems to prove that it may, on the contrary, through ex-
changes and emulation between bodies, enrich human rights concepts and
strengthen the awareness of them by public opinion. The in-depth explora-
tion of the concept of "torture" by the jurisprudence of the European Com-
mission and the [ECHR], the [UNHRC] and the Inter-American Commission
may be mentioned in this regard, for example.
Maxime Tardu, The Effectiveness of United Nations Methods and Mechanisms in the Field of
Human Rights: A Critical Overview, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/60/Add.5, 1 75 (1993).
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through forum shopping.
First, outside Europe, the universe of petitions submitted to hu-
man rights tribunals over the last three decades numbers in the doz-
ens or the hundreds, as compared with the thousands of cases decided
by domestic courts each year.27 Although the number of petitions
filed has risen rapidly in the 1990s,2 the relative paucity of cases limits
the opportunities for dialogue through disputes involving different
litigants. Second, human rights tribunals reference and consider
precedents from outside their own legal systems far less habitually
than do judges in common law jurisdictions. Although dialogue has
increased significantly in the last decade in both forum shopping and
non forum shopping cases 9 it has yet to obtain the consistency re-. • •240
quired for a coherent cross-treatyjurisprudence to emerge.
27 See, e.g., Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination , U.N.
GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 18, 11 483-85, U.N. Doc. A/53/18 (1998) (noting that as
of 1998, CERD had issued seven decisions); Report of the Committee Against Torture; U.N.
GAOR, 53d Sess., Supp. No. 44, 271, U.N. Doc. A/53/44 (1998) (reporting that in
1997-98, CAT received 70 petitions); Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 53d Sess., Supp. No. 40, 11[ 420-21, U.N. Doc. A/53/40 (1998) (de-
claring that as ofJuly 1998, the UNHRC had received 823 petitions and had issued 293
"views" on the merits); Richard J. Wilson, Researching the Jurisprudence of the Inter-
American Commission On Human Rights: A Litigators Perspective, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POLY 1, 19-319 (1994) (containing a comprehensive index of the several hundred pe-
titions filed with the Inter-American Commission up to 1994).
m' See 1996 Alston Report, supra note 2, 1 7(e) ("The number of communications
being processed under the various [U.N.] complaints procedures has greatly increased
See ZWART, supra note 43, at 2 (noting the UNHRC's increasing references to
European case law); Liz Heffernan, A Comparative Vriew of Individual Petition Procedures
Under the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 78, 92 (1997) ("[A] tangible manifestation of co-
existence between the Strasbourg and Geneva systems is the increasing willingness of
parties and institutions in each system to cite developments in the other."); Heifer &
Slaughter, supra note 1, at 359 n.398 (documenting this trend in the case law of the
UNHRC). The Inter-American Commission has been particularly active in consulting
the case law of other human rights tribunals to decide on the proper interpretation of
the American Convention. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Mexico, Case 11,430, INTER-AM.
Y.B.H.R. 994, 1020 (1996) ("Even though the Convention has not clarified the scope of
the expression 'reasonable time,' there are a great many precedents in the jurispru-
dence of international bodies according to which... the following criteria have been
considered...."); Gimenez v. Argentina, Case 11,245, INTER-AM. Y.B.H.R. 238, 264-76
(1996) (referencing case law from other tribunals in concluding that prolonged im-
prisonment was unreasonable); Garcia v. Peru, Case 11,006, INTER-AM. Y.B.H.R. 232,
288 (1995) (referencing the ECHR in evaluating Article 7 of the American Conven-
tion). See also cases discussed supra Parts II.B.1, ll.B.3.
210 See, e.g., 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, JJ[ 246-51 (noting the "lack of interac-
tion" among U.N. and regional tribunals, notwithstanding the importance of interac-
tion to promote normative consistency); Mutua, supra note 228, at 348 (stating that
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In some instances, the absence of dialogue occurs not because ju-
rists eschew consulting persuasive authority from sibling tribunals but
because they may simply be unaware of its existence.24' Forum shop-
ping, and successive petition forum shopping in particular, remedies
this information failure by directly and repeatedly exposing jurists to
on-point precedents from other treaty systems. When jurists on one
tribunal are aware that the same petition has recently been decided by
another tribunal, they will be hard pressed to ignore that tribunal's
analysis and conclusions in shaping their interpretation of analogous
rights found in their own treaty.24 Forum shopping thus increases
coherence by reducing the possibility for inadvertent divergences or
conflicts in international human rights jurisprudence.
2
3
More fundamentally, forum shopping actively promotes horizon-
tal dialogue by providing a structured setting for jurists to clarify the
similarities and differences among overlapping treaty texts. In this
setting, the second tribunal to consider a petition can benefit signifi-
African Commission decisions "do not reference jurisprudence from national and in-
ternational tribunals"); THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW, The UN Human Rights Regime: Is
It Effective?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING IMPLEMENTATION,
COMPLIANCE, AND EFFECTIVENESS 460, 481 (Apr. 9-12, 1997) ("[U.N.] treaty bodies
seldom explicitly reference the findings or recommendations of other human rights
mechanisms, such as special rapporteurs or sister treaty bodies, and produce varying
commentaries on identical abuses and rights.") (remarks by Dinah PoKempner, Hu-
man Rights Watch) [hereinafter UNHuman Rights Regime].
2" See 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, 11 247, 252-54 (stating that there is no
regular forum to become acquainted with other tribunals' decisions and suggesting
ways to remedy this problem); Lillich, supra note 153, at 466 (noting, in two death row
cases, that "neither body apparently was aware that the other was simultaneously grap-
pling with the same issue").
2142 As Professor Cover has stated with respect to forum shopping by litigants in the
United States:
Forum shoppers and those who oppose them ... become the carriers thatpo-
linate one system of courts with the information about another system's expe-
rience. Moreover, where synchronic or diachronic redundancy is possible,
each system must confront the potentially conflicting outcome in the same case
of some other court with its alternative norms. Such a possibility makes sec-
ond thoughts and adjustments more likely.
Cover, supra note 7, at 678 (footnote omitted).
24 This benefit of forum shopping occurs even where the second tribunal does not
expressly distinguish the first tribunal's reasoning. In Brinkhof and Casanovas, for ex-
ample, the UNHRC's citation of prior petitions to the European Commission, together
with its discussion of the parties' reliance on regional precedents, demonstrates the
UNHRC's awareness of regional approaches to the problem when it interpreted the
ICCPR to provide more extensive protection than the European Convention. As I ar-
gue above, however, more open deliberation and analysis of the Commission's prece-
dents would have bolstered the Committee's decision to diverge from the Commis-
sion's interpretation of rights guaranteed in the same language in both treaties. See
supra Part II.B.1.
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candy from the first tribunal's reasoning and conclusions, using them
either to confirm in its case law similarities in the treaties' texts, or to
employ as a point of departure from which to justify a divergent ap-
proach. Whether the second tribunal chooses convergence (as will
likely occur in most cases where treaties enshrine identical legal stan-
dards) or divergence (where treaty texts and objectives are similar but
not identical), the petition system benefits by a more coherent evolu-
tion of human rights standards.
2. From Regional Protectionism to Robust Regionalism
A second argument advanced by early commentators was that fo-
rum shopping would undermine regional human rights regimes.
Contrary to these commentators' fears, regional human rights systems
have not been hobbled by forum shopping or the divergence of stan-
dards it can engender. Instead, these systems have increased in
244strength and effectiveness.
a. The European Convention
The European human rights system in particular has flourished.
The ECHR and European Commission are widely regarded as the
most effective human rights institutions in the world.24 The Euro-
pean Convention now has more than forty Western and Eastern
European signatories, a fact that has resulted in a meteoric rise in the
number of petitions filed with the tribunals. As delays resulting from
managing the ever-increasing workload continued to mount, Euro-
pean States refused to permit the regional petition system to become
a victim of its own success. Instead, they streamlined the Convention's
petition system, abolishing the Commission and creating a permanent
244 SeeTorkel Opsahl, The Coexistence Between Geneva and Strasbourg. Inter-Relationship
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on
Human Rights and Their Respective Organs of Implementation, 1991-1992 CAN. HUM. RTS.
Y.B. 151, 165 (arguing that interactions between European tribunals and the UNHRC
have "not threatened or damaged but rather promoted the regional system"); see also
Heffernan, supra note 239, at 84 (interpreting ratification of the Optional Protocol by
European States as "evidence of the growing acceptance in Europe of the stature of the
Human Rights Committee in its adjudication of individual petitions").
2 See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 296 n.96 (citing authorities that describe
the effectiveness of the ECHR's judgments); see also Heffernan, supra note 239, at 91
("'The stature of the [ECHR] as the foremost international judicial arbiter of human
rights issues imbues the Strasbourg system with presence and prestige.").
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Court of Human Rights to which States must grant individuals direct
246access.
b. The Inter-American Convention
The Inter-American Convention is also increasing in strength and
respect, albeit more slowly. Its petition system is broader than the
European system, requiring States to recognize the Inter-American
Commission's competence to entertain complaints by individuals,
groups, and non-governmental organizations, and eliminating the re-
quirement that complaints be submitted by the victims of a treaty vio-
247lation. It thus "plays a considerably wider and more interventionist
role in the management of the system than does its European ana-
logue."'2 4 The Commission has also "over a period of some thirty years
developed a modus operandi with which the States of the region are fa-
miliar and willing to accept."
249
States parties have been far more reluctant to recognize the juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court to hear individual petitions re-
ferred by the Commission. A recent and comprehensive study of the
Inter-American system, however, concludes that States have gradually
become more receptive to the Court's adjudication of such peti-
tions.2w Equally as important, the Court has firmly endorsed a hori-
zontal dialogue conception of human rights litigation. In the Other
Treaties case, the Court rejected "a strict distinction between univer-
246 See Andrew Drzemczewski & Jens Meyer-Ladewig, Principal Characteristics of the
New ECHR Control Mechanism, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81 (1994) (explaining the characteris-
tics and procedures of the new, single European Court of Human Rights, which re-
placed the existing Commission). For a discussion of the European Commission's in-
creasing workload, see Henry G. Schermers, The European Court of Human Rights After
the Merger, 18 EuR. L. REV. 493, 496 (1993).
2147 See DAVIDSON, supra note 36, at 157 (noting that, unlike most human rights tri-
bunals, in applications before the Inter-American Commission "there is no primary
requirement that petitioners be the actual victims of a Convention violation").
248 Id. at 193.
249 Id. For a different perspective on the function of individual petition procedures
in a democratic era, see Tom Farer, The Rise of the Inter-American Human Rights Regime:
NoLongera Unicorn, Not Yet an Ox 19 HuM. RTS. Q. 510, 543-45 (1997).
' Davidson notes that the low number of contentious cases before the Court
is beginning to change as the democratic impulse becomes more firmly em-
bedded in a number of States Parties who have committed themselves to ef-
fective human rights protection through a variety of measures, including
greater participation in the region's human rights instruments and a willing-
ness to allow the Court to adjudicate on human rights violations.
DAVIDSON, supra note 36, at 204-05.
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salism and regionalism," and endorsed a comparative approach and
dialogue as a means of integrating human rights systems.2'
c. The African Charter
The African petition system also shows a strengthening trend.
The African Charter did not even exist when commentators first ar-
ticulated their concern with regional primacy. Adopted in 1981, the
treaty entered into force only five years later and now has received
forty-nine ratifications. 2
Although a neophyte compared to its more established regional
neighbors, the African Commission has begun to hear a wide range of
cases from individuals and groups under the Charter's mandatory pe-
tition procedures. The Commission's textually-defined powers are
somewhat vague, but it has used a "dynamic interpretation of its for-
mal protective mandate" to enhance its authority to hear individual
petitions.2 A recent survey concludes that the Commission is devel-
oping a "quasi-judicial role to pronounce on violations committed by
States" and is treating its decisions as legally bindingY2 The Commis-
sion's independence and assertiveness may soon lead to further
strengthening of the petition procedures: in December 1997, the Or-
ganization of African Unity adopted a protocol to create an African
Court of Human Rights and Peoples' Rights comparable to other re-
gional courts.25
3. From Resisting to Embracing Differing Human Rights Standards
a. Diverging Standards
The possibility of diverging human rights decisions is an equally
insufficient basis upon which to bar forum shopping. To the contrary,
2" Other Treaties, supra note 228, 1[1 40-41.
252 African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, available in University of
Minnesota Human Rights Library (visited Sept. 21, 1999) <http://www.umn.edu/
humanrts/instree/ratzlafchar.htm>. Only Eritrea and Ethiopia have failed to ratify
the Charter. SeeMurray, supra note 62, at 419 n.59.
213 Id. at 414.
2 Id, at 428, 431. For a somewhat less sanguine assessment, see Mutua, supra note
228.
2- For a discussion of the new court, see Draft Additional Prtocol supra note 36; Ma-
tua, supra note 228.
2 For a definition of "divergence" among international legal norms, seeJenks,
supra note 145, at 425-26.
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diverging decisions reflect differing substantive standards in the trea-
ties themselves, which, in turn, are often the result of deliberate policy
choices by treaty drafters. 7 Where textual, contextual, or historical
indicia of differing human rights standards exist, accepted principles
of treaty construction require the tribunals to give effect to them in
their decisions.m Once diverging rulings are seen as a natural reflec-
tion of human rights lawmaking, forum shopping becomes a useful
way to encourage dialogue among jurists regarding how similarities
and differences among the treaties should be harmonized.259
2 In some instances, textual differences between treaties result from an evolution
in State practice or an awareness of a new human rights problem that convinces States
to incorporate more stringent or more precisely defined obligations into a subse-
quently drafted treaty than were contained in an earlier agreement. Examples include
CEDAW and the Convention Against Torture, each of which contains more specific
and extensive human rights standards that first appeared in the ICCPR and ICESR. See
also DAviDSON, supra note 36, at 62-67 (discussing the Inter-American Convention to
Prevent and Punish Torture). In other cases, a treaty may enshrine higher substantive
standards because it is directed to a regional grouping of States. See, e.g., Jan
Lathouwers, Council of Europe: The Plans for an Additional Protocol on Non-
Discrimination to the ECHR (1998) (draft on file with author) (discussing proposed
protocol on race and national origin discrimination). Finally, a treaty may contain
higher standards than other agreements addressing the same subject matter, but
achieve those standards only by settling for weaker implementation provisions. See
HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKiNG, supra note 13, at 165 & n.78 (citing the Protocol relating
to the Status of Refugees as an example).
Textual differences may also be a product of poor draftsmanship or "incompe-
tence, hasty consideration and approval, lack of adequate research and editing." Id. at
269. In such cases, because the drafters did not make a deliberate decision to enshrine
differing substantive standards, it may be possible for tribunals to avoid needless di-
verging interpretations and harmonize human rights law across different treaties. See
Glasenapp v. Federal Rep. of Germany, 104 Eur. C. H.R. (ser. A) 48, at 25 (1986)
(suggesting that the ECHR may have less interpretive freedom where the absence of a
right in the European Convention was not "a chance omission," but a deliberate exclu-
sion).
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31, 32, opened for signature
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 340 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (specifying
interpretive methodologies for all treaties). The ECHR has refused to find certain
rights implicitly protected by the European Convention in part because its drafters had
deliberately excluded those rights with the knowledge that they were contained in
other human rights agreements. See, e.g., Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 99-102 (1991) (finding no explicit obligation to comply with the tribunal's in-
terim rulings); Johnston v. Ireland, 112 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 11 51-58, at 24-26 (1986)
(finding no explicit right to divorce).
29 Even where treaty texts are identical, however, diverging rulings may be appro-
priate based on the differing objectives of two treaties. For example, the European
tribunals have often read higher human rights standards into the European Conven-
tion by using a comparative methodology that examines national law trends among the
treaty's signatory States. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 382-84 (discussing this
method of interpretation). A similar purposive approach may explain the UNHRC's
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Contrary to some commentators' fears, diverging decisions are un-
likely to produce a "race to the bottom" in which States comply only
with the "weakest" decision interpreting a right protected by two or
more treaties to which they are parties.2'6 Most human rights treaties
contain a "most-favorable-to-the-individual clause" which ensures that
"the individual should have the benefit of the instrument which gives
him greater protection against governmental interference with his
rights." 16  As applied to tribunals' case law, these clauses preclude a
more rights-protective rulings in the Brinkhofand Casanovas cases. See supra notes 101,
177.
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAmNG, supra note 13, at 145, 241 (suggesting such a con-
cer).
2" COMMISSION TO STUDYTHE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE, supra note 218, at 175; see
also TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 114-15 (reviewing treaty provisions and case law adopt-
ing as a principle of coexistence between human rights systems "the choice orprimacy of
the mostfavourableprovision to the individual concerned, when the same rights are guar-
anteed by two or more instruments"). See ICESCR, supra note 25, art. 5(2), for rele-
vant text stating:
No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights
recognized or existing in any country in virtue of law, conventions, regulations
or custom shall be admitted on the pretext that the present Covenant does
not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent.
Equivalent language is found in the ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 5(2). See also European
Convention, supra note 26, art. 60 ("Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which
may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other
agreement to which it is a Party."); American Convention, supra note 27, art. 29 ("No
provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as... [r]estricting the enjoyment or
exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or
by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party."); CEDAW,
supra note 30, art. 23 ("Nothing in this Convention shall affect any provisions that are
more conducive to the achievement of equality between men and women which may
be contained... [i]n any other international convention, treaty or agreement in force
for that State."); Convention Against Torture, supra note 31, art. 1(2) (providing that
the Convention's definition of torture "is without prejudice to any international in-
strument or national legislation which does or may contain provisions of wider applica-
tion").
Although the Race Convention and the African Charter do not contain similar
clauses, commentators have argued that the most favorable to the individual standard
has evolved into a general principle of construction that applies even in the absence of
a specific treaty provision. See TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 121 ("Where States have
undertaken obligations under parallel co-existing instruments of protection of human
rights, it may be taken to have been the intention to accord individuals a more ex-
tended and effective protection .... "); Lillich, supra note 153, at 475 n.115 (arguing
that "other international and regional bodies should be allowed to interpret similar
human rights norms differently when in so doing they accord individuals a greater
measure of protection"). But see HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKING, supra note 13, at 145
(noting that in the absence of a specific treaty clause, "States might argue that the
principle of the most favourable treatment constitutes a principle de legeferenda and try
to benefit from the existence of two different standards by observing the lower of the
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State from invoking a less rights-protective decision interpreting treaty
"A" as a basis for rejecting a more ights-protective decision of another
tribunal interpreting the same right protected by treaty "B."262 The
clauses thus enhance the legal protections available to human rights
victims under overlapping treaty provisions and provide a meta-rule to
resolve any uncertainties generated by divergent rulings on the same
subject. With the "dangers" of divergence so diminished, the need to
bar forum shopping as a means of preventing divergence also dissi-
pates.
b. Conflicting Standards
Conflicting human rights rulings present a more troublesome
problem requiring more careful scrutiny. Unlike domestic law, there
is no final judicial arbiter of international human rights law empow-
ered to preempt conflicting decisions. Where arguably conflicting
rights are protected by different treaties overseen by different tribu-
nals, forum shopping may produce rulings that make it impossible for
the defending State to comply with both sets of its treaty obligations at
the same time. The most favorable to the individual rule does not re-
solve this problem since it does not indicate which set of opposing in-
dividual rights is paramount.
A closer examination, however, reveals that even the risk of con-
flicting decisions fails to justify a broad-based forum shopping ban.
First, instances of conflict are likely to be rare. There is a broad con-
cordance of human rights standards across universal, regional, gen-
eral, and specialized treaties-all of which find their common genesis
in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. As a result, divergent
rulings will predominate over cases of conflict.s
two").
262 In theory, a State might argue that the most favorable of the individual clauses
apply only to treaty texts and not to the decisions of the tribunals interpreting them,
particularly with decisions that are not legally binding. Such a position is, however,
inconsistent with the treaties' objects and purposes, which contemplate an authorita-
tive, interpretive role even for tribunals that issue non-binding recommendations. See
General Comment 24(52), supra note 112, 11 11, 13 (discussing States' reservations to
substantive treaty obligations). This position also undermines the widely accepted rule
of construction that human rights treaties are to be given an expansive rather than re-
strictive interpretation that favors the rights of individuals. See Heifer & Slaughter, su-
pra note 1, at 378-79 (discussing case law adopting expansive interpretations of human
rights treaties).
m See, e.g., TRINDADE, supra note 13, at 409 (identifying the "essentially comple-
mentary nature" of different human rights treaty systems and tribunals); Heffernan,
supra note 239, at 82 (discussing how "the European Convention would join with the
[Universal] Declaration in providing a blueprint for the subsequent elaboration of civil
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Second, active horizontal dialogue among tribunals is also likely to
reduce conflict. The case study of racist speech demonstrates that
human rights jurists can consider and harmonize each other's deci-
sions and interpretive statements to avoid placing States in situations
where they are forced to disregard one of their international obliga-
tions. In this way, forum shopping may actually lead to greater con-
vergence of standards, as issues that appeared to be conflicting in the
abstract are shown through case law to be compatible with each
other.6
Third, even assuming that it is desirable to avoid conflicting deci-
sions, a ban on forum shopping is ill-suited to achieve that objective.
As the case studies of racist speech and the death row phenomenon
demonstrate, whether a treaty permits or prohibits forum shopping is
often irrelevant to whether jurists are presented with identical or simi-
lar legal issues that may lead to divergent or conflicting rulings. Even
in treaty systems that bar successive and simultaneous petition forum
shopping, jurists may entertain identical legal claims where the idern-
tity of the petitioner differs.25 Thus, a forum shopping ban is an
overbroad tool for preventing conflicting rulings, and it is achieved at
the cost of preventing human rights victims from receiving redress
under all of the treaties to which their governments are parties.
Finally, the limited number of conflicting legal norms that do ex-
ist reflect the international community's commitment to respect rights
that are, at least in the abstract, incompatible.265 Given the tensions
between universal and culturally influenced conceptions of human
rights and the differing stages of development among States, it may
not be possible to avoid conflicting rulings entirely. Even here, how-
and political rights protection"); see also Other Treaties, supra note 228, 11 51-52 (noting
the Inter-American Court's competence to interpret human rights treaties outside the
Inter-American system and the Court's rejection of the claim that this would lead to
"the possibility that the opinions of the Court might conflict with those of other tribu-
nals or organs").
2 This convergence will also restrict States' ability to take advantage of unadjudi-
cated potential conflicts by selectively choosing which treaty obligations to follow or by
invoking such potential conflicts tojustify their refusal to conform their domestic law
to either treaty's standards.
See supra note 67 (noting that petitions will only be barred on the grounds that
they address "the same matter" when they are brought by the same, or by "virtually the
same" complainants).
In addition to racist speech, two other significant areas of potential conflict are
the rights of women versus religious freedom, and the rights of unborn children versus
the privacy rights of pregnant women. See HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAING, supra note 13,
at 77-79, 137-40, 153-60 (highlighting the conflicts between religious freedom and
women's equality, and between the right to life and the right to privacy).
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ever, forum shopping can encourage dialogue that will permit jurists
to avoid conflicting decisions where possible, while precisely defining
those conflicts that are unavoidable in carefully limited, fact-specific
contexts. States faced with such conflicting decisions will then be
given a concrete issue for future corrective law-making.
E. Refocusing on Institutional Interests: Burdens of Expanding
Responsibilities, Crowded Dockets, Delays,
and Inadequate Resources
Having demonstrated that the early commentators' concerns do
not justify a blanket forum shopping ban, and that forum shopping
has significant advantages for both aggrieved individuals and the peti-
tion system as a whole, I now consider in detail evidence relating to
finality concerns and efficient use of resources that strongly suggest a
need to restrict forum shopping.
Human rights litigation at the close of the twentieth century looks
very different than it did only a few decades ago. Human rights tribu-
nals have increased in number, as have the States parties participating
in adjudication before them. The number of petitions filed has also
risen, reflecting the growing awareness by individuals, attorneys, and
non-governmental organizations ("NGO"s) of the advantages of seek-
267ing international review when domestic efforts at redress fail.
Swelling dockets bring with them significant problems as well as
opportunities to interpret treaty obligations and redress wrongs.
From the individual's perspective, challenging a government before a
human rights tribunal is a long and arduous process. For example,
until the 1998 merger of the ECHR and the European Commission,
petitioners with meritorious claims waited more than five years for
their cases to be heard by both tribunals.2"s The delays outside of
Europe are also significant. "It usually takes two to three years [for
the UNHRC] to adopt Views on a case, though in exceptional cases
the procedure may be completed in under a year.'2
Moreover, the UNHRC is not a permanent body and meets three
times a year for three-week sessions. This schedule permits the Com-
2617 See sources cited supra notes 237-38.
See Schermers, supra note 246, at 495 (discussing the "increasing backlog of
cases"). It should be noted, however, that only meritorious cases require such pro-
longed consideration. Decisions dismissing a case at the admissibility stage are made
much more quickly, usually in under a year. Id. at 495-96.
Oldrich Andrysek, Gaps in International Protection and the Potential for Redress
Through Individual Complaints Procedures, 9 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 392, 403 (1997).
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mittee to issue final decisions for no "more than thirty to forty cases
annually."2 7° According to UNHRC member Thomas Buergenthal,
the Committee can barely keep pace with its growing docket.7 A
steady flow of cases from each of the ninety-five Optional Protocol
signatories "would paralyze the Committee. "2 Although such a para-
lyzing increase does not appear imminent, it might occur if universal
ratification of the ICCPR is achieved early in the next century.27
Adding to the backlog are hundreds of petitions that are frivolous
or relate to issues unambiguously outside the treaty's scope. The tri-
bunals have adopted a variety of mechanisms to process these claims,
most notably shifting decision-making authority to sub-committees,
working groups, or Secretariat staffs to screen such cases and discour-
age their formal registration. Each year, for example, the UNHRC's
Secretariat dismisses several hundred communications and refuses to
register several hundred others until the complainants have provided
adequate information to determine their admissibility.274 The Euro-
pean Commission's Secretariat staff goes even further, actively dis-
suading individuals with no prospect of success from formally register-
ing their petitions.275  In more serious cases, individual jurists
270 UN Human Rights Regime supra note 240, at 483 (remarks by Thomas Buergen-
thai, George Washington University National Law Center). This figure apparently
does not include admissibility decisions. For example, the Committee's 1994 report to
the General Assembly indicated that in three sessions over a one-year period it issued
final views in 32 cases, declared another 30 cases inadmissible, and declared 26 addi-
tional cases admissible for further review on the merits. See Annual General Assembly
Report of the Human Rights Committee, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 vol. 1, 1 380-82 (1994) [hereinafter1994 Annual Report].
2' See UN Human Rights Regime, supra note 240, at 483 (stating that the Committee
"is every day less able to discharge its responsibilities") (remarks by Thomas Buergen-
thai, George Washington University National Law Center).
2n d
2n See 1996 Alston Report, supra note 2, 11 14-36 (discussing the recent increase in
ratification of U.N. human rights treaties and efforts made to achieve "universal ratifi-
cation"). The smaller number of signatories to the optional petition procedures of
CERD and CAT has thus far resulted in a less crowded docket for those tribunals. See
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies Database
<http://ivww.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf> (noting 56 cases decided by CAT and 6 cases
decided by CERD as of Sept. 22, 1999). However, the push to achieve more wide-
spread ratification of U.N. human rights treaties may lead to a significant increase in
future case loads. See 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, 1 249 (noting that optional
communications procedures are "likely to grow in the years ahead").
2' See 1994 Annual Report, supra note 270, 1[ 378 (noting that many communica-
tions require further information); ZWART, supra note 43, at 11 (discussing the deci-
sion process for accepting communications).
27 See ZWART, supra note 43, at 24-25 (detailing the process for establishing a provi-
sional file and advising the applicant on whether or not to proceed). These attempts
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appointed as special rapporteurs, or working groups composed of a
few jurists, make final admissibility rulings or recommend a decision
to be taken by the plenary tribunal2 6 Through these approaches, the
tribunals have made significant progress in reducing their workloads,
although it is unclear whether further streamlining could result in
277significant additional efficiencies.
In addition to considering complaints from individuals, U.N.
treaty bodies and the Inter-American and African Commissions must
devote a significant amount of their resources and meeting times to
activities unrelated to the petition system, such as reviewing States par-
ties' initial and periodic reports, generating studies of human rights
issues (which sometimes include on-site investigations), and drafting
general comments interpreting the treaties they superintend.m Here
even more serious problems are plaguing jurists. With respect to
States' reporting under U.N. human rights treaties, for example, two
to three years elapse between a State's filing of a report and its review
by jurists. The only reason that the treaty bodies can review reports
this quickly is because so many States are dilatory in submitting them.
If all States were to promptly submit their reports, an enormous back-
279log would be createdY.
The broad range of judicial and non-judicial functions that hu-
man rights jurists must perform for an increasing number of States
might have generated enhanced levels of material and financial sup-
port. Sadly, it has not. All tribunals, with the exception of the ECHR,
are chronically starved for resources. The UNHRC, for example, has
repeatedly requested that the Secretary General provide the staff and
financial resources necessary to process in a timely fashion the peti-
tions and reports it receives, and has warned that its ability to perform
its functions is suffering as a result. A similar resource vacuum
at dissuasion are remarkably effective in reducing the Commission's workload, for
"only a fifth of the complaints submitted under the Convention are registered for ex-
amination by a committee." Id. at 29.
26 See 1994 Annual Repor4 supra note 270, 11 385-87 (discussing the use of new ap-
proaches to examining communications, including the use of "Special Rapporteurs");
ZWART, supra note 43, at 10-11, 29-31 (discussing the changing role of the respective
organs with respect to the use of special rapporteurs).
2n See NOWAK, supra note 44, at 688-89 (discussing factors that determine the
length of proceedings); ZWART, supra note 43, at 38-40 (discussing the use of time-
saving procedures to ease caseload burdens).
m' See DAViDSON, supra note 36, at 107-18; Mutua, supra note 228, at 345-46; supra
Part I.A (presenting an overview of the human rights treaty system).
2" See 1996 Alston Report, supra note 2, 1 48-52 (discussing the "inadequacy of the
current system to [handle] the timely submission of reports").
2w See 1994 Annual Repor supra note 270, 1 27 (requesting additional resources to
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plagues other tribunals.28 ' Amendments to several treaties have been
adopted to ease some of these resource concerns, but they are not
comprehensive and have yet to enter into force.
2
2
Taken together, these concerns suggest the emergence of a triage-
like situation in which the tribunals conserve their limited resources
to address only the most serious human rights concerns. Devoting
significant time to processing forum shopping petitions, which by
definition are being or have already been considered by at least one
tribunal, seems from this perspective to be among the least compel-
ling cases for the jurists' attention.
IV. FORUM SHOPPING REFORM
The complex and conflicting institutional and normative con-
cerns that pervade the human rights petition system at the beginning
of the twenty-first century warrant a significant restructuring of exist-
ing approaches to forum shopping. Any proposal for reform must, on
the one hand, maximize the benefits that flow from adding additional
cases to the tribunals' dockets--such as providing greater opportuni-
ties to redress individual human rights violations, enhancing the op-
portunities to clarify the treaties' substantive requirements, and har-
monizing human rights standards through an informed and active
horizontal dialogue amongjurists. But it must also allow jurists suffi-
cient flexibility to manage the additional administrative and financial
burdens caused by the increase in petitions and to avoid alienating de-
fendant States by an unduly prolonged petition process. Finally, such
a proposal must be squared with the broader reforms of the treaty sys-
tem currently being debated within the U.N.
The proposal that follows is divided into three stages. In the first
stage, I set out a comprehensive proposal for forum shopping reform
that balances the theoretical concerns identified in Part III and en-
meet an increasingly complex and intensive workload); 1995 Annual Report, supra
note 167, 1 491 (reiterating a request to the Secretary-General to "take the necessary
steps to ensure a substantial increase in the number of staff, specialized in the various
legal systems, assigned to service the Committee," and noting "that the work under the
Optional Protocol continues to suffer as a result of insufficient Secretariat resources").
" See 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, 11 194-206 (stating that the funding and
support that "each [committee] receives is inadequate and an impediment to more
effective functioning"); Lynda E. Frost, The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights: Reflections of Present and Former Judges, 14 HUM. RTS. Q. 171, 177
(1992) (discussing the economic crisis of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
22 See 1996 Alston Report, supra note 2, 11 98-99 (noting the need for such amend-
ments, but observing the "domestic legal and political requirements needed to ap-
prove such an amendment to a treaty").
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courages jurists to engage in a dialogue over human rights norms
shared by more than one treaty. The proposal assumes that the cur-
rent structure of the petition system, in which each tribunal is em-
powered to review petitions concerning one treaty only, will remain in
place at least in the short term and perhaps for several decades.
The second stage addresses how this proposal can be imple-
mented. Under one approach, States parties could amend the treaties
to grant jurists discretion to decide which forum shopping cases to
consider on the merits. Given the political difficulties of coordinating
amendments across all global and regional treaties, this approach will
likely be feasible as a near-term strategy only for those optional peti-
tion procedures that have not been finalized and opened for signa-
ture to States parties, at least until the U.N. undertakes more compre-
hensive reforms of the treaty system. In the interim, a different
approach will be required. I therefore identify a series of concrete
steps that jurists can adopt immediately to implement the bulk of my
proposal into the petition system in its current form.
The third stage of the proposal highlights some cautionary con-
cerns about broader reforms of the treaty system now being debated
within the United Nations. Thus far, most of the reforms have con-
centrated on modifying the procedures for reviewing States parties
reports. Several commentators, however, including some human
rights jurists, have also advocated far-reaching reforms of the petition
system, including abolishing the multiple tribunals within the U.N.
and replacing them with a permanent human rights court. Although
a single human rights court is a salutary long-term goal, prematurely
abolishing the existing tribunals risks diminishing rather than enhanc-
ing opportunities for international review of national laws and prac-
tices.
A. A Proposal for Forum Shopping Reform
As a preliminary matter, my proposal to reform human rights fo-
rum shopping distinguishes between simultaneous and successive pe-
tition forum shopping.
2
2W See supra Part I.C. As noted above, "choice of tribunal forum shopping" is per-
mitted under all human rights agreements. Because eliminating this choice would se-
riously undermine the efficacy of the treaty system for aggrieved individuals, I do not
propose any restrictions on this type of forum shopping. See Eissen, supra note 13, at
201-02 (discussing the benefits and criticisms of "choice of tribunal forum shopping").
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1. Simultaneous Petition Forum Shopping
a. Identical FactualAllegations and Legal Claims
Although several treaties do not bar individuals from filing simul-
taneous petitions that raise identical factual allegations and legal
claims,2 the arguments against permitting such a practice are com-
pelling. The principal objectives of the petition system are to provide
aggrieved individuals with a neutral forum in which to determine
whether their rights have been violated, to permit jurists to apply a
treaty's text to a specific set of facts, and, where a violation is found, to
issue judgments or recommendations to States parties to modify their
national practices. Any single tribunal, acting alone, is competent to
achieve each of these goals.t
Efficiency and finality concerns, as well as the need to promote
horizontal dialogue among jurists, strongly counsel against simultane-
ous petition forum shopping. Permitting more than one review body
to entertain the same complaint at the same time is highly inefficient,
wasting scarce judicial resources and needlessly duplicating proceed-
ings.2 These concerns have become even more pressing in recent
years as the tribunals' workloads have increased while their resources
have remained stagnant. Nor are efficiency losses compensated for by
the benefits of increased dialogue over human rights norms that suc-
cessive petition cases can engender. To the contrary, simultaneous
review precludes a dialogue among different sets of jurists that often
occurs in successive petition cases, since neither formal nor informal
mechanisms exist for jurists to review collectively a petitioner's pend-
See supra note 62 (discussing the African Charter, ILO treaties, and the Race
Convention).
See HenryJ. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role
for the Human Rights Committee?, in THE FTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREAiY
MONITORING 9-10, 12 (PhilipJ. Alston &J. Crawford eds., forthcoming 2000) (draft on
file with author) (identifying the three adjudicatory purposes the UNHRC seeks to ful-
fill as providing individual justice, protecting rights through deterrence and behavior
modification, and expounding the meaning of the ICCPR).
See TARDu, supra note 4, at 22 (stressing the need for "a minimum of cohesion
at the international level and for reasonable safeguards against repetitive complaints").
In U.S. law, simultaneous petition forum shopping is allowed prior to final judgment,
although the practice is limited somewhat through statutes, abstention doctrines, and
certification procedures. See Cover, supra note 7, at 647. Permitting simultaneous liti-
gation domestically also avoids a first-to-file race between the plaintiff and defendant to
control the choice of forum, leaving that choice in part in the hands of a neutral judi-
cial umpire. In the human rights context, by contrast, there is no race to file because
only individuals and groups can file petitions against States. States cannot counter-
claim or seek declaratory relief in response.
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ing allegations or the legal norms shared by more than one treaty.287
In light of these policies, I propose that no simultaneous petition fo-
rum shopping be permitted where the two pending petitions are
based upon the same factual allegations and assert violations of the
same treaty rights.
2s8
b. Distinct Legal Claims and Factual Allegations
A more difficult problem arises, however, where the pending peti-
tions address distinct legal issues or distinct factual allegations. Al-
though the case law on this issue is limited, three different types of
simultaneous forum shopping cases can be envisioned.289
i. Distinct Legal Claims Arising Out of Related Factual Allegations
The first type of case arises when a petitioner seeks to divide be-
tween two or more tribunals the adjudication of distinct legal claims
arising out of the same underlying factual allegations. The UNHRC's
decision in V.M.O. v. Norwaym can be modified to provide an exam-
ple. The petitioner in VM.O. claimed that a domestic court had vio-
lated his rights by issuing a divorce and custody decree that did not
grant him adequate visitation rights with his daughter. V.M.O. raised
three distinct legal challenges to the decree: the right to a fair trial,
the right to respect for family life, and the right to be free from sex
discrimination. In the actual case, he presented all three claims first
to the European Commission and then to the UNHRC. But could he
have divided these three legal claims between the two tribunals, sub-
mitting two claims to the Commission while simultaneously submitting
the remaining claim to the UNHRC?
28S7 See Eissen, supra note 13, at 202 n.70 (discussing bars to collective deliberation
of pending petitions); see also HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING, supra note 13, at 139 (not-
ing that each human rights tribunal "tends to act in isolation").
2"s But see infra Part IV.B.2 (suggesting such review in one unique context).
29 The admissibility clauses in existing human rights agreements implicitly endorse
an individual's right to divide his or her factual allegations and legal claims and to pre-
sent them simultaneously to two different human rights tribunals. By banning forum
shopping only where the "same matter" or "substantially the same" matter is pending
before another tribunal or review body, these clauses imply that litigating different le-
gal claims or factual allegations in another forum is permissible. See, e.g., European
Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(1)(b); Optional Protocol, supra note 42, art.
5(2)(a).
m V.M.O., supra note 82. For a discussion of V.M.O. v. Norway, see supra text ac-
companying notes 82-92.
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No international human rights decision clearly answers this ques-
tion. As discussed in Part II, several decisions of the UNHRC have
adopted an "events and facts" interpretation of the phrase "the same
matter" as contained in the Optional Protocol's forum shopping
clause and reservations?2' By focusing on a petition's underlying fac-
tual allegations, this interpretation appears to preclude a petitioner
from raising in a second petition a distinct legal claim arising out of
the same factual allegations contained in a petition that is simultane-
ously pending before another tribunal, even if that precise legal claim
had not been raised in the first proceeding. In its 1994 General
Comment, however, the Committee adopted a seemingly contradic-
tory position. It stated that the forum shopping bar should be applied
only if "the legal right and the subject matter" set forth in both peti-
tions are "identical."2 This contrary interpretation suggests that the
petitioner in V.M.. could have split his three claims between two si-
multaneously-filed petitions, a possibility discussed in greater detail
below.
ii. Distinct Factual Allegations
A second type of simultaneous forum shopping occurs where the
complaining party's pending petitions address distinct or unrelated
factual allegations and, by implication, the distinct legal claims that
flow from them. In the Fajardo case, for example, a group of dis-
missed government employees first challenged the government's sup-
pression of union activities before the ILO's Trade Union Freedom
Committee. While the ILO petition was pending, the employees filed
a petition with the Inter-American Commission challenging the un-
fairness of judicial proceedings relating to that strike. They based
their petition on different events and treaty rights. Given the signifi-
cantly different focus of the two allegations, the Commission refused
to dismiss the simultaneous petition under the American Conven-
tion's forum shopping bar2 3
2' See supra Part Il.A-b (discussing Trutien, supra note 94, 1 6.4). This standard
is similar to the transactional tests applied by many U.S. courts to determine the scope
of a claim. See Erichson, supra note 9, at 973 (discussing standards used to determine
whether claims made in multiple lawsuits are the same).
2' General Comment 24(52), supra note 112, [ 14. The Committee was addressing
successive petition forum shopping cases, but its interpretation of "the same matter" in
article 5, paragraph 2 of the Optional Protocol would apply mutatis mutandis to simul-
taneous petition cases.
For a discussion of Fajardo, see supra text accompanying notes 131-40.
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iii. Claims Reviewable in Only One Forum
In both of the situations outlined immediately above, the peti-
tioner will often be able to litigate all of her claims before either tri-
bunal, rather than splitting those claims between two tribunals. How-
ever, the significant differences among human rights treaties
identified in Part I raise the possibility that an individual may file a si-
multaneous petition with a second tribunal as a means of obtaining
international review of some facet of her claim that could not be liti-
gated before the first tribunal.
This possibility arises in both related and distinct factual allega-
tion cases. For an example of a related factual allegation case, imag-
ine that the petitioner in V.M.O. failed to pay the child support or-
dered by the Norwegian court when it awarded custody of his
daughter to his ex-wife. The petitioner might have challenged the
payment order, which arose out of the same factual allegations as his
challenge to the custody order, as a violation of his right to the
"peaceful enjoyment of his possessions." However, because that
right is protected by the European Convention but not the ICCPR, he
could have raised this claim only before the European Commission,
not the UNHRC.25
The Fajardo case illustrates how this issue can arise in a distinct
factual allegations situation. The ILO Committee, to which the peti-
tioners directed their claims concerning the government's suppres-
sion of union activities, only has jurisdiction to review petitions that
allege violations of ILO labor treaties. The Committee could not have
considered any of the petitioners' claims concerning unfair and arbi-
24 Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, opened for signature Mar. 20, 1952, art. 1,Europ. T.S. No. 9 [hereinaf-
ter Protocol No. 1].
29 See Robertson, supra note 13, at 40 (pointing to three rights which are "pro-
tected by the European system but not in the United Nations Covenant," including the
right to property). Under the European Commission's deferential approach to prop-
erty regulation, the likelihood that such a claim would succeed is extremely slim. See,
e.g., App. No. 8906/80, Admissibility decision of 7 Dec. 1982 (unpublished), reprinted in
5 DIGEST OF STRASBOURG CAsE-LAw RELATING TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, Update, Part 4, at 29 (1997) (rejecting peaceful enjoyment of prop-
erty claim based on spousal support order); see also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note
86, at 641-42 (stating that in regard to the payment of taxes, "the States Parties have a
wide margin of appreciation in deciding on the type of tax or contributions they wish
to levy").
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trary domestic judicial proceedings.2 In short, only by filing a simul-
taneous petition with the Inter-American Commission could the peti-
tioners have received international review of all of their human rights
claims.
c. Applying an "Events and Facts" Approach to Simultaneous Petitions
To what extent should human rights jurists permit simultaneous
petition forum shopping in the three different situations outlined
above? The competing theoretical justifications identified in Part III
can be balanced most effectively by applying an "events and facts" or
transactional approach to evaluate the admissibility of a simultaneous
petition. Under this standard, individuals would be precluded from
presenting the same factual allegations and legal claims to different
tribunals at the same time. They would also be compelled to raise in a
single proceeding all legal claims arising out of those allegations that
are within the jurisdiction of the tribunal considering the petition.
Weeding out a distinct legal claim that could have been raised in the
initial proceeding and presenting it to a second tribunal while the first
petition is still pending would not be permitted. 7
This "events and facts" approach would not, however, bar jurists
from adjudicating a simultaneous petition containing factual allega-
tions significantly distinct from those at issue in a petition pending be-
fore another body28 Nor would it prohibit them from entertaining a
simultaneous petition to the extent that the first tribunal to hear the
petition does not have the power to adjudicate all of the legal claims
arising out of those factual allegations.
2 See Fajardo, supra note 131, 1 47 ("The Committee would not be competent to
rule on this issue since that would involve matters that were not charged in the case
before it...
Prior to dismissing a petition on this basis, jurists should inform the petitioner
of their decision and permit her to choose the forum in which to proceed. For exam-
ple, an individual faced with the prospect that the second tribunal will dismiss her
complaint should have the option to withdraw the complaint pending before the first
tribunal and proceed solely before the second tribunal. The same rule should be ap-
plied where the first tribunal indicates that it will dismiss the complaint on the basis of
a simultaneous petition forum shopping bar. The UNHRC has already adopted this
practice. See Bordes, supra note 129, 1 5.2 (explaining that an individual withdrew his
application from the first tribunal in order to present his case to the second tribunal).
I use the phrase "significantly distinct" to stress thatjurists should retain the dis-
cretion to dismiss simultaneous petitions that emphasize minor factual details that
could have been raised in the first proceeding or that do not affect the substance of
the petitioner's claims. See infra Part IV.B (discussing approaches to the implementa-
tion of forum shopping reform).
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By significantly constraining the ability of litigants to split their
claims, the "events and facts" standard will lead to a more efficient use
of jurists' severely limited resources without unduly constraining peti-
tioners' right to seek an effective international remedy. However, be-
cause the determination of which events and facts should be deemed
"related" and which legal claims are beyond the jurisdiction of an-
other tribunal necessarily vary with the details of each case, the stan-
dard cannot draw a definitive line in advance to separate those simul-
taneous petitions that should be considered from those that should be
summarily dismissed. The touchstone for the jurists' analysis, there-
fore, should be whether the first tribunal seized of the case has the
ability to issue a decision that will vindicate the petitioner's rights.
Again, the VM. 0. and Fajardo decisions provide helpful examples.
The petitioner in VM.0. raised three distinct legal claims, but his
principal objective was to obtain a favorable supranational decision
allowing him to pressure the Norwegian government or courts to
overturn the order denying him custody of his daughter. Because a
favorable ruling on any of his three legal claims would achieve this re-
sult, permitting V.M.O. to divide his legal claims between two pending
proceedings would be highly inefficient. It would require two sets of
jurists to expend significant effort examining the same interrelated
legal and factual issues, which would become moot for one set of ju-
rists, possibly at an advanced stage of the proceedings, if the first set of
jurists issued a decision in V.M.O.'s favor.3
Even if, under the child support hypothetical discussed above,
V.M.O. had raised a property deprivation claim before the European
Commission while his petition to the UNHRC was pending, compel-
ling arguments would support the Commission's decision to dismiss
2" See V.M. 0., supra note 82, 1-3. I phrase the petitioner's objective in this way
because many petition procedures do not result in legally binding decisions, and even
those that do are often not given direct effect in national laws. It is thus more accurate
to describe petitioners as seeking supranational decisions that allow them to pressure
government actors to modify national laws and practices. SeeHelfer & Slaughter, supra
note 1, at 290.
It might be argued that V.M.O. had an interest in having each of his three dis-
tinct legal claims fully adjudicated by some tribunal. This interest would survive the
issuance of a decision by the first tribunal finding in his favor on only one of those
claims. Such an argument is, however, inconsistent with the settled practice of human
rights tribunals, which regularly decline to consider additional legal claims raised by a
petitioner once a single treaty violation has been found. See, e.g., Hertel v. Switzerland,
European Court of Human Rights-Judgments and Decisions 1998-VI, 2298, 2333, App. No.
25181/94, 87 Eur. Ct. H.R-, 1 54 (1998); A. v. Australia, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 59th Sess., Annex, 1 9.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (1997).
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that petition. Although the UNHRC would not have the power to ad-
judicate V.M.O.'s property deprivation claim, a decision in his favor
on one of the other legal claims raised in his petition would still have
provided V.M.O. with the means to pressure Norwegian officials and
judges to modify the court order containing both the custody decree
and the hypothetical child support award. Because a favorable ruling
by the Commission on V.M.0.'s distinct property rights claim would
be unlikely to provide him any meaningful relief beyond what he
could already expect from the UNHRC, the Commission could prop-
erly decline to consider the property claim.
The same arguments cannot be applied to the Fajardo case. Any
recommendation by the ILO Committee concerning the petitioners'
free association rights would not have affected the outcome of their
petition to the Inter-American Commission seeking compensation for
arbitrary and unfair judicial proceedings.3' Those latter claims were
factually distinct from the allegations presented to the ILO Commit-
tee and thus involved little duplication of effort by the two tribunals.
Moreover, these claims raised legal issues going well beyond the ILO
Committee's jurisdiction. Had the Inter-American Commission de-
clined to hear the case on forum shopping grounds, a significant
component of the petitioners' alleged human rights violations would
never have been addressed by an international tribunal competent to
review them.
2. Successive Petition Forum Shopping
Successive petition forum shopping presents even more complex
issues. As explained in Part I, human rights treaties, States parties,
and commentators are sharply divided over whether to permit this ac-
tivity. This division exists because of the difficulty of balancing the
opposing interests of the parties involved in human rights litigation as
well as the competing institutional and normative concerns raised by
such conduct.
It is possible, however, to reconcile these issues by breaking down
successive petition forum shopping into three distinct types of dis-
putes: first, disputes in which the petitioner could not have presented
to the first tribunal the legal claims or factual allegations contained in
the later petition; second, cases in which the petitioner could have
'' Fajardo, supra note 131, 1 37 ("While it is true that the events in the two cases
are the same, the rights that have presumably been violated are different and an ILO
decision does not lead to any effective settlement of the violation denounced.").
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presented to the first tribunal the legal claims or factual allegations
contained in that later petition, but did not; and finally, cases in which
the petitioner did present the legal claims or factual allegations con-
tained in the later petition to the first tribunal, but the tribunal con-
sidered and rejected them on the merits.
I propose that human rights tribunals be given the authority to
entertain all three types of successive petitions on their merits. As a
matter of prudence, however, such authority should be exercised dif-
ferently depending upon the type of case presented. Jurists should be
most inclined to entertain the first category of cases, should be more
reluctant to entertain the second class of disputes, and should enter-
tain the third group of cases only rarely, if at all.
My proposal for successive petition forum shopping closely tracks
the "events and facts" standard I advocate for simultaneous petition
forum shopping, in that it encourages litigants to raise all factual alle-
gations and legal claims that are within a tribunal's jurisdiction in a
single proceeding. However, my proposal deviates from the "events
and facts" standard in that it grants jurists limited discretion to enter-
tain factual and legal issues that either were, or could have been,
raised in an earlier proceeding. In the sections that follow, I describe
each of these three case types in greater detail, explaining for each
the arguments supporting my proposal and identifying prudential
considerations to guide jurists facing any of these three circumstances.
I stress two points at the outset. The first is that my proposal does
not require a tribunal to hold a full-blown hearing on the merits
whenever it decides not to dismiss a complaint on forum shopping
grounds. To the contrary, the jurists may reach the entirely defensible
conclusion that, although a successive petition should not be summa-
rily dismissed on the basis of a treaty's forum shopping bar, it never-
theless should be declared inadmissible for failing to satisfy one of the
treaty's other admissibility requirements.Y02 Under current practice,
these forum shopping bars disempower human rights jurists from any
consideration of the allegations contained in a successive petition,
even in a summary fashion. Under my proposal, by contrast, jurists
themselves will have the discretion to determine whether a successive
Thus, it would be perfectly permissible, for example, for a tribunal to dismiss a
petition for failing to disclose a colorable violation of the treaty, even though that peti-
tion should not be dismissed on the basis of a treaty's successive petition forum shop-
ping bar. See ZWART, supra note 43, at 139-54 (discussing cases in which the European
Commission and the UNHRC have decided cases on the merits at the admissibility
stage). For a comprehensive discussion of treaty admissibility clauses, see id at 41-228.
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petition's allegations justify a full review on the merits or a summary
dismissal at the admissibility stage.
Second, although I believe that jurists rather than States parties
should control the pace and extent of forum shopping by petitioners,
I do not propose that each forum shopping decision be based on an
ad hoc assessment of case-specific factors having no precedential value
for future disputes. Instead, jurists should use the prudential con-
cerns I identify below, along with other relevant factors, to create clear
and relatively constraining rules for petitioners and States parties to
follow. What I envision is a common law-like process, in which tribu-
nals use early forum shopping petitions to generate a fund of experi-
ential knowledge upon which to build jurist-created rules to guide the
parties' strategic behavior when utilizing the petition system.
a. Legal Claims and FactualAllegations That Could Not Have Been Raised
in the First Proceeding
The strongest argument for permitting successive petition forum
shopping exists regarding petitions that raise legal claims or factual
allegations that are a proper subject for litigation before the second
tribunal but that could not have been adjudicated in the first proceed-
ing. In this situation, the full extent of the petitioner's allegations was
beyond the competence of the first tribunal and thus could not even
have been considered by its jurists in rendering their decision. Con-
struing admissibility clauses or reservations so as to require the second
tribunal to dismiss such successive petitions denies the petitioner the
opportunity for a complete review of all of her human rights claims,
thus intruding upon a core function of the petition system.t 30
i. Legal Claims
With respect to legal claims, the possibility that the first tribunal
will be unable to entertain all of a petitioner's allegations arises be-
cause of the four types of differences among overlapping human
rights treaties identified in Part I.B.m These differences create a seri-
"s See General Comment 24(52), supra note 112, 1 13 ("[T]he object and purpose of
the first Optional Protocol is to allow the rights obligatory for a State under the
[ICCPR] to be tested before the Committee....").
" The four types of differences are: (1) rights protected exclusively by treaty "A"
or treaty "B," but not both; (2) rights protected by both treaties, for which one treaty
alone provides more extensive protection for individuals; (3) rights guaranteed in both
treaties with identical texts, but which are interpreted in different ways by the tribu-
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ous hardship for petitioners if the second tribunal dismisses a succes-
sive petition in which the petitioner could not have raised the full
scope of her legal claims before the first tribunal.
a. Exclusive Treaty Rights
The starkest example of this hardship occurs in cases in which a
petitioner alleges a violation of two different human rights arising out
of the same "events and facts," and each right is protected by only one
treaty. Imagine, for example, that a government seizes private prop-
erty belonging to members of an ethnic or religious minority group.
Such conduct could be challenged as violating both the right to protec-
tion of property and the rights of ethnic and religious minorities to
enjoy their own culture and practice their own religion. However, the
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions is protected only in the
European human rights system, whereas express minority group rights
are found only in the ICCPR.
3°5
Under a strict interpretation of the "events and facts" approach to
forum shopping, aggrieved individuals in such cases face an impossi-
ble choice. They can choose to bring one of their legal claims to ei-
ther the ECHR or the UNHRC. They will not, however, be permitted
to file a second petition with the other tribunal if their first petition is
rejected, because the second petition is based on the same "events and
facts."
A similar, albeit less severe, variation of this problem occurs where
the petition alleges a violation of a cluster of rights relating to the
same events, but where one or more of those rights are protected by
only one of two applicable treaties. Such a case could arise, for exam-
nals; and (4) rights that conflict, such that it would be impossible for a State party to
protect both of them at the same time. See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text
(discussing the types of differences amongst overlapping human rights treaties and
giving examples).
"' The right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions is found in Protocol No. 1 to the
European Convention. See Protocol No. 1, supra note 294, art. 1 ("Every natural or le-
gal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions."). The right of
ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities to the protection of their culture, language,
and religion appears in article 27 of the ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 27
("[P]ersons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right.., to enjoy
their own culture .... practice their own religion, or use their own language."). It is
also possible that the government's conduct in this hypothetical case would violate the
right to nondiscrimination found in both the European Convention and the ICCPR.
However, a leading commentator on the ICCPR has written that article 27 "goes be-
yond the mere prohibition of discrimination ... and contains elements of a right to de
facto equality." Nowak, supra note 18, at 500. Thus, it would not be possible for the
petitioners to obtain a full review of their claims before the ECHR.
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ple, when the government represses a minority political party and
summarily dismisses its members from their positions of employment
in government service. These facts suggest violations of the free asso-
ciation, free expression, and due process rights of the political party
and its members. Only the ICCPR, however, expressly guarantees
every citizen the right to "have access, on general terms of equality, to
public service in his country."" Thus, a petition to the ECHR could
raise violations of rights protected by both the ICCPR and the Euro-
pean Convention, but it could not allege a violation of the U.N.
treaty's public service right.
Were the petitioners in such a situation to lose their case before
the ECHR and then file a successive petition with the UNHRC di-
rected solely at the violation of the public service right, a strict inter-
pretation of the "events and facts" approach might well require its
dismissal.s 7 Although such a result might be justified in domestic liti-
gation, the procedural constraints placed upon aggrieved individuals
by the disaggregated nature of the petition system and the need to
promote horizontal dialogue among tribunals outweigh the preclu-
sion of these claims on finality or efficiency grounds.
b. Differently Defined or Interpreted Treaty Rights
Even assuming that most tribunals would permit successive review
in exclusive treaty rights cases, ss there is no consensus as to whether
*6 ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 25(c); cf. Huber, supra note 110, 1 36 (reaffirming
"that 'disputes relating to the recruitment, careers and termination of service of civil
servants are as a general rule outside the scope of Article 6 § 1'" of the European Con-
vention).
Of course, if the petitioners prevail before the ECHR and then seek to litigate
their distinct participation right claim in a successive petition, the UNHRC should
dismiss their petition unless the petitioners can demonstrate that the prior judgment
does not afford them meaningful relief. SeeTardu, supra note 13, at 798-95 (suggesting
this standard).
"a The tribunals' existing case law is divided as to whether petitioners may assert in
a second proceeding legal claims that could not have been raised in a first proceeding.
The UNHRC's decision in Casanovas v. France, in which the Committee refused to dis-
miss a successive petition alleging a violation of a government employee's due process
rights which the European Commission had previously dismissed as falling outside the
scope of the European Convention, provides a hopeful sign in this direction. See Cas-
novas, supra note 101, 11 5.1-5.2 (stating that because the initial petition alleged a vio-
lation not covered by the European Convention, the Committee was not precluded
from examining it). The same is true of Mejia v. Peru, in which the Inter-American
Commission stated that forum shopping clauses "must be interpreted restrictively,"
and do not apply where the petitioner alleges "human rights violations concerning
which" another tribunal "has not yet given its opinion." Me'ia, supra note 67, at 157; see
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they would entertain cases in which the relevant rights are protected
by both treaties, but have different textual definitions or have been
interpreted differently in case law&'9 The UNHRC's jurisprudence il-
lustrates the confusion. In VM.O., the Committee rejected the argu-
ment that a successive petition can be considered on its merits when
the rights it alleges are defined more expansively in the ICCPR than
in the European Convention.3 0 However, in its 1994 General Com-
ment, the UNHRC stated that it would not dismiss a successive peti-
tion unless the rights contained in the two treaties were "identical.""'
And in the Casanovas case, the Committee refused to dismiss a peti-
tion concerning a right defined identically in both treaties' texts, but
interpreted more broadly in the Committee's case law.
31 2
also supra text accompanying notes 101-111, 116 (discussing cases). In VE.M. v. Spain,
by contrast, a case essentially identical to Casanovas in terms of procedural posture and
rights violations alleged, the UNHRC dismissed a petition that had merely been "sub-
mitted to" (as opposed to "considered by") the European Commission. See V.E.M., su-
pra note 116 (invoking Spain's forum shopping reservation to preclude review of a
previously submitted petition). The dismissal suggests that States parties, through
properly drafted admissibility clauses or reservations, can block successive petition re-
view in these cases. See European Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(1) (b) (requiring
the European Commission to dismiss cases that have "already been submitted to" an-
other tribunal (emphasis added)).
M9 The likelihood of successive petition forum shopping occurring in a case of
conflicting treaty rights is comparatively small, given that only one of the two treaties is
likely to contain legal standards an aggrieved individual can invoke to support her peti-
tion. Consider theJersild case, supra note 193 at 4; supra text accompanying notes 193-
200. The European Convention, not the Race Convention, protects the right to free-
dom of expression thatJersild alleged had been violated. Thus, hadJersild's allega-
tions been reected by the European Commission and the ECHR, there would have been
little basis for him to bring a successive petition before CERD. Indeed, conflicting
rights situations are most likely to arise when a different petitioner raises the same issues
before another tribunal, such as might have occurred had a member of a racial minor-
ity in Denmark petitioned CERD afterJersild's victory before the ECHR, alleging that
the reversal of the journalist's conviction amounted to a failure of Denmark's obliga-
tion to prosecute individuals who disseminate racist speech. Because of the different
identity of the petitioners, CERD would not be precluded from hearing such a peti-
tion. See supra note 67 (emphasizing that petitions addressing the same matter will not
be dismissed unless the complainants are the same, or "virtually the same").
-10 See VM. 0., supra note 82, 1 4.4.
" General Comment 24(52), supra note 112, 1 14.
312 See Casanovas, supra note 101, 1 5.1 (stating the Committee's view that because
"the rights of the European Convention differed in substance and with regard to their
implementation procedures from the right set forth in the Covenant, a matter that had
been declared inadmissable ratione materiae had not.., been 'considered' in such a way
that the Committee was precluded from examining it"). There is no justification for
treating the VM. 0. and Casanovas cases differently for forum shopping purposes. The
only difference between the two decisions is that the successive petition in Casanovas
alleged the violation of a single right that the European Commission had construed to
be outside the scope of the European Convention (a category (1) situation), whereas
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Refusing to consider the merits of petitions alleging violations of
differently defined or interpreted rights is highly problematic from
the perspective of the theoretical arguments discussed in Part III.
From the individual's perspective, such an approach categorically pre-
cludes the second-petitioned tribunal from addressing what may well
be meritorious legal claims under the more expansive definitions or
interpretations of the second treaty. It thus prevents aggrieved indi-
viduals from receiving a complete review of their claims commensu-
rate with the differing levels of protection contained in the various
treaties to which the defending State is a party. From an institutional
and normative perspective, enforcing the forum shopping ban disem-
powers the second tribunal from charting its own interpretive course
for the treaty it superintends, or from engaging in a horizontal dia-
logue with the jurists on the first tribunal to clarify the relationship
between the rights and freedoms contained in both agreements. Fi-
nally, such an approach denies the opportunity for improved reason-
ing and analysis which can occur when one set of jurists receives the
benefit of another tribunal's earlier decision. It thus leaves States par-
ties, individuals, and NGOs with diminished guidance for assessing the
contours of the differing standards contained in the two treaties.
ii. Factual Allegations
Strong policy arguments also support granting jurists the authority
to entertain successive petitions containing factual allegations that
were beyond the jurisdiction of the first tribunal. Cases of this sort
can arise when a petitioner alleges a series of discrete human rights
violations occurring over a period of months or years.
For example, the obligation to exhaust all available and effective
domestic remedies may preclude petitioners from introducing facts
about later-arising treaty violations during the first proceeding. This
the allegations in V.M.. concerned violations of several rights which are protected by
both treaties, but more broadly under the ICCPR than the European Convention (a
category (2) and (3) situation). In both cases, however, the European Commission's
dismissal of the petitions demonstrated that the individuals' allegations did not
amount to a violation of the European Convention. Similarly, both individuals sought
further relief before the UNHRC, relief that they might have been entitled to under
the more expansively-defined rights of the ICCP1L Yet, in only one of the two cases did
the Committee recognize the differing substantive standards between the two treaties
as a basis for avoiding the forum shopping bar and addressing the merits of the case.
Indeed, the argument for applying the bar was more persuasive in Casanovas than in
V.M.O., since in the former case the texts of the treaties are virtually identical, and it
was the Committee's case law that first identified the ICCPR as providing greater pro-
tection than the European Convention.
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could occur if domestic remedies concerning those later violations
were not exhausted until after the first tribunal had already rejected
other allegations that the petitioner had exhausted at an earlier
date.313 A similar case might arise under the six-month limitations rule
contained in several human rights treaties.3 1' Under this rule, an indi-
vidual must file a petition within six months of exhausting domestic
remedies. However, other treaties do not contain any limitations pe-
riod. 5 As a result, some of a petitioner's allegations may properly be
submitted to a second tribunal even though they were time-barred in
an earlier proceeding under a different treaty.
3 1 6
In neither of these two situations should the forum shopping bar
preclude jurists from considering a petitioner's unexamined factual
allegations. If a petitioner is unable to raise certain allegations in the
first proceeding, it would be manifestly unfair to prohibit her from
raising them in a second proceeding because different factual allega-
tions had previously been presented to the first tribunal.
iii. Prudential Concerns
The foregoing arguments strongly suggest that human rights ju-
rists should have the authority to review successive petitions that allege
any legal or factual claims that were beyond the jurisdiction of an-
other tribunal in an earlier proceeding. However, jurists should also
313 Exhaustion of domestic remedies may also occur while the first petition is still
pending. In that event, the petitioner should raise her allegations in a supplemental
submission to the first tribunal. The failure to raise those exhausted allegations in the
first proceeding should make it more difficult for the petitioner to raise it in a second
proceeding. See infra Part IV.A.2.b. If such exhausted allegations were raised and re-
jected in the first proceeding, the petitioner's ability to litigate them in a second peti-
tion should be extremely limited. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.
31 See, e.g., American Convention, supra note 27, art. 46(1) (b) (mandating a six-
month limit); European Convention, supra note 26, art. 26 ("The Commission may
only deal with a matter.., within a period of six months from the date on which the
final decision was taken."). The African Charter requires that a communication be
"submitted within a reasonable period from the time local remedies are exhausted."
African Charter, supra note 28, art. 56(6).
31S See, e.g., Optional Protocol, supra note 42; Convention Against Torture, supra
note 31. The Race Convention, supra note 29, art. 14, contains a six-month rule, but it
applies only if the State party has empowered a national tribunal to hear petitions al-
leging that treaty rights have been violated.
316 The UNHRC's jurisprudence supports jurists' authority to entertain such peti-
tions. See O.F. v. Norway, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 23d Sess., Annex 12, 1 5.2,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/23/D/158/1983 (1984) (refusing to apply a forum shopping bar
to a petition dismissed by the European Commission under the six-month limitations
rule).
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have discretion to dismiss such petitions on forum shopping grounds
where prudential concerns indicate that entertaining the petitions
would create more problems than benefits for either the treaty they
superintend or the global petition system as a whole.
For example, dismissal at the admissibility stage might be appro-
priate in cases where the petitioner has already filed more than one
successive petition before the first tribunal, and thus has raised the in-
ference that her petition before the second tribunal is frivolous, ex-
cessively delayed, or an abuse of the right of submission. Similarly,
dismissal might be appropriate even if the petitioner's allegations re-
late to a distinct or more expansively defined or interpreted right pro-
tected by the second treaty, where the facts alleged do not reveal any
possibility of a violation of a right that is expansively defined or inter-
preted by the second treaty and the tribunal believes that its limited
resources should be devoted to other petitions. Dismissal might also
be warranted for stale petitions, even in those treaty systems that do
not contain a six-month limitations period. Finally, the second tribu-
nal might also reasonably decline to hear a case on the merits where
there is a lack of consensus among the tribunal's members over how
to approach an unsettled legal issue common to more than one treaty
regime, and where the jurists believe it would be better to permit the
pertinent legal standards under a sister treaty to evolve before address-
ing the issue themselves.1
Conversely, the second tribunal's jurists might choose to entertain
such claims for a variety of reasons, such as engaging in a horizontal
dialogue with their colleagues to identify the existence of common
standards in both treaties or to explain the need for divergent stan-
dards in light of the differences in the treaties' text, object and pur-
pose, or preparatory work. Entertaining such petitions may also assist
nascent or underutilized tribunals to stake out an area of expertise in
adjudicating rights not covered by other treaties. The demonstration
of such expertise may attract additional petitioners, which in turn
would raise the jurists' profile and reputation. 1
317 Cf. ZWART, supra note 43, at 4 (noting that tribunals have applied admissibility
hurdles to screen out cases because "their members were divided on the issues raised
by the applicant" or "feared that a decision on the merits might alienate (potential)
States parties").
'8 The CAT appears to have followed this course. See Anne F. Bayefsky, The U.N.
Human Rights Regime: Is It Effective? Remarks at the American Society of International Law
Proceedings, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 91ST ANNUAL MEETING, Apr. 9-12, 1997, at 469
(stating that "word is spreading that the Committee.. .will decide for itself in deporta-
tion cases whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author of the
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These prudential concerns are illustrative rather than exhaustive.
They suggest that, even when extra-jurisdictional legal claims or fac-
tual allegations are alleged in a successive petition, it may not be wise
for tribunals to hear them. There is a crucial difference, however, be-
tween my proposal and the current approach to forum shopping.
Under the current approach, jurists have interpreted the treaties' ad-
missibility clauses and State party reservations to compel the dismissal
of petitions containing these legal claims and factual allegations. Un-
der my proposal, it is the jurists themselves, rather than the States,
who have the discretion to determine when dismissal at the admissibil-
ity stage is appropriate. They thus can control the pace at which to
hear successive petitions, and conserve their resources for the most
serious claims by screening out frivolous petitions that needlessly ex-
pend their resources and those of defending States.
Aggrieved individuals and their counsel also have an important
role to play under my proposal. Armed with the knowledge that tri-
bunals may, but are not compelled to, consider successive petitions on
their merits, they should articulate as carefully as possible those legal
and factual allegations that could not have been litigated in the prior
proceeding, paying particular attention to definitional and interpre-
tive differences among parallel treaty rights. Although jurists have in
the past been indulgent in framing legal claims for petitioners who
have not done so themselves,1 9 a tribunal more likely will choose to
hear a successive petition when the petitioner or her representative
highlights the novel legal or factual claims at issue. Improved reason-
ing and analysis is also likely to follow as petitioners make more pre-
cise and sophisticated arguments about a treaty's text, its objectives,
and past decisions interpreting the rights under review.
b. Claims That Could Have Been Raised in the First Proceeding,
But Were Not
The arguments in favor of entertaining a successive petition
communication would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to the
country of origin," resulting in a "marked increase in the number of individuals" ap-
proaching the Committee after their asylum claims have failed); see also NOWAX, supra
note 44, at 461 (discussing the range of responses to the UNHRC's interpretation of
the ICCPR's non-discrimination clauses as providing a broader right than that con-
tained in the European Convention).
'19 See, e.g., Bozize v. Central African Republic, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
49th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 124, 11 3, 6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/428/1990 (1994)
(finding a violation of the ICCPR even though petitioner did not specify which rights
under the ICCPR the defending State had violated).
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weaken when the petitioner did not exercise her opportunity to liti-
gate legal claims and factual allegations before the first tribunal. Al-
though it is uncertain whether existing admissibility clauses and reser-
vations actually compel tribunals to dismiss these claims and
allegations, when considered from the perspective of the competing
theoretical rationales discussed above, the case for entertaining these
successive petitions is decidedly mixed.
On the one hand, the fundamental principle that every aggrieved
individual should have the right to present each of her factual allega-
tions and legal claims to at least one tribunal supports permitting ju-
rists to entertain such petitions. Victims of human rights abuses, par-
ticularly those not residing in nations with active and independent
NGO support groups, are often at a disadvantage compared to de-
fending States, many of whom are repeat players in human rights ad-
judication. Individuals with limited knowledge or support systems
may have difficulty understanding their treaty rights and the often
complex procedures they must follow to bring their claims before in-
320ternational tribunals. Petitioners therefore should be given some
leeway to raise novel factual allegations or legal claims in a successive
petition after the first tribunal has dismissed their initial petition on
other grounds.
On the other hand, where a petitioner has surmounted the hur-
dles to international review and is sufficiently sophisticated to seek out
not one, but two human rights tribunals for redress, it would not be
unduly burdensome to require her to raise all factual and legal argu-
ments in the first petition. This requirement would allow the first tri-
bunal to consider the full scope of the allegations and to determine
whether any of them constitute a treaty violation, which might well
moot further litigation. Requiring a petitioner to raise all cognizable
factual allegations and legal claims also encourages opportunities for
dialogue and more precise reasoning if a successive petition raising
those issues is later presented to a second tribunal.
Although the UNHRC has twice permitted petitioners to raise
claims that could have been raised in earlier proceedings,32' the Euro-
320 See supra Part ILI.C (discussing the complex choices facing individuals when
choosing a forum).
321 See, e.g., Glaziou, supra note 100, 1 7.2 (refusing to apply forum shopping bar to
an allegation of prison beating not presented to the European Commission in an ear-
lier petition but excluding it for lack of substantiating evidence); Valentijn, supra note
100, 1 5.4 (permitting review of a challenge to retroactivity of a sentencing statute be-
cause it had not been raised in the first proceeding).
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pean Commission has been more circumspect. In Ajinaja v. United
Kingdom, 32 the European Commission considered whether a petition
that it had previously dismissed could be reopened when the peti-
tioner asserted legal and factual claims that he had not raised in the
first proceeding.M The Commission categorically rejected this possi-
bility, stating that it "cannot accept, as a basis for reconsidering a case,
information, further submissions or reformulated complaints which
were known to the applicant and could clearly have been presented by
him with the original application."324
The Ajinaja case involved an attempt to seek successive review
within the same human rights system, and thus is not directly applica-
ble to successive petition forum shopping among treaty systems. The
Commission's reasoning, however, suggests that petitioners who do
engage in forum shopping and who do not raise all of their claims in
an initial proceeding should bear the burden of explaining why a sec-
ond set of jurists should consider their claims in a subsequent pro-
ceeding. Here too, jurists should consider a variety of prudential con-
cerns in deciding whether or not to hear such claims on the merits.
These concerns include: the petitioner's reasons for originally omit-
ting the claim; whether the petitioner was represented by legal coun-
sel in the first proceeding; whether the omitted claims are closely re-
lated to claims that were actively litigated in the first proceeding; and
whether the petitioner originally did not raise the omitted allegations
because the first tribunal's prior case law foreordained an unfavorable
decision. To facilitate the jurists' decision, petitioners or their coun-
sel should directly address in their pleadings the reason they declined
to raise the omitted allegations in the prior proceeding.
c. Claims That Were Raised and Rejected in the First Proceeding
The last and weakest case for permitting successive petition forum
shopping arises where a petitioner seeks to relitigate factual allega-
tions or legal claims that the first tribunal rejected either after a full
32 App. No. 13365/87, 55 Eur. Comm'n H.R Dec. & Rep. 294 (1988).
s2 Ajinaja's second set of allegations were "entirely different from his original
complaints." Id. at 296. His first petition alleged "unlawful arrest, conviction and de-
tention, contrary to Article 5 para. l(a)and (c), and Articles 3 and 4 of the Conven-
tion," whereas his second petition asserted violations of the "minimum rights of de-
fence" under Article 6. Id. at 294-95.
324 Id. at 296. The Commission also dismissed the second petition for failing to
comply with the Convention's six-month limitations rule. See id. at 295 ("[T]he Com-
mission is not competent to deal with the applicant's complaints because he has failed
to observe the six months rule laid down in Article 26 of the Convention....').
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hearing on the merits or on the basis of a substantive objection to
their admissibility.325 In these cases, the petitioner has already exer-
cised the right to present her claims to a human rights tribunal, and
now seeks further review of the identical claims in a different forum.
In this situation, both the tribunal's interest in efficient use of its lim-
ited resources and the defending State's interest in finality and the
prevention of meritless or abusive litigation weigh heavily against the
individual's interest in receiving a second opportunity for review. In
addition, where both treaties protect the same legal standards, there is
little need for a dialogue among the jurists to clarify ambiguous areas
of treaty law. For all of these reasons, the second tribunal should
adopt a strong presumption in favor of dismissal.
Three narrow situations might justify an exception to this pre-
sumption, however. First, a petitioner may not always articulate
clearly her belief that the second tribunal should consider her succes-
sive petition because the rights guaranteed by the treaty at issue in the
second proceeding are broader than those protected by the treaty at
issue in the first proceeding. In Brinkhof, for example, the petitioner
did not expressly argue that the European Commission's treatment of
different categories of conscientious objectors was insufficiently rights-
protective. Rather, he simply presented his successive petition to the
UNHRC, which itself identified the ICCPR as providing broader pro-
316tection than the European Convention. It should thus be possible
for such a tribunal to entertain previously rejected claims in a succes-
sive petition where the jurists wish to use the case to explore differ-
s2 Not all petition dismissals at the admissibility stage are substantive. Where a tri-
bunal concludes that a petitioner's allegations conclusively fail to demonstrate a treaty
violation and thus require no further consideration, it will dismiss the petition as
.manifestly ill-founded," "manifestly groundless," or "incompatible with the provisions
of" the treaty. For treaty text requiring the relevant tribunal to consider inadmissible
any petition that is groundless or otherwise not compatible with the treaty, see Ameri-
can Convention, supra note 27, art. 47(c); Optional Protocol, supra note 42, art. 3;
European Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(2). Such dismissals are loosely equivalent
to a U.S. court granting a motion to dismiss with prejudice.
By contrast, dismissals based on procedural grounds, such as the failure to exhaust
domestic remedies, the failure to comply with a treaty's six-month limitations rule, and
the submission of anonymous petitions, fall into the non-substantive category. See
ZWART, supra note 43, at 155-72, 187-230 (discussing anonymous and abusive com-
plaints, and exhaustion of domestic remedies, respectively); M6se & Opsahl, supra note
103, at 291-311 (discussing the different conditions of admissibility). Dismissals on
these grounds should not be the basis for a later forum shopping bar, since the peti-
tioner's claims were never considered on the merits by another tribunal.
6 See Brinkhof, supra note 177, 19.3 (noting that although differential treatment of
different categories of conscientious objectors is unreasonable, petitioner did not show
that his rights were adversely affected as a result of this disparity).
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ences between two human rights agreements. In such situations, of
course, the successive petition is more properly viewed as one in
which the petitioner's allegations were beyond the jurisdiction of the
first tribunal.1
2
Second, the second tribunal may wish to review the allegations set
forth in a successive petition solely for the purpose of mapping out a
claim which falls outside both the treaty that the tribunal superintends
and the treaty at issue in the first proceeding. Such review will likely
occur at the admissibility stage rather than at the review on the merits,
since the definition of the treaties' boundaries will lead the second set
ofjurists to reject the petitioner's allegations, just as the first tribunal
did. Although this type of review provides no additional relief to peti-
tioners seeking a second opportunity to litigate their claims, it does
permit jurists to harmonize the borders of global and regional human
rights standards. As the margins of protection shared by two or more
treaties become more fully understood, the need to review successive
petitions for the limited purpose of harmonization will diminish.
Finally, and most controversially, the second set of jurists may
choose to entertain a petition on the merits where failing to do so
would result in manifest injustice to the petitioner. Although most
tribunals give careful consideration to petitions that raise serious
questions regarding human rights abuses or treaty interpretation, the
rising number of petitions being filed with regional and U.N.-based
tribunals suggests that occasionally a complaint may not receive the
328attention it deserves. In such cases, it should not be beyond the
power of the second tribunal to consider the petitioner's previously
rejected factual allegations or legal claims, even where both treaties
define or interpret the protected right identically.
In deciding whether to entertain such claims, however, the second
set ofjurists must proceed with caution. When the reason for hearing
a successive petition is the first tribunal's failure to review adequately
the matter in a prior proceeding, the second panel is tacitly suggesting
that the first panel missed a legal or factual issue that raises a prima
3 See supra Part IV.A.2.a (discussing successive petitions containing legal claims or
factual allegations that could not have been raised in the first proceeding).
32 In Europe in particular, the large volume of petitions submitted to the Euro-
pean Commission, see Schermers, supra note 246, at 495 (noting the increasing backlog
and length of European Commission proceedings), together with its extremely high
rate of dismissal at the admissibility stage, increase the chance that a few meritorious
cases might not receive adequate consideration. SeeA.H. ROBERTSON &J.G. MERRiLLS,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE 264 (3d ed. 1993) (noting that the Commission rejects
more than 90% of filed cases at the admissibility stage).
FORUM SHOPPING
facie treaty violation. Reviewing the merits of such a petition may thus
call into question the authority and abilities of the first set of jurists.
To minimize this result, the second set ofjurists should not conduct a
de novo review of the petition's allegations. Rather, they should grant
substantial deference to the decision of the first tribunal, and declare
the petition admissible only if the petitioner's allegations reveal a
clear treaty violation.32 This way, the second set of jurists can avoid
manifest injustice to petitioners without unduly undermining the in-
ternational standing of the first set ofjurists.
B. ImplementingForum Shopping Reform
The proposal just advanced seeks to balance the competing inter-
ests of the parties and to take into account institutional and normative
concerns in order to develop a coherent and comprehensive ap-
proach to human rights forum shopping. How might this proposal be
implemented into the international human rights petition system?
Two alternative approaches are possible.
1. Amending the Treaties to IncreaseJurists' Discretion
The first implementation strategy would require amending admis-
sibility clauses contained in all global and regional human rights
agreements that contain petition procedures permitting individuals to
bring suit against their national governments. The amendments
would delete existing forum shopping admissibility clauses and re-
place them with two new admissibility clauses: one concerning simul-
taneous petition forum shopping, and the other concerning succes-
sive petition forum shopping. Below, I set forth two draft articles,
which together would permit human rights jurists to implement the
above proposal.
329 The standard of review that I contemplate is analogous to that applied by the
UNHRC when reviewing challenges to procedural rulings and jury instructions issued
by domestic trial courts. The Committee has stated that the scope of review in such
cases is extremely limited, and that no treaty violation will be found unless the peti-
tioner demonstrates that the trial court's decisions "were clearly arbitrary or amounted
to a denial ofjustice." Tomlin v. Jamaica, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 57th Sess.,
Annex, 1 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/589/1994 (1996). Regional tribunals have
adopted similarly deferential review standards. See, e.g., Murray v. United Kingdom,
269 Eur. Ct. H.R (ser. A) at 17 (1993) ("It is not normally within the province of the
European Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the domestic
court."). These rules provide a settled body of case law for tribunals to draw upon
when deciding whether to hear a case that falls within this narrow category of succes-
sive petitions.
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Draft admissibility clause concerning simultaneouspetition
forum sh"pping-
The [Court/Commission/Committee] shall have
the discretion to declare a petition inadmissible to the
extent that the petition raises:
(a) essentially the same factual allegations or legal
claims that are contained in a petition pending before
another procedure of international investigation or
settlement, or
(b) novel legal claims arising from essentially the
same factual allegations that are contained in a peti-
tion pending before another procedure of interna-
tional investigation or settlement. For purposes of this
subsection, "novel legal claims" shall mean legal
claims that have not been asserted in a petition pend-
ing before another procedure of international investi-
gation or settlement, without regard to whether such
legal claims were outside the jurisdiction of that pro-
cedure.
Draft admissibility clause concerning successive petition
forum shnping
The [Court/Commission/Committee] shall have
the discretion to declare a petition inadmissible to the
extent that the petition raises:
(a) essentially the same factual allegations or legal
claims that have already been examined by another
procedure of international investigation or settlement,
or
(b) factual allegations or legal claims that were not
asserted in a petition that has already been examined
by another procedure of international investigation or
settlement, having due regard to whether such allega-
tions or claims were outside the jurisdiction of that
procedure.
Although parts of these admissibility clauses track language used
FORUM SHOPPING
in existing human rights agreements, 3 the clauses differ in several re-
spects from existing forum shopping clauses. Thus, several points of
explanation are in order.
As for the specific language of the clauses, I use the phrases "to
the extent that" and "essentially the same factual allegations or legal
claims" to emphasize that jurists may dismiss all or only part of a peti-
tion, and may do so because either the factual or legal claims it con-
tains duplicates those at issue in a pending or previously decided case.
These phrases also permit jurists to consider on the merits a petition
that raises factual or legal questions distinct from those at issue in an-
other proceeding, even if those distinctions relate to subtle differ-
ences between the two treaties' texts, object and purpose, orjurispru-
dence.
The phrase "novel legal claims" in subparagraph (b) of the simul-
taneous petition forum shopping clause adopts the "events and facts"
standard discussed above. The standard will encourage petitioners to
resolve all of their claims in a single proceeding. At the same time, it
will grantjurists the authority to dismiss simultaneous petitions raising
unexamined legal issues that are unlikely to provide any more relief to
the petitioner than can be obtained in the pending proceeding. Fi-
nally, the phrase "due regard" in subparagraph (b) of the successive
petition forum shopping clause directs jurists to give careful consid-
eration to reviewing legal or factual claims that were beyond the juris-
diction of the first tribunal. As explained above, such claims are likely
to be particularly worthy of review on the merits when raised in a suc-
cessive petition.
More fundamentally, the two admissibility clauses are drafted in
precatory language, reflecting the need to provide jurists with suffi-
cient flexibility to engage in a common law-like rulemaking process to
address the wide variety of forum shopping disputes identified above.
For example, the draft clauses use the phrase "another procedure of interna-
tional investigation or settlement." Although cumbersome, this phrase appears in
most human rights agreements and is generally understood to cover onlyjudicial or
quasi-judicial procedures "concerned with the examination of claims by individuals."
ZWART, supra note 43, at 174; see also id at 182-83 (explaining that the European
Commission has recognized both the "procedure before the HRC on the basis of the
Optional Protocol and the machinery for the protection of the freedom of association
of the ILO" as being "another procedure" within the meaning of article 27(1) (b) of
the Convention (footnotes omitted)). In addition, the draft admissibility clauses do
not alter the well-settled rule that a forum shopping bar applies only to petitions filed
by the same individual or by someone with standing to act on his or her behalf. See id
at 177, 181-82 ('he BRC will not deal with a communication if the same claim con-
cerning the same individual is being examined by another international organ.").
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On the surface, this discretionary approach may seem at odds with ex-
isting admissibility clauses, which are drafted using the mandatory
phrase "shall."331 However, such mandatory clauses actually mask the
discretion created by ambiguous or undefined terms that appear in all
332
existing admissibility conditions.
Including permissive language in the forum shopping admissibil-
ity clauses is essential to ensure that jurists have the discretion to con-
trol their own dockets and to devise forum shopping control rules that
balance their scarce resources against the other competing policy ob-
jectives for and against duplicative review. 33 An overtly discretionary
approach is also preferable to the existing system, where jurists, con-
fronted with what appear to be mandatory forum shopping clauses,
have interpreted (and arguably misinterpreted) the clauses to allow
them flexibility in deciding which cases to hear on the merits.
Finally, adopting a single set of admissibility clauses for all human
rights agreements will require jurists to work from the same textual
blueprint. This increases the likelihood that different tribunals will
consult each others' decisions as persuasive precedents and reach the
same results when faced with similar types of forum shopping issues.s
It is these precedents, rather than the discretionary clauses set forth
above, that will ultimately provide the most precise guideposts for lit-
3 See, e.g., Optional Protocol, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (a), at 303 ("The Committee
shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has ascertained that.
. t]he same matter is not being examined under another procedure of international
investigation or settlement." (emphasis added)).
'" See generally ZwART, supra note 43, at 4 (arguing that "policy considerations often
play a part" in how admissibility clauses are applied); Mutua, supra note 228, at 221
(noting "the ambiguity of the text creating the [UN]HRC and defining its powers").
For example, the drafters of the Optional Protocol did not define the phrase "the
same matter" in article 5(2) (a), thereby leaving to the UNHRC significant independ-
ence to decide which cases should be declared admissible under this clause. Another
example can be found in article 3 of the Optional Protocol, which states that the
Committee "shall consider inadmissible" any communication which "it considers to
be... incompatible with the provisions of the Covenant." Optional Protocol, supra
note 42, art. 5(2) (a), at 303 (emphasis added).
The discretionary approach I advocate is a more modest form of a proposal ad-
vanced by Professor Henry Steiner. Professor Steiner argues that States should amend
the Optional Protocol to grant the UNHRC broad-based "discretionaryjurisdiction" to
focus its scarce resources on cases its members can use to expound the meaning of the
ICCPR and to "stimulat[e] thought and dialogue with diverse actors." Steiner, supra
note 285, at 17-18.
The beginnings of such a trend can be found in Fajardo, supra note 131, 1 41,
where the Inter-American Commission consulted the practice of the UNHRC in de-
termining the admissibility of a simultaneous forum shopping petition.
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gants considering whether to file a simultaneous or successive peti-
tion.
2. Justifying Forum Shopping Discretion: Death Row Petitions and
Treaty Denunciations in the Caribbean
Compelling evidence of the need for judicial discretion in forum
shopping cases is provided by a recent series of treaty denunciations
by three Caribbean nations. In October 1997, Jamaica denounced the
ICCPR's First Optional Protocol, eliminating the right of individuals
to petition the UNHRC concerning Jamaica's human rights prac-
tices.ms In May 1998, Trinidad and Tobago denounced both the Op-
tional Protocol and the American Convention, and, in January 1999,
Guyana withdrew from the Optional Protocol. Trinidad and Tobago,
and Guyana, later re-ratified the Optional Protocol with broad reser-
vations covering death penalty issues.33 Barbados is considering simi-
lar action. 37
These troubling denunciations were precipitated by a 1993 deci-
sion of the London-based Judicial Committee of Privy Council, which
functions as the highest court of appeal for several former British
colonies in the Caribbean. In Pratt & Morgan v. Jamaica,3  the Privy
Council commuted the death sentences of two men who had spent
more than fourteen years challenging their convictions and sentences
while on death row. The court accepted the argument, which had
been rejected by the UNHRC, 39 that prolonged periods of detention
on death row constitute inhuman or degrading punishment. The
'" See Schiffrin, supra note 165, at 563 (reporting Jamaica as the first State to de-
nounce the First Optional Protocol); Marvette Darien, Rights-Jamaica: Spurning Rights
Group Is Wrong Move, Advocates Say, INTER PRESs SERVICE, Dec. 10, 1998 (reporting the
reactions of critics to Jamaica's threat to withdraw from the Optional Protocol). Ja-
maica has yet to re-ratify the Optional Protocol. See Schiffrin, supra note 165, at 567
n.31 (indicating that Trinidad and Tobago, unlike Jamaica, is considering re-ratifying).
Both Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana, then re-ratified the Optional Protocol
with reservations prohibiting the UNHRC from receiving communications from "any
prisoner who is under sentence of death in respect of any matter relating to his prose-
cution, his detention, his trial, his conviction, his sentence or the carrying out of the
death sentence on him and any matter connected therewith." Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Trinidad & Tobago, Aug. 26, 1998
(visited Mar. 1, 1999) <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/partboo
/ivboo/iv_5.html>.
W See Estrella Gutierrez, Rights-Americas: Trindad and Tobago Stands Up to OAS INrER
PRESS SERVICE,June 4, 1998 (reportingthat Barbados may denounce the Inter-American
Convention).
2 App. Cas. 1 (P.C. 1993).
339 For further discussion, see supra Part II.B.1.
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Privy Council also imposed a presumptive five-year time limit for
completing both domestic appeals and petitions to international hu-
man rights bodies, ruling that executing a defendant after that time
period would be unconstitutional.3 °
Following the Pratt & Morgan decision, Jamaica and Trinidad and
Tobago commuted the sentences of more than 100 prisoners incar-
cerated on death row for more than five years. The decision also en-
couraged other death row inmates to file petitions with international
human rights tribunals. Many of these defendants engaged in succes-
sive petition forum shopping, filing petitions first with the Inter-
American Commission and later with the UNHRC.sl
The time required to complete these petition procedures, to-
gether with delays in national court proceedings, often exceeded the
five-year time limit imposed by the Pratt & Morgan decision. Death
row petitioners engaging in successive petition forum shopping could
thus force the defending governments to commute their capital sen-
tences simply by submitting two consecutive petitions to the tribunals.
The result was a de facto abolition of the death penalty in these Car-
ibbean nations, even though neither the ICCPR nor the American
Convention proscribes capital punishment. Faced with this unusual
state of affairs, the governments chose to denounce their treaty obli-
gations rather than abandon the death penalty.
These events demonstrate the importance of granting jurists
broad discretion to fashion forum shopping rules in response to un-
anticipated situations such as the Pratt & Morgan decision. Had the
Inter-American Commission and the UNHRC enjoyed greater flexibil-
ity than they do currently, they might have fashioned a workable solu-
tion when confronted with a large number of petitions by death row
defendants who were understandably using every means available to
overturn their capital convictions. For example, the jurists might have
balanced the State's interest in speedy resolution of the claims against
the petitioners' interests in maximizing the avenues for international
review by coordinating the expedited review of petitions submitted to
both bodies concurrently. Although such formal coordination be-
30 The Privy Council found that review of a petition by a human rights body could
normally be completed within 18 months. SeeSchiffrin, supra note 165, at 567.
'' See id, at 566 n.27.
52 See id. at 564 & n.5 (noting that ICCPR does not prohibit capital punishment);
DAvIDsON, supra note 36, at 267-74 (discussing the limited circumstances under which
the American Convention allows imposition of the death penalty); see also Francis Wil-
liams,Jamaica Quits U.N. Accord, FIN. TMES, Oct. 27, 1997, at 3 (characterizing the Pratt
&Morgan decision as creating "a de facto abolition of the death penalty").
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tween human rights tribunals has not occurred in the past, 3 it seems
a particularly appropriate response to the exigencies of capital pun-
ishment and the time constraints imposed by the Privy Council. Ju-
rists could have reinforced the incentives for petitioners to file all of
their claims simultaneously by refusing to consider any successive peti-
tions absent extraordinary circumstances, such as the government's
willful withholding of exculpatory evidence.
It is, of course, uncertain whether such expedited procedures
would have prevented the denunciations. States willing to risk inter-
national opprobrium by denouncing their treaty commitments clearly
have no interest in embracing forum shopping reforms or even in
presenting reasoned arguments to explain why jurists should dismiss a
particular petition.3" Yet the repeated, unregulated use of successive
petition forum shopping by death row defendants and their counsel
highlighted a potential flaw in the petition system that Caribbean gov-
ernments could use to justify their denunciations of the treaties.m
Under the forum shopping revisions I propose, the tribunals could
have addressed this flaw themselves. Under the current rules, they
lack the discretion to do so.
3. The Prospects for Amending the Treaties
Even assuming that amending the treaties to grant jurists discre-
tion to regulate forum shopping is desirable as a matter of policy, it is
unlikely that the more than one hundred States parties to the numer-
ous global and regional human rights agreements would be willing to
undertake such a politically uncertain task. Forum shopping is, after
all, far from the most pressing issue on the international human rights
agenda, and it pales in comparison to the resource concerns and
See Samson, supra note 46, at 658; HUMAN RIGHTS LAw-MAKING, supra note 13,
at 139.
4 For example, when a death row petitioner attempted to split his claims between
the Inter-American Commission and the UNHRC, Trinidad and Tobago argued that
"the splitting of petitions between two human rights bodies is an abuse of the right of
submission" and a ground for dismissal. Bethel v. Trinidad & Tobago, U.N. GAOR,
Hum. Rts. Comm., 65th Sess., 1 6.2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/65/D/830/1998 (1999).
3 See Gutierrez, supra note 337 (reporting that Trinidad and Tobago foreign minis-
ter characterized successive petition forum shopping as "Death row inmates 'abusing'
recourse to international entities"); see also Virginia Hardy, Rights-Jamaica: Government
Goingthe Wrong Way, Say Critics, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 11, 1998 (noting thatJamaican
national securityministerjustifiedwithdrawal from either Optional Protocol or American
Convention as necessary because "[aippeals to these human rights bodies take a consid-
erable amountof time and have to run consecutivelyrather than concurrently").
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backlog of work facing most tribunals.
3 4 6
Amending the human rights agreements may be a realistic option
in two circumstances, however. First, expert and political bodies
within the United Nations are considering whether to adopt new op-
tional petition procedures for two existing human rights agree-
ments-CEDAW and the ICESCR. Since negotiations concerning the
texts of these optional agreements are ongoing, it would be compara-
tively easy to include the forum shopping admissibility clauses set
forth above before the treaties are finalized and opened for signature
to States. 7 States parties to other human rights agreements could
then monitor how these treaties apply the new forum shopping
clauses and decide at a later date whether to adopt them for other pe-
tition procedures.
Second, as explained more fully below, there is pressure within
the U.N. to reform the existing petition system and replace it with a
single tribunal that has the power to review petitions under all U.N.-
based human rights agreements. Although the political will to create
such a tribunal is uncertain,38 if and when such a proposal is given se-
rious consideration, States will need to decide whether to permit fo-
rum shopping among the U.N. human rights tribunal and the three
regional human rights systems.3 9
4. Implementing Forum Shopping Reform in the
Absence of Amendment
In the immediate future, the human rights tribunals currently re-
viewing individual petitions will continue to operate under existing
346 See supra Part III.E (discussing inadequate resources of overburdened tribunals).
37 See supra notes 63, 65 and accompanying text. The same result could be used
for the Migrant Workers' Convention, which has been opened for signature but which
has not yet entered into force. Cf 1996 Alston Report, supra note 2, 96 (advocating
amendment of Migrant Workers' Convention prior to its entry into force to eliminate
existence of new treaty body and confer supervisory powers on an existing treaty body).
34 See id. 1 94 (questioning "whether there is the political will to begin exploring in
detail the contours of such a reform").
39 See UN Human Rights Regime, supra note 240, at 483 (proposing consolidation of
six existing U.N. treaty bodies into two monitoring bodies, one dealing with State party
reports and the other with individual petitions, together with a United Nations human
rights court with advisory jurisdiction) (remarks by Thomas Buergenthal, George
Washington University National Law Center); Lillich, supra note 153, at 475 & n.1 15
(noting that any proposed International Court of Human Rights would be unlikely to
cover regional human rights instruments, at least initially); see also 1993 Alston Report,
supra note 38, 248 (stressing the need to develop harmonious relationships among
regional human rights tribunals and U.N. treaty bodies).
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procedures and admissibility clauses. Will it be possible for the jurists,
if they are so inclined, to implement forum shopping reforms into the
existing system?
As discussed in Part II, the texts of existing admissibility clauses
have not produced congruent case law. To the contrary, the
UNHRC's recent decisions demonstrate that there are inconsistent
strands of jurisprudence even within a single tribunal. Notwithstand-
ing these divergent decisions, however, jurists on all tribunals have
construed the admissibility clauses to grant them some discretion in
deciding when litigants may forum shop for a favorable decision.
As a result, in the case of treaties or reservations prohibiting si-
multaneous and successive petition forum shopping where the "same
matter,"3 "substantially the same" matter,3s or "the subject of the pe-
tition or communication " 352 is being or has been examined by another
tribunal, jurists do have sufficient flexibility to implement the bulk of
the forum shopping reforms I propose. For example, the UNHRC's
decision in the Casanovas case,353 its statements in General Comment
24(52),- and the Inter-American Commission's decision in the Fa-
jardo cases  demonstrate that jurists can use existing treaty texts to
achieve the most important policy objectives underlying my proposal-
engaging in a horizontal dialogue to harmonize substantive differ-
ences among human rights treaties and permitting individuals to pur-
sue in a second petition legal and factual claims that could not have
been raised in an earlier proceeding. By contrast, the strict "events
and facts" standard used by the UNHRC to dismiss other forum shop-
ping petitions can be adapted to screen out most simultaneous peti-
356tion forum shopping claims in the manner I propose.' To achieve
w CERD PL of Proc., supra note 62, Rule 84(1) (g); Migrant Workers' Convention,
supra note 33, art. 77(3)(a); Convention Against Torture, supra note 31, art. 22 (5)(a);
Optional Protocol, supra note 42, art. 5(2) (a).
'5 European Convention, supra note 26, art. 27(1) (b); American Convention, su-
pra note 27, art. 47(d).
352 American Convention, supra note 27, art. 46(1) (c).
'3 See Casanovas, supra note 101 and accompanying text.
%4 See General Comment 24(52), supra note 112 and accompanying text.
m' SeeFajardo, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
The only situations in which jurists will not be able to implement my proposal
involve petitions where the same factual allegations or legal issues are being or have
already been examined in an earlier proceeding. See supra Part IV.A.2.c (discussing
claims that were rejected in a prior proceeding). The plain language of the treaties
precludes jurists from considering such cases even if they believe that the first tribunal
failed to redress a blatant human rights violation. In addition, the European and In-
ter-American tribunals, which are prohibited from entertaining successive petitions
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this result, however, jurists will need to analyze forum shopping peti-
tions more carefully, reconciling inconsistent strands of case law and
reconciling their decisions with forum shopping cases decided by
other tribunals.
Even in treaty systems that permit only simultaneous petition fo-
rum shopping or only successive petition forum shopping, or that do
not regulate forum shopping at all, jurists are not required to enter-
tain all forum shopping petitions on their merits. To the contrary,
they can implement the broad outlines of my proposal by applying
other admissibility clauses to screen out claims that do not further the
interests of the petition system as a whole. For example,jurists might
dismiss a successive petition on admissibility grounds "related to the
merits ',3s7 when the allegations it contains have been fully explored in
an earlier proceeding and do not raise any new issues worthy of con-
sideration. Similarly, they could dismiss as an "abuse of the right of
submission" successive petitions submitted after an unduly long delay
or after earlier petitions have been repeatedly rejected by another tri-
bunal 3-s Conversely, to the extent that a treaty system does not regu-
late forum shopping, jurists already enjoy wide discretion to declare
admissible those simultaneous or successive petitions that are worthy
of consideration on the merits, provided that they comply with the
treaty's other admissibility requirements.
In short, although amending the treaty texts would be the most
direct way to achieve forum shopping reform, it is not the only alter-
native available. Jurists currently possess the authority to regulate the
practice. The extent to which they do so may vary with a tribunal's
stage of development. Tribunals that have yet to attract a large num-
ber of claimants may choose to err on the side of admissibility to cre-
ate additional opportunities to flesh out unexplored treaty questions.
More established tribunals may impose more stringent admissibility
requirements and conserve their resources for petitions raising the
most significant or unsettled issues.
where "substantially the same" claims have been raised in an earlier proceeding, may
feel obliged to declare inadmissible petitions that raise marginally different legal or
factual claims. Such a position does not, however, require the tribunals to dismiss legal
or factual claims that were beyond the jurisdiction of the first tribunal. See supra Part
IV.A.2.a (discussing such cases).
357 ZWART, supra note 43, at 139. These admissibility grounds are used to screen
out claims that are "manifestly ill-founded," "incompatible with the provisions of" the
treaty, unsubstantiated, or which fail to disclose the appearance of a violation. See id at
139-50.
8 For a discussion, see id. at 164-69.
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C. Reforming the U.N. Human Rights System: A Cautionary Note
The forum shopping reforms I have proposed are incremental
and presuppose the continued existence of decentralized fora for ad-
judicating human rights petitions. There is, of course, a far more
radical method of addressing forum shopping: consolidating the pro-
fusion of venues in which claims may be brought into a single court or
tribunal with the authority to interpret all human rights agreements.
Professor Theodor Meron's 1984 study on human rights law-making
in the U.N. endorsed such a proposal as a "desirable long-range solu-
tion" to the proliferation of treaties and tribunals: "By consistently
and rationally applying and interpreting human rights instruments,
and by proper balancing of the norms therein contained... such a
tribunal would reduce immensely the risk of normative conflicts and
would enlarge the range of norms which could be applied to specific
violations. " 5
As a long-term aspirational goal, the proposal to create a single
human rights tribunal has undoubted merit. It suggests a future in
which aggrieved individuals throughout the world will assert all of
their claims before one judicial body, which can then address and
hopefully resolve the tensions created by diverging and, conflicting
standards contained in overlapping human rights agreements. As an
immediate strategy to replace the existing petition system, however,
the proposal's prospects are bleak. Given the nonbinding nature of
many human rights decisions and the spotty record of compliance
with those decisions outside of Europe, States are unlikely, as a politi-
cal matter, to rush to replace existing tribunals with a human rights
court possessing the power to oversee the laws and practices of all of
the world's nations.m Moreover, geographically linked groupings of
States which have developed confidence in regional human rights ad-
judication may resist abandoning regional procedures in favor of a
less familiar global review system.36'
Practical politics aside, serious normative concerns cast doubt
upon the wisdom of consolidating the treaty bodies in the immediate
future. As human rights expert Philip Alston has explained, those fea-
ss HUMAN RIGHTS LAW-MAKING, supra note 13, at 212-13.
See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 1, at 366-67 (discussing reasons why the exist-
ing petition system is unlikely to be modified in the near future).
'6 This is particularly true for Europe, which has recently completed its own con-
solidation of the European human rights tribunals into a permanent European Court
of Human Rights. See supra note 36 (describing how the ECHR and the European
Commission merged).
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tures of a consolidated tribunal that some observers view as advantages
over the existing decentralized system are seen by others as serious
disadvantages. For example, it is debatable whether a single tribunal
will actually enhance, rather than diminish, the jurists' expertise to
address the enormous range of human rights issues in a comprehen-
sive way. This question is of particular concern to those parties cham-
pioning historically underrepresented human rights perspectives such
as children's rights, gender discrimination, and economic, social, and
cultural rights. Such parties might fear that centralization would privi-
lege a dominant interpretive position that marginalizes these issues.ms
In addition, amending the existing treaty system raises the disquieting
prospect that some States would use the opportunity to press for a
"least common denominator" approach. This approach would favor
adopting for the new tribunal the least rights-protective petition pro-
cedures found among the six existing treaty bodies.ns
Taken together, these cautionary concerns suggest that a single
tribunal is not desirable as a short-term reform strategy, and that a
more prudent approach would permit the existing decentralized sys-
tem to mature further before implementing such a proposal. During
this interim period, however, other reforms should actively be pur-
sued, including streamlining existing procedures and improving co-
ordination among the U.N. treaty bodies and their regional neigh-
bors.5  These reforms should enhance and formalize channels of
362 See Philip Alston, Effective Implementation of International Instruments on Human
Rights, Including Reporting Obligations Under International Instruments on Human Rights,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 109, 1 182, U.N. Doc. A/44/668 (1989) [herein-
after 1989Alston Report] (noting that some parties argue that the consolidation process
may cause underrepresented human rights perspectives to be glossed over); cf. Andrew
Byrnes & Jane Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedure for
the Women's Convention?, 21 BROOK J. INT'LL. 679, 778 (1996) (defending the creation
of the optional petition procedure for CEDAW against the claim that the procedure
will produce "normative inconsistency" on the ground that existing treaty bodies do
not adequately address women's human rights issues); Elizabeth Evatt, The Right to In-
dividual Petition: Assessing Its Operation Before the Human Rights Committee and Its Future
Application to the Women's Convention on Discrimination, in THE AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 89TH ANNUAL MEETING: STRUCTURES OF WORLD ORDER 227, 230
(Apr. 5-8, 1995) (defending the new petition procedure on the basis of the superior
.expertise" of CEDAW and its "deeper understanding of how discrimination against
women works in practice" compared to other treaty bodies).
m See 1989 Alston Report, supra note 362, 1 183 (arguing that any changes might, in
practice, diminish the effectiveness of already existing approaches); see also HUMAN
RIGHTS LAw-MAKING, supra note 13, at 243 (suggesting that "over-zealous efforts to ra-
tionalize the existing multiplicity of procedures might cause the most favourable pro-
cedures to be brought into line with the less far-reaching ones").
Over the last decade, the U.N. has given serious consideration to reforming the
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communication among jurists to increase efficiency and promote an
exchange of views over shared human rights standards.36 For exam-
ple, States might adopt a procedure for jurists and their secretariat
staffs to share information concerning petitions submitted simultane-
ously to more than one tribunal. They might also permit two or more
tribunals to entertain petitions together in cases where the need for
concurrent, rather than successive, review is exceptionally pressing.W
existing human rights system. In three reports published in 1989, 1993, and 1996,
human rights expert Philip Alston conducted detailed studies of the need for reform.
His proposals include: (1) urging States to increase significantly the material and fi-
nancial resources needed to support the treaty bodies in their work, including a push
to ratify amendments that will improve funding sources for several treaty bodies; (2)
overhauling the reporting system to adopt a system of consolidated or thematic report-
ing-, (3) imposing a moratorium on the creation of new supervisory bodies to review
compliance with new treaties and entrusting their functions to existing treaty bodies;
and (4) formalizing information exchanges among existing treaty bodies, regional tri-
bunals, and specialized U.N. agencies. See 1996Alston Report, supra note 2, [[ 85-101;
1993 Alston Report supra note 38,11207-54.
According to Professor Alston, proposals to consolidate the six existing U.N. treaty
bodies into one or two tribunals or review bodies, see UN Human Rights Regime, supra
note 240, at 483 (arguing that the six committees of the U.N. treaty body system
should be consolidated into two bodies) (remarks by Thomas Buergenthal, George
Washington University National Law Center); Lillich, supra note 153, at 475 (discuss-
ing the establishment of an International Court of Human Rights); Mutua, supra note
228, at 359-60 (suggesting the establishment of an African Human Rights Court and an
African Human Rights Commission), are still in the early stages of study. See 1996Al-
ston Repor, supra note 2, 1 94 (questioning whether "political will" exists to consolidate
treaty bodies, but suggesting creation of a small expert group to study the issue).
Thus, even if, as ProfessorAlston predicts, the U.N. undertakes "radical changes of one
type or another within less than a decade," id. 1 80, such changes are unlikely to in-
clude creating a single U.N.-based human rights tribunal that would eliminate all op-
portunities for forum shopping.
In 1993, Professor Alston proposed four approaches to enhance normative con-
sistency in the jurisprudence of U.N. and regional tribunals. These included: (1)
drafting "a programme of action designed solely to ensure that the United Nations
treaty bodies and the relevant regional bodies are kept reasonably well informed of
one another's activities;" (2) asking the U.N. Secretary General "to strengthen ex-
changes between the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations
dealing with human rights;" (3) convening regular meetings for detailed briefings be-
tween representatives of the U.N. treaty bodies and their regional counterparts; and
(4) developing sophisticated legal databases to permit jurists on different bodies to
consult each other'sjurisprudence. 1993 Alston Repor4 supra note 38, 11 252-54. With
respect to Alston's last proposal, the availability of human rights resources on the
Internet through both official and unofficial sources has increased enormously since
1993, further faciitatingjurists' ability to consult each other's case law. See, e.g., United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Treaty Bodies Database (visited Oct. 26,
1999) <http://www.unhchr.ch> (providing numerous documents relating to the U.N.
and human rights, including decisions of human rights tribunals); University of Minne-
sota Human Rights Libray (visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://www.umn.edu/humanrts>
(providing access to U.N. and regional human rights documents).
See supra Part IV.B.2 (advocating such an approach to address unique concerns
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To the extent that proposals for a single human rights tribunal are
designed to prevent "normative inconsistency" in a decentralized sys-
tem composed of multiple tribunals with overlapping jurisdictions,
the case law discussed in this Article demonstrates thatjurists are fully
capable of consulting each other's decisions and engaging in a dia-
logue about common legal questions. The threat to the "credibility
and integrity" of human rights tribunals that arguably arises from a
lack of normative consistency can only occur ifjurists fail to engage in
this dialogue and instead permit unthinking divergences or conflicts
to emerge in their case law. 67
The value of forum shopping, and successive petition forum
shopping in particular, lies in reducing the chances of such inadver-
tent divergences and conflicts by providing jurists with a structured
setting in which to communicate with each other about common legal
questions. When the same factual allegations are submitted before
two different tribunals consecutively, the second set of jurists cannot
ignore the fact that another tribunal is wrestling with issues that they
too must consider in their own treaty regimes. In exercising their dis-
cretion to decide whether to dismiss the petition or hear it on the
merits, these jurists can benefit enormously from the first tribunal's
reasoning and conclusions. The second tribunal can use them either
to confirm similarities in the two treaties, or as a point of departure
from which to justify a divergent approach based on the differing
texts, structures, or objectives of the two agreements.m By adopting
an openly deliberative approach and candidly weighing the persuasive
value of decisions from outside their own treaty regime, jurists can
fashion a forum shopping policy that not only does justice between
the parties, but also builds a more fully informed and coherent hu-
man rights jurisprudence.36 9
Understanding the qualified virtues of forum shopping also sug-
raised by successive petition forum shopping by death row defendants in several Car-
ibbean nations).
367 The quoted language is from the 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, 1 241-42.
See supra Part III.D.1 (discussing the case for coordination and dialogue among
human rights tribunals); see also 1993 Alston Report, supra note 38, 251 (arguing that
jurists must "justify differences of approach and interpretation when they are deemed
necessary").
m' See id. 1 248 (arguing that the jurisprudence of the various treaty systems is
readily available to each of the bodies to contribute to the continued development of a
better and more sophisticated international human rights jurisprudence); cf. Henry G.
Schermers, Adaptation of the 11th Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, 20
EuR. L. REv. 559, 560 (1995) (praising the "mutual criticism" between European Court
and Commission which produced improved decision-making).
FORUM SHOPPING
gests a way to implement more comprehensive structural reforms as
the petition system matures. For example, before supplanting the ex-
isting system with a single human rights court, States could begin to
chip away at the disaggregated nature of the petition system by grant-
ing existing tribunals jurisdiction to review claims arising under mul-
370tiple human rights treaties. Jurists would thus have an express man-
date to consult the case law of their fellow tribunals and to promote
convergence of norms. Such cross-treaty jurisdiction would also allow
petitioners to raise all of their allegations before a single tribunal,
mooting the need for forum shopping in many cases.
Alternatively, States might create a new conflicts tribunal for the
limited purpose of resolving diverging or conflicting standards among
existing tribunals. At least initially, the tribunal'sjurisdiction could be
confined to appeals from cases where the rulings of two or more tri-
bunals were inconsistent or divergent. If the conflicts tribunal proved
adept at resolving these inconsistencies, States could then grant it a
wider jurisdiction to function as the principal arbiter of global and re-
gional human rights disputes.
CONCLUSION
The proposals I have developed in this Article are motivated by a
re-envisioning of the relationship among the global and regional
courts, tribunals, and review bodies that consider human rights peti-
tions by individuals. The traditional analysis of the petition system
views these entities as discrete and having little or no formal relation-
ship to each other. According to this view, each set of human rights
jurists acts essentially in isolation, interpreting the text of its founding
treaty without referring to identical or analogous rights and freedoms
protected by other human rights agreements. Any conflicts or diver-
gences between the tribunals' case law over such shared legal norms is
an accidental by-product of the litigation process, not the result of a
deliberate decision to consider and reject the interpretation ex-
pounded by fellowjurists. Under this conception of human rights ad-
judication, permitting individuals to file a claim with more than one
tribunal increases the possibility for normative schisms across the trea-
ties' overlapping substantive standards and thus destabilizes the peti-
tion system.
This isolationist stance has been undermined by an increasing
37o See supra note 228 and accompanying text (noting that Inter-American and pro-
posed African tribunals have limitedjurisdiction to hear such cases).
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number of instances in which litigants have raised identical legal
claims before different tribunals. Both individuals and States now
regularly request that one human rights tribunal follow or distinguish
the reasoning of prior decisions by another tribunal, and jurists are
beginning to consider these decisions as persuasive precedents. In
this environment, the corpus of case law generated by international
human rights litigation should be viewed not as a series of disjoined
decisions, but as a shared and ongoing enterprise in which jurists draw
upon each other's experiences to formulate a harmonious, though
not necessarily uniform, set of human rights standards. Seen from
this perspective, permitting aggrieved individuals a limited opportu-
nity to forum shop for a favorable human rights ruling enhances this
common endeavor. Such limited forum shopping provides opportu-
nities for jurists to engage in an extended dialogue over the content
of human rights norms, to eschew unthinking conflicts or divergence
of those norms, and, where such conflicts or divergence are unavoid-
able, to cogently identify the justifications for them so that treaty revi-
sions can be considered by interested participants and observers after
a full ventilation of the issues.
